☢ test - Í

that Hill was there as well. Furthermore, as noted, a witness list naming Shaneka and her 2001statement to police were provided to Hill pre-trial; therefore, Hill had ample opportunity to secure her as a witness.” Sutton v. State, 295 Ga. 350, 759 S.E.2d 846 (June 16, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. GBI firearms examiner testified for State; later, she resigned from the GBI “following an investigation which demonstrated that she intentionally fabricated firearms data in another, unrelated case.” “A new trial will not be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence where, as here, the only effect of the evidence would be to impeach the credibility of a witness. Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 491 (271 S.E.2d 792) (1980); Smith v. State, 222 Ga.App. 366, 371(6) (474 S.E.2d 272) (1996).” State v. Simmons, 321 Ga.App. 688, 742 S.E.2d 505 (May 1, 2013). Following armed robbery convictions, trial court properly granted new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Defendant Simmons presented alibi witnesses and attempted to obtain cell phone records from his cell provider, but the cell provider claimed not to keep those records on prepaid phones like his. As the jury was deliberating, however, the company notified defense counsel that it had found the records. The trial court declined to grant a mistrial and the jury convicted. On motion for new trial, the defense presented the records and a witness from the phone company, supporting the alibi defense (though not making defendant’s participation in the robberies impossible). Held, no abuse of discretion in granting motion for new trial; trial court could find the new evidence “material” even though it didn’t rule out defendant’s participation in the crimes and even though defendant was able to present other evidence at trial to support his alibi defense. “‘[W]hether evidence is cumulative depends not only on whether it tends to establish the same fact, but it may depend on whether the new evidence is of the same or different grade.’ Brown v. State, 264 Ga. 803, 806(3), 450 S.E.2d 821 (1994) (punctuation omitted). And it is only when newly discovered evidence ‘either relates to a particular material issue concerning which no witness has previously testified, or is of a higher and different grade from that previously had on the same material point, that it will ordinarily be taken outside the definition of cumulative evidence.’ Id. (emphasis supplied) (punctuation omitted); see Bell [ v. State, 227 Ga. 800, 806-807(3), 183 S.E.2d 357 (1971)]; Humphrey [ v. State, 207 Ga.App. 472, 475(1), 428 S.E.2d 362 (1993)]. And here, Simmons's mobile-phone records are not merely cumulative of the testimony provided by the witnesses who stated that he was at the nightclub in East Point on the night that Arnold and Barnes were robbed in Midtown. Indeed, the records constitute a higher grade of evidence that corroborates that testimony and provides independent and objective support for Simmons's claim that he was at the nightclub in East Point at the time the robbery was committed in another part of town. See Bell, 227 Ga. at 807(3), 183 S.E.2d 357 (holding that newly discovered evidence that strengthened defendant's alibi was not cumulative because it was of a different grade); Humphrey, 207 Ga.App. at 475(1), 428 S.E.2d 362 (holding that testimony of new witness corroborating defendant's claim that victim consented to sex was not cumulative).” Charleston v. State, 292 Ga. 678, 743 S.E.2d 1 (March 25, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to new trial based on newly discovered evidence when co-defendant, at sentencing following his separate trial, said, “‘[Appellant] did not do it. I did it. He didn't know nothing were going to go down like that.’ Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for new trial based on this allegedly ‘newly discovered evidence.’ To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must meet six requirements, and the failure to satisfy even one means that the motion for new trial must be denied. See Drane v. State, 291 Ga. 298, 300 (728 S.E.2d 679) (2012). At a minimum, Appellant failed to satisfy the requirement that ‘“the affidavit of the witness [providing the allegedly new evidence] should be procured or its absence accounted for.”’ Id. (citation omitted). Walker's statement at his sentencing was not sworn, and Appellant did not procure an affidavit from Walker, call him as a witness at the motion for new trial hearing, or account for the inability to provide the required sworn statement. See Davis v. State, 283 Ga. 438, 443 (660 S.E.2d 354) (2008) (holding that an unsworn affidavit submitted to support a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence must be disregarded).” Drane v. State, 291 Ga. 298, 728 S.E.2d 679 (June 25, 2012). Following defendant’s convictions for murder and aggravated battery, trial court properly denied extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence; defendant failed to meet “materiality” and “due diligence” prongs of the Timberlake test. Materiality. Proffered evidence that co-defendant Willis later claimed to have committed the offense alone wasn’t likely produce different result, given significant evidence at trial showing defendant’s own involvement, as well as evidence that Drane and Willis “had been very close friends in the past and that the two had agreed before their apprehension by authorities that they would work in concert to protect one another from prosecution.”). Due diligence. Willis’s lawyer wouldn’t let him testify at Drane’s trial because Willis’s own charges were still pending. Assuming, then, that Willis’s testimony wasn’t available until after his own trial, Drane fails to show here why he failed to raise the issue until “more than 17