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sincerity regarding her impartiality and fairness, we find that the successor judge erred by granting Clements a new trial on the basis of juror bias.” Accord, State v. Hill , 295 Ga. 716, 763 S.E.2d 675 (September 22, 2014) (“the discretion of a successor judge is narrower in scope than that of the judge presiding at trial, and the successor judge's factual rulings are not given the broad deference given to findings by the presiding judge.”). Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 889, 692 S.E.2d 379 (March 29, 2010). In defendant’s capital murder trial, defendant couldn’t raise new issues on motion for new trial by attempting to amend his motion after the original motion had already been denied. “After the trial court denied the motion for new trial, Thompson filed a second amended motion for new trial, which raised this claim that the indictment was fatally defective. However, that amendment was filed after the motion for new trial had already been denied, and, thus, it was untimely. OCGA § 5-5-40(b) (motion for new trial may only be amended before a ruling thereon).” Gaston v. State, 303 Ga.App. 502, 693 S.E.2d 841 (March 16, 2010). After defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking, kidnapping, and related offenses, trial court granted defendant’s motion for new trial, in part based on defendant’s representation that victim didn’t want him to go to jail. The next week, the State filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching statements from the victim indicating her fear of defendant and his continued attempts to contact her despite the court’s order not to do so. Based on these statements, the trial court vacated the grant of new trial. “[T]he trial court had discretion to set aside its order for any meritorious reason. However, the trial court erred to the extent that it based its ruling on consideration of the exhibits attached to the State's motion because Gaston did not have the opportunity to confront and challenge [victim’s] statements.” Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (March 15, 2010). At defendant’s capital murder trial, verdict could not be impeached by affidavits of jurors or investigators who interviewed them after trial, claiming that they misunderstood the law. “[T]he trial court did not err in disregarding the two investigators' affidavits, because ‘“ if a verdict may not be impeached by an affidavit of one or more of the jurors who found it, certainly it cannot be impeached by affidavits from third persons, establishing the utterance by a juror of remarks tending to impeach his verdict.” ’ Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 544 n.11 (3)(a)(iv) (678 S.E.2d 900) (2009) (citation omitted).” State v. Jones, 284 Ga. 302, 667 S.E.2d 76 (September 22, 2008). Trial court erred in granting defendant a new trial on grounds not enumerated in defendant’s motion for new trial, more than 30 days after entry of judgment of conviction. “‘While the court may grant a new trial on its own motion within 30 days from entry of the judgment ( [current OCGA § 5-5-40(h); cit.] ), the judgment here was entered on [July 11, 2007], and the new trial was not granted until [October 31, 2007], which was more than 30 days from entry of judgment after the term had expired. We know of no authority which would allow the court to grant a new trial on an unspecified ground in these circumstances.’ Darby v. Commercial Bank, 135 Ga.App. 462, 463(2), 218 S.E.2d 252 (1975).” Holmes v. State, 284 Ga. 330, 667 S.E.2d 71 (September 22, 2008). “The trial court permitted the State to file a brief opposing defendant's motion for new trial several months after it was due. This was not error. Unless it contravenes a rule of procedure or prejudices a defendant, a trial court has discretion to grant extensions of time to respond to a motion. See Quinn v. State, 234 Ga.App. 360, 362(5), 506 S.E.2d 890 (1998) (motion for extension of time is addressed to sound discretion of trial court).” Allen v. State, 286 Ga.App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583 (July 10, 2007). Trial court properly denied new trial based on discovery that juror had a relative who was a judge in Florida, specializing in narcotics cases, information the juror did not disclose in voir dire. “Trial counsel testified that she would have used a peremptory strike if she had known. In this setting, the Supreme Court has established that to obtain a new trial, ‘ a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. ’ Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 741(44)(3) (386 S.E.2d 316) (1989); see also Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 840(2) (514 S.E.2d 426) (1999). First, Allen has not presented testimony from the juror himself, and Allen’s counsel’s testimony is only hearsay. Second, Allen has not shown that if the juror had given a truthful answer he would have been dismissed for cause, as required.” Austin v. State, 286 Ga.App. 149, 648 S.E.2d 414 (June 6, 2007). Defendant’s contention that his arrest warrants were not supported by sufficient evidence was not an appropriate ground for seeking new trial, where defendant did not seek the suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of his arrest pre-trial. “Pretermitting whether the arrest warrants were valid, a new trial would not be required because the sanction for an unconstitutional arrest is the