☢ test - Í

exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of that arrest. The sanction is not the suppression of the prosecution. Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 333(2) (271 S.E.2d 478) (1980); Ricks v. State, 204 Ga.App. 441, 442(1) (419 S.E.2d 517) (1992). Austin has not identified any evidence obtained as a result of his arrest under these warrants.” Accord, Bruster v. State , 291 Ga.App. 490, 662 S.E.2d 265 (May 12, 2008) (remedy for invalid arrest is suppression of evidence, not suppression of prosecution); Goodman v. State , 313 Ga.App. 290, 717 S.E.2d 496 (October 4, 2011). Banks v. State, 281 Ga. 678, 642 S.E.2d 679 (March 19, 2007). “‘[T]rial courts on motion for new trial are authorized to consider as substantive evidence the information presented by competent affiants in properly-executed affidavits when the affidavit is made on personal knowledge and sets forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.’ Dickens v. State, 280 Ga. 320, 322 (n. 2) (627 S.E.2d 587) (2006).” White v. State, 281 Ga. 276, 637 S.E.2d 645 (November 20, 2006). “Trial counsel did not testify at the hearing on the motion for new trial. However, appellate counsel relied on an affidavit that trial counsel had prepared and filed with the clerk of court, in which trial counsel stated that he should have made certain objections that he did not make. This Court has concluded that ‘trial courts on motion for new trial are authorized to consider as substantive evidence the information presented by competent affiants in properly-executed affidavits when the affidavit is made on personal knowledge and sets forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.’ Dickens v. State, 280 Ga. 320, 322 (n. 2) (627 S.E.2d 587) (2006). The State nonetheless contends that the affidavit was never introduced as an exhibit at the hearing and was not properly placed before the trial court. Pretermitting any question of whether the affidavit was properly before the court, the affidavit contends, in part, that certain events occurred that are not reflected in the record. To the extent that White’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pertains to those alleged events, the affidavit does not serve to supplement the record, see OCGA § 5-6-41(f), and its factual contentions do not present any issue for review. See Forehand v. State, 267 Ga. 254, 255(2) (477 S.E.2d 560) (1996); Henderson v. Lewis, 128 Ga.App. 28(1) (195 S.E.2d 289) (1973).” Morales v. State, 281 Ga.App. 18, 635 S.E.2d 325 (August 8, 2006). “The objection to the evidence on the basis of an invalid search warrant, raised for the first time in the motion for new trial, was too late. Chesser v. State, 228 Ga.App. 164, 165(1)(a) (491 S.E.2d 213) (1997) (‘it is too late to pose for the first time in a motion for new trial an original objection to evidence admitted at trial or to modify or expand the scope of an objection made at trial’). See Sanders v. State, 134 Ga.App. 825, 826(1) (216 S.E.2d 371) (1975) (‘[a]n issue raised as a basis for a motion for a new trial which was not asserted during the trial, cannot be asserted on appeal as a basis for reversal’).” Dickens v. State, 280 Ga. 320, 627 S.E.2d 587 (March 13, 2006). Physical precedent only ; three justices concur specially, one concurs in judgment only. At hearing on motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, defense counsel may testify to what an uncalled witness would have said to establish whether counsel’s performance was deficient – that is, whether the decision to call the witness or not was reasonable. “However, a defendant cannot use defense counsel’s testimony about what an uncalled witness had been expected to say in order to establish the truth of that uncalled witness’s testimony . Defense counsel’s testimony in that regard is hearsay evidence, Dewberry v. State, 271 Ga. 624(2) (523 S.E.2d 26) (1999); Prather v. State, 259 Ga.App. 441(4) (576 S.E.2d 904) (2003); see also Fuller v. State, 278 Ga. 812(2)(d) (607 S.E.2d 581) (2005) (counsel’s testimony cannot be used to prove that witness had prior felony); and hearsay, of course, has no probative value. Bridges v. State, 279 Ga. 351 n. 12 (613 S.E.2d 621) (2005). Hearsay evidence cannot be used either under the first Strickland prong to rebut the reasonableness of trial counsel’s tactical decision or under the second Strickland prong to establish that the defense was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Either the uncalled witness must testify or the defendant must introduce a legally recognized substitute for the uncalled witness’s testimony.” Such a substitute may include an affidavit by the witness in question, pursuant to OCGA § 24-10-40. Benham, joined by Carley and Hines, concurs specially, advocating for proffers of witness testimony in this context. Majority disagrees: “Even in the context of an offer of proof, ..., hearsay is not admissible through the testimony of counsel. Thus, the trial court may properly refuse counsel’s offer of proof where there has been no showing that the excluded testimony was from a witness who had either been properly subpoenaed or else prevented by the State from being present at trial and where counsel could proffer only what counsel thought the witness would say. Castell v. State, 252 Ga. 418(2) (314 S.E.2d 210) (1984).” Accord, Brigman v. State , 282 Ga.App. 481, 639 S.E.2d 259 (November 16, 2006); Banks (March 19, 2007), above. Collins v. State, 266 Ga.App. 871, 601 S.E.2d 111 (April 8, 2004). “‘ The State cannot concede error where there is none,’” quoting Brown v. State , 264 Ga. 803, 807 450 S.E.2d 821 (1994) (Carley, J., concurring specially). Decided in context of appeal; equally applicable on motion for new trial?