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driving under the influence . Sentences for driving under the influence are otherwise provided for by OCGA § 40-6- 391(c).” This appears to be an erroneous reference to 40-6-391(f), which says “The provisions of Code Section 17-10- 3… shall not apply to any person convicted of violating any provision of this Code section.” Vacated and remanded for consideration of defendant’s motion for modification of sentences. S. MOOTNESS Jayko v. State, 335 Ga.App. 684, 782 S.E.2d 788 (February 11, 2016). Following guilty pleas to forgery and related offenses, defendant’s appeal challenging conditions of probation (not the underlying convictions) dismissed as moot where the sentence expired before reaching the appeals court. “In her brief, Jayko asserts that during the sentencing hearing, the judge orally imposed as a condition of her probation a prohibition on living with someone of the opposite sex to whom she was neither married nor related.” “[O]ur precedent and the precedent of the Supreme Court of Georgia … mandates dismissal of moot cases absent an applicable exception. Mootness is ‘a jurisdictional matter.’ Collins v. Lombard Corp., 270 Ga. 120, 122–23(3), 508 S.E.2d 653 (1998). When the remedy sought in litigation no longer benefits the party seeking it, the case is moot and ‘must be dismissed.’ Roberts v. Deal, 290 Ga. 705, 707(1), 723 S.E.2d 901 (2012); see also Baca v. Baca, 256 Ga.App. 514, 515–16(1), 568 S.E.2d 746 (2002) (‘mootness is a mandatory ground for dismissal’).” Distinguishing cases holding that defendant may still challenge a conviction though the sentence has been fully served, such as Medina v. State , 312 Ga.App. 399, 400 n. 3, 718 S.E.2d 323 (2011). “It has long been our precedent that we have jurisdiction to decide challenges to convictions brought by defendants who have completed their sentences, so that they ‘may seek to redress legal grievances flowing from allegedly void convictions and thereby hope to escape lifelong adverse collateral consequences.’ Chaplin v. State, 141 Ga.App. 788, 790(1), 234 S.E.2d 330 (1977) (quoting Parris v. State, 232 Ga. 687, 691, 208 S.E.2d 493 (1974)). In other words, the appellant may still receive a remedy (relief from ‘lifelong adverse collateral consequences’), and thus those cases are not moot. Rodriguez–Martinez v. State, 243 Ga.App. 409, 410(1), 533 S.E.2d 443 (2000) (‘On account of these collateral consequences, the case is not moot.’) (citation omitted).” T. NEW TRIAL 1. EVIDENCE Muthu v. State, A16A0293, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1635091 (April 26, 2016). DUI and related convictions affirmed; on motion for new trial, trial court properly declined to consider juror’s affidavit and testimony that the verdict was not unanimous. “‘Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror shall not testify by affidavit or otherwise nor shall a juror’s statements be received in evidence as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the jury deliberations or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith; provided, however, that a juror may testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the juror’s attention, whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form.’ OCGA § 24–6–606(b). Here, neither Muthu nor [juror] P.H.’s affidavit alleged that any extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to P.H.’s attention, that any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon P.H., or that there was an error in entering the verdict on the verdict form. Instead P.H.’s affidavit addressed the deliberations amongst the jurors. This evidence is explicitly excluded by the plain language of OCGA § 24–6–606(b).” 2. FILING, HEARING AND PROCEDURE Hill-Blount v. State, A16A0758, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1314700 (April 5, 2016). Appeal dismissed following convictions for armed robbery and related offenses. Appeal was filed following denial of motion for new trial, but motion for new trial was filed more than 30 days following conviction, and “an untimely motion for a new trial is void and does not extend the time for filing an appeal, Wicks v. State, 277 Ga. 121, 121–122, 587 S.E.2d 21 (2003). To be timely, a motion for a new trial must be made ‘within 30 days of the entry of the judgment on the verdict.’ OCGA § 5–5–40(a). A defendant may obtain permission from the trial court to file an out-of-time motion for a new trial, the denial of which may be appealed directly. See Washington v. State, 276 Ga. 655, 656(1), 581 S.E.2d 518 (2003). Here, however, the record does not show that Hill–Blount sought permission to file an out-of-time motion.” State v. Cash, 298 Ga. 90, 779 S.E.2d 603 (November 16, 2015). Following malice murder and related convictions, no error in granting new trial on general grounds. 1. No prohibition against trial court hearing evidence at new trial hearing before ruling on motion on general grounds. Evidence presented here related to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance. “[T]he General Assembly has provided grounds for motions for new trial that do not require new