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years since Willis’ trial.” Ellis v. State, 316 Ga.App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (June 25, 2012). Rape and related convictions affirmed; at motion for new trial hearing, trial court properly excluded evidence that would have been merely impeaching of victim’s testimony, to wit: evidence of alleged prior false accusations of sexual abuse of her daughter. To the extent the evidence went to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “the trial court was entitled to believe counsel's testimony that Ellis never shared with him any information about the victim's prior false allegations of sexual misconduct. [Cit.] Thus, Ellis could not show that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to investigate a matter of which he was unaware at the time. Consequently, any error in excluding testimony about the matter at the motion for new trial hearing was harmless.” Chance v. State, 291 Ga. 241, 728 S.E.2d 635 (June 18, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied new trial based on alleged newly-discovered evidence. “Appellant claims that a new trial is required because of newly discovered evidence in the form of testimony by Joy Bradham which was not available to defense counsel before trial and would have changed the outcome of this case. At the motion for new trial hearing, Ms. Bradham testified that Appellant's co-indictee Raymond Trey Sapp confessed to her on more than one occasion that he shot the victim to protect Appellant from the victim pulling a gun. … Ms. Bradham's testimony ‘regarding [Sapp's] post-trial statement is merely impeaching of [his] testimony and does not establish as fact that [it] was knowingly and wilfully false.’ Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352(2) (541 S.E.2d 373) (2001). Moreover, Ms. Bradham's testimony was not so material that it would probably produce a different verdict, as Sapp's statement still would have placed Appellant at the scene of the crime, attempting to complete a purchase of cocaine, ‘making him equally guilty of felony murder.’ Glenn v. State, 255 Ga. 533, 536(4) (340 S.E.2d 609) (1986).” Seabrook v. State, 315 Ga.App. 801, 728 S.E.2d 322 (May 7, 2012). Trial court properly dismissed defendant’s petition for writ of coram nobis (“an obsolete writ, … the ancestor of an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence”), filed 15 years after his guilty pleas to aggravated assault and related offenses. “[T]he prerequisites for issuing ‘a writ of error coram nobis or for granting an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence appear to be identical. Before a court authorizes either, it is generally required that the moving or petitioning party base the pleading on facts which are not part of the record and which could not by due diligence have been discovered at the time of the trial.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Moss v. State, 255 Ga.App. 107, 108 (564 S.E.2d 516) (2002). Here, Seabrook failed to point to any newly discovered evidence that would have authorized the trial court to grant the writ. Rather, his claims regarding the validity of his plea, his attorney's alleged ineffectiveness in the plea process, and his actual innocence ‘all deal with evidence which was known to [Seabrook] ... at the time he entered his plea of guilty. Thus, [Seabrook] could not properly challenge his plea under a writ of error coram norbis.’ (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Id.” In any event untimely, as filed outside term of court at which plea entered. Accord, Jones v. State , 322 Ga.App. 269, 745 S.E.2d 1 (June 17, 2013). Wheeler v. State, 290 Ga. 817, 725 S.E.2d 580 (March 23, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for new trial based on alleged “newly discovered evidence.” Evidence here was expert testimony asserting a new theory regarding DNA evidence submitted by State. “Contrary to Wheeler's assertions, this was not ‘newly discovered evidence’ that would justify the grant of a new trial at all, but merely a new expert asserting an alternative theory about the case based on the same DNA evidence that had always been available to Wheeler for his review.” Nations v. State, 290 Ga. 39, 717 S.E.2d 634 (November 7, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no due process or stastutory violation based on alleged perjured testimony used to garner convictions. 1. Statutory provision. “OCGA § 17–1–4 [fn] mandates the setting aside of a verdict or judgment obtained or entered as a result of perjury ‘when the judgment could not have been obtained without the perjured evidence and the perjurer has been duly convicted thereof.’ John v. State, 282 Ga. 792, 795(4) (653 S.E.2d 435) (2007). There is no showing that any perjury actually occurred or that [witness] Clifton was ever charged with or convicted of perjury. Id. Even assuming arguendo that Clifton perjured himself on the stand, it cannot be said that the guilty verdicts and consequent judgments could not have been obtained without such evidence inasmuch as there was testimony from other witnesses at the crime scene portraying Nations's unjustified shooting of [victim] Jason. Id.” At motion for new trial hearing, defense presented recording of Clifton allegedly telling a friend “that he had lied at Nations's trial by testifying that he had no knowledge of Jason threatening anyone prior to the fatal event.” 2. Due process. “Nor is there any basis for Nations's claim of a due process violation. This is not a situation in which the prosecution knew or should have known about a witness's untruthful testimony prior to trial or circumstances which resulted in the corruption of the essential truth-seeking