☢ test - Í

693(1) (194 S.E.2d 87) (1972). Although Gomez–Oliva subsequently filed an amended motion for new trial, ‘[n]o amendment could be filed to such void motion.’ Harrison, supra, 229 Ga. at 693(1).” “Because Gomez–Oliva filed his notice of appeal within 30 days after the trial court denied his motion, [fn: ‘ [A]n order dismissing [a premature] motion for new trial is considered a disposition of the motion pursuant to OCGA § 5–6–38(a), and it commences the running of the 30–day period for filing an appeal.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Craig v. Holsey, 264 Ga.App. 344, 345(1) (590 S.E.2d 742) (2003). ] Gomez–Oliva's appeal is properly before this Court and will be considered on its merits. [fn] See Fairclough [ v. State, 276 Ga. 602, 603(1) (581 S.E.2d 3) (2003)]; Craig, supra, 264 Ga.App. at 345(1).” 2. Ineffective assistance claim raised in premature motion for new trial could still be considered on appeal. “See Sparks v. State, 277 Ga. 72, 73 n.1, 74(3) (586 S.E.2d 645) (2003) (addressing merits of ineffective assistance of counsel claims where defendant had raised such claims in premature motion for new trial); Fairclough, supra, 276 Ga. at 603(1), 605(4) (considering ineffective assistance claims raised in untimely motion for new trial where, prior to denial of that motion, the trial court's grant of out-of-time appeal had rendered untimely motion one that was merely premature). Cf. Clemons v. State, 288 Ga. 445, 446–447(3) (704 S.E.2d 762) (2011) (refusing to consider ineffective assistance claims raised in untimely motion for new trial because after that motion ‘was denied, the subsequent grant of an out-of-time appeal could no longer render the motion merely premature’).” Johnson v. State, 306 Ga.App. 844, 702 S.E.2d 920 (November 17, 2010). In defendant’s family violence battery prosecution, “[t]he trial court erred in dismissing Johnson's motion for new trial on the ground that he was not present at the hearing on the motion. ‘A criminal defendant who is not laboring under the penalty of death has no right to be present during the hearing held upon his motion for new trial.’ (Citations omitted.) Moore v. State, 254 Ga. 525, 531(4)(c) (330 S.E.2d 717) (1985). Accord Rosser v. State, 284 Ga. 335, 336-337(2) (667 S.E.2d 62) (2008) (trial court did not violate defendant's due process rights by denying his request to be present at hearing on motion for new trial); Mantooth v. State, 303 Ga.App. 330, 336-337(2) (693 S.E.2d 587) (2010) (same). Even for those convicted of a felony, the constitutional right of the accused to be present during the course of the trial ‘does not extend to post-verdict procedures such as a motion for new trial.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Mantooth, supra at 336(2). See generally Jack Goger, Daniel's Georgia Criminal Trial Practice, § 17-7 (2009-2010 ed.) (“Generally, the defendant does not have a right to be present at post-verdict procedures such as a motion for a new trial, at which only questions of law, not questions of fact are determined”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). Thus, Johnson did not waive his motion for new trial by his absence; all he waived was his presence at the hearing.” Accord, Barlow (June 24, 2014), above. Mantooth v. State, 303 Ga.App. 330, 693 S.E.2d 587 (April 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for family violence battery and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly declined to have defendant produced from prison for hearing on motion for new trial. “‘In Georgia, the constitutional right of one accused of a felony to be present during the course of his trial does not extend to post-verdict procedures such as a motion for new trial.’ Florescu v. State, 276 Ga.App. 264, 267(1)(c), 623 S.E.2d 147 (2005). Rather, due process affords him the right to be present at such a hearing only ‘if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Wallace v. State, 294 Ga.App. 159, 161(2), 669 S.E.2d 400 (2008). Where the defendant's testimony would do nothing to support his claims of error, then due process does not require his presence. Id. In this case, the trial court asked Mantooth's counsel multiple times to make a proffer showing why Mantooth's testimony was necessary – i.e., to state what facts Mantooth would testify to and how such testimony would support his claims of error. … Given counsel's repeated failure to make the requested proffer, Mantooth cannot claim that the trial court violated his due process rights by hearing the new trial motion without him present. Id.” See also Florescu (November 7, 2005), below. Rosser v. State, 284 Ga. 335, 667 S.E.2d 62 (September 22, 2008). “‘ A criminal defendant who is not laboring under the penalty of death has no right to be present during the hearing held upon his motion for new trial. [Cits.]’ Moore v. State, 254 Ga. 525, 531(4)(c), 330 S.E.2d 717 (1985). In denying [defendant's] request, the trial court found that there were no allegations in the motion for new trial that required [defendant’s] presence and expressly ruled that, should developments at the hearing indicate a need for [defendant’s] testimony, ‘we would do what we had to to bring him and postpone a ruling on the matter.’ A review of the hearing transcript establishes that no such need arose during the proceedings. The trial court did not violate [defendant’s] due process rights by denying his request to be present at the motion for new trial hearing.” See also Florescu (November 7, 2005), below. Range v. State, 289 Ga.App. 727, 658 S.E.2d 245 (February 22, 2008). “‘A defendant has a due process right to a hearing on his motion for a new trial if he requests one, “but the trial court has no duty to initiate such hearing.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wilkins v. State, 220 Ga.App. 516, 518(3) (469 S.E.2d 695) (1996). Rather, ‘the party seeking a hearing must take affirmative steps to request one,’ and failure to do results in a waiver of the right. Id. Here,