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because the record reflects no request by Range for a hearing on his motion for a new trial, the trial court did not err in failing to hold such a hearing.” Accord, Mangrum v. State , 285 Ga. 676, 681 S.E.2d 130 (June 15, 2009). Hood v. State, 282 Ga. 462, 651 S.E.2d 88 (September 24, 2007). Following defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses, 1. t rial court clerk erred in returning defendant’s unsigned pro se motion for new trial. “It is beyond the purview of the clerk to be concerned with the legal viability of a pleading presented to the clerk for filing. See Hughes v. Sikes, 273 Ga. 804(1) (546 S.E.2d 518) (2001) (where clerk returned notice of appeal for supplementation); Gibbs v. Spencer Industries, [244 Ga. 450, 451 (260 S.E.2d 342) (1979)] (where clerk returned answer for supplementation). … The Court of Appeals has suggested that a court ‘should grant leave to comply with the rule as to signature rather than strike the pleading....’ Lee v. Precision Balancing & Machine, Inc., 134 Ga.App. 762, 764 (216 S.E.2d 640) (1975). We believe the uniform superior court rule requiring signatures on all filed documents in civil or criminal matters [USCR 36.4] should be similarly construed. Consequently, the superior court clerk should have filed the unsigned pro se motion for new trial and left to the trial court the determination of the viability of the unsigned motion. [Cits.]” 2. Trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion for new trial, filed with his notice of appeal. “The filing of Hood’s pro se notice of appeal on the same day as the motion for new trial did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction since ‘such divestiture does not become effective during the period of time in which a motion for new trial may be filed. In the event a motion for new trial is timely filed as provided in OCGA § 5-5-40, the effectiveness of the divestiture is then delayed until the motion for new trial is ruled upon and a notice of appeal to the ruling has been filed or the period for appealing the ruling has expired.’ Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Geter, 252 Ga. 196, 197 (312 S.E.2d 309) (1984); Brown v. State, 208 Ga.App. 726 (431 S.E.2d 726) (1993).” Accord, Jones v. State , 309 Ga.App. 149, 709 S.E.2d 593 (April 6, 2011) (trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion for new trial, filed after notice of appeal but otherwise still timely.). Hammond v. State, 282 Ga.App. 478, 638 S.E.2d 893 (November 17, 2006). Trial court properly denied defendant’s post-trial motion to require state’s witness to take a polygraph test, in support of defendant’s motion for new trial. “A trial court is under no obligation to grant a defendant post-trial discovery in the hope that it will lead to the discovery of new evidence. See OCGA § 5-5-23.” Accord, Bharadia v. State , 297 Ga. 567, 774 S.E.2d 90 (June 29, 2015). Florescu v. State, 276 Ga.App. 264, 623 S.E.2d 147 (November 7, 2005). 1. Trial court erred in refusing to consider defendant’s motion for new trial on grounds of defendant’s mental incompetence. Defendant moved for new trial on grounds that he had been incompetent to stand trial and had received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed “to request a psychiatric evaluation prior to or during trial to establish his lack of competence.” Held, since the court would have been required to conduct a hearing if the issue had been raised pre-trial, “ Florescu’s current mental incompetence provides no logical basis to delay a post-conviction proceeding to address whether he was incompetent at trial, whether the trial court should have been on notice of his incompetency and conducted a hearing during trial, or whether his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely raise the competency issue.” 2. “[T]he trial court’s finding that Florescu has a right to be present at the motion for new trial hearing is simply incorrect. In Georgia, the constitutional right of one accused of a felony to be present during the course of his trial does not extend to post-verdict procedures such as a motion for new trial. Drake v. State, 248 Ga. 891, 895(2), 287 S.E.2d 180 (1982); see also Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 75(7), 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982) (unless a defendant is facing the death penalty, "there is no law or constitutional principle which guarantees to [the defendant] the right to be present in court upon the hearing of his motion for a new trial") (citations and punctuation omitted); Backey v. State, 234 Ga.App. 265, 267(4), 506 S.E.2d 435 (1998) (defendant contending he was denied the effective assistance of counsel had no right to be present at hearing on motion for new trial).” Accord, Rosser (September 22, 2008), and Mantooth (April 1, 2010), both above. Menefee v. State, 271 Ga.App. 364, 609 S.E.2d 714 (January 21, 2005). “[T]rial court was authorized to dismiss James Menefee’s motion for new trial without conducting a hearing on the motion, based on Menefee’s failure to secure a transcript of his trial in a timely manner” after he failed to pay for transcript for “[a]bout a month and half.” “Although OCGA § 5-6-48(c) requires an ‘opportunity for hearing’ before a trial court orders an appeal dismissed for an unreasonable and inexcusable delay in filing the transcript, technically no such requirement pertain to motions for new trial.” 3. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE See ATTORNEYS – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, above 4. NEW TRIAL, GENERALLY