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does not render it inadequate. Carnes [ v. Crawford, 246 Ga. 677, 678 (272 S.E.2d 690) (1980)].” R. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENTS See also PROBATION – MODIFICATION OF PROBATION, and SENTENCING – CORRECTION, below Rooney v. State, 318 Ga.App. 385, 734 S.E.2d 104 (November 7, 2012). Appeal from denial of motion to modify sentence dismissed. Defendant pled guilty in 1995; his out-of-time appeal was final in 2001. Defendant has filed numerous other appeals since, but those appeals couldn’t extend the time for the trial court to modify his sentence. “‘Pursuant to OCGA § 17–10–1(f), a court may correct or reduce a sentence during the year after its imposition, or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal, [fn] whichever is later. Once this statutory period expires, a trial court may only modify a void sentence. A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow. To support a motion for sentence modification filed outside the statutory time period, therefore, a defendant must affirmatively demonstrate that the sentence imposes punishment not allowed by law. Moreover, a direct appeal does not lie from the denial of such motion unless it raises a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact, void.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Frazier v. State, 302 Ga.App. 346, 348, 691 S.E.2d 247 (2010). … The fact that Rooney filed an appeal in 2011 from which the trial court received a remittitur on September 2, 2011, does not extend the time for filing a motion to modify his sentence because the 2011 appeal did not involve the affirmance of the judgment of his conviction as required by OCGA § 17–10–1(f). See Reynolds v. State, 272 Ga.App. 91, 94(1), 611 S.E.2d 750 (2005) (motion to set aside sentence that was not filed in the term in which the sentence was entered, within a year of the date upon which sentence was imposed, nor ‘within 120 days of the trial court's receipt of a direct-appeal remittitur’ was untimely). To hold otherwise would result in the indefinite extension of time within which a trial court may modify a sentence, something not contemplated by the statute. Thus, the trial court properly denied Rooney's motion to modify.” Accord, Jackson v. State , 323 Ga.App. 602, 742 S.E.2d 519 (May 2, 2013) (motion to modify and vacate sentence, made within 120 days of remittitur from direct appeal, was timely); Williams v. State , 331 Ga.App. 46, 769 S.E.2d 760 (March 6, 2015) (motion to modify sentence, filed five years after entry of guilty plea, was untimely). Grady v. State, 311 Ga.App. 620, 716 S.E.2d 747 (September 8, 2011). Six months after his guilty plea to cocaine trafficking and related offenses, defendant filed a motion to modify sentence. Held, motion was proper pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-1(f), which allows trial court to modify sentence within one year of sentencing. Motion couldn’t be used, however, to challenge underlying plea or conviction. “Notwithstanding [defendant’s] contentions, ‘the authority granted to trial courts by OCGA § 17–10–1(f) to modify sentences ... does not, on its face, include the power to vacate the conviction on which the sentence is based.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Ellison v. State, 283 Ga. 461 (660 S.E.2d 373) (2008).” McGruder v. State, 307 Ga.App. 379, 705 S.E.2d 175 (October 15, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motions to withdraw pleas and motion to modify sentence, filed eight years after plea entry; sentence was not void because court amended it outside defendant’s presence, to reflect that the 15 years to serve consisted of ten years on the armed robbery charge and five years on the firearms charge. Based on Robertson v. State, 280 Ga. 885, 886 (635 S.E.2d 138) (2006) (entry of mandatory sentence on remand properly done outside defendant’s presence). “We hold that the court's resentencing here was purely ministerial and therefore could be performed in McGruder's absence. See id. Moreover, there could be no harm because the amended sentence is the same as McGruder's original sentence.” Barlow v. State, 279 Ga. 870, 621 S.E.2d 438 (October 24, 2005). “The trial court … has the inherent power during the same term of court in which the judgment was rendered to revise, correct, revoke, modify or vacate the judgment, even upon its own motion. Bagley v. Robertson, 265 Ga. 144, 146 (454 S.E.2d 478) (1995); Bank of Cumming v. Moseley, 243 Ga. 858 (257 S.E.2d 278) (1979). However, such authority generally does not extend beyond the same term of court, unless a motion to modify, or vacate, or the like was filed within the same term of court. Tanaka v. Pecqueur, 268 Ga.App. 380 (601 S.E.2d 830) (2004). See also Carswell v. Shannon, 209 Ga. 596, 598- 599(2) (74 S.E.2d 850) (1953).” Accord, McGruder v. State , 307 Ga.App. 379, 705 S.E.2d 175 (October 15, 2010) (trial court properly denied motion to modify sentence, filed over eight years after entry of his guilty pleas). Trial court retains power after term, however, to clarify terms of a judgment – see Procedure – Clarifying Orders, below. Patel v. State, 247 Ga.App. 815, 545 S.E.2d 383 (February 5, 2001). Trial court erred in ruling that it had no discretion to modify defendant’s sentences for following too closely, leaving scene of accident, and reckless driving, but correctly ruled that it could not modify DUI sentence. As to most misdemeanors, OCGA § 17-10-3(b) provides, “The sentencing courts shall retain jurisdiction to amend, modify, alter, suspend, or probate sentences under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of [OCGA § 17-10-3] at any time….” “But such discretion does not extend to the sentence for