☢ test - Í

function of the trial process. Compare Fugitt v. State, 251 Ga. 451, 453(1) (307 S.E.2d 471) (1983); Williams v. State, 250 Ga. 463 (298 S.E.2d 492) (1983).” Smith v. State, 309 Ga.App. 241, 709 S.E.2d 823 (March 17, 2011). Conviction for aggravated assault affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. At motion hearing, defendant’s lifelong friend testified that he saw the shooting, but that he never told defendant and defendant never asked him about it in the three years between the shooting and trial. “Smith cannot show that he exercised due diligence in obtaining Riley's testimony. Riley testified that he was a lifelong friend whom Smith met every morning at the store for coffee. Riley testified that Smith knew he would be at the store that day, yet for three years Smith never asked Riley about the shooting and never gave his attorney Riley's name as a potential witness. ‘Given [Smith's] failure to show due diligence, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.’ (Citation omitted.) Woodard v. State, 289 Ga.App. 650, 649 (658 S.E.2d 129) (2008).” Delgiudice v. State, 308 Ga.App. 397, 707 S.E.2d 603 (March 14, 2011). Convictions for kidnapping with bodily injury and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for new trial. Subsequent dismissal of pending charges against State’s witness didn’t constitute ‘newly discovered evidence,’ as it was merely impeaching in nature. Brinson v. State, 288 Ga. 435, 704 S.E.2d 756 (January 10, 2011). Defendant’s murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence – a restaurant receipt which bolstered his testimony as to his whereabouts earlier in the evening of the murder. “Because the shooting occurred around 10:30 p.m., the fact that Brinson was at a restaurant around 8:30 p.m. and returned to his apartment before 9:00 p.m. does not, as the trial court found, ‘impact whether he may have left again and traveled to the scene of the shooting’ in time to commit the crimes. The evidence therefore is not so material that it would probably produce a different result. Moreover, the evidence is cumulative of Brinson's and his girlfriend's testimony at trial.” Taylor v. State, 307 Ga.App. 487, 705 S.E.2d 295 (December 17, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; co-defendant’s recanted testimony didn’t amount to newly discovered evidence “because it was cumulative of other evidence offered at Taylor's trial.” Hopson v. State, 307 Ga.App. 49, 703 S.E.2d 719 (November 23, 2010). Convictions for rape, kidnapping, aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; former prosecutor’s statement that he “knew the victim and another prosecution witness were lying in their trial testimony” didn’t constitute “newly discovered evidence,” but a mere expression of opinion which a) wasn’t admissible at trial, and b) was merely impeaching of trial witness testimony. Statement was made as former prosecutor was trying to get defendant to retain him (via another attorney) for post- conviction representation. “Additionally, as the trial court noted, the facts that supported [prosecutor's] opinion that the witnesses were lying-inconsistent testimony about whether she was dragged or went voluntarily to a particular area-were presented at trial. Hopson's attorney relied upon this discrepancy in closing argument, and at the motion hearing.” Jackson v. State, 294 Ga.App. 555, 669 S.E.2d 514 (November 14, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for new trial after his conviction for armed robbery; alleged “new evidence” didn’t support motion. Three defendants were tried separately; at defendant’s trial, victim store manager denied that she was a willing participant in the robbery, but at last co-defendant’s trial, she admitted that Jackson gave her “about five hundred” dollars from the robbery proceeds. Held, this evidence fails the first test for newly-discovered evidence: “that the evidence has come to [Jackson's] knowledge since the [prior] trial.” Timberlake [ v. State, 246 Ga. 488 (271 S.E.2d 792) (1980)]. … It can be reasonably inferred that if [victim] O'Brien's testimony is true, then Jackson would have known about this evidence at the time of his trial. See Grover v. State, 215 Ga.App. 907, 908(2) (452 S.E.2d 586) (1994) (‘if defendant's girl friend was truly an alibi witness, defendant knew of the existence of her testimony long before the time of trial’). Jackson also maintains that O'Brien perjured herself during his trial, but he fails to show that O'Brien ever recanted her testimony, and, in any event, her alleged perjury would not in itself constitute grounds for a new trial. See, e. g., Morrison v. State, 256 Ga.App. 23, 26(4) (567 S.E.2d 360) (2002) (‘[t]he law is settled that a post-trial declaration by a State's witness that his former testimony was false is not a ground for a new trial’) (citation omitted). Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 656 (54 S.E.2d 350) (1949), on which Jackson relies, does not require a different result, particularly as this is not a case ‘where it is shown and not denied that a conviction was procured by perjured testimony, which testimony the State's prosecuting attorney knew to be perjured at the time it was introduced....’” Thompson v. State, 291 Ga.App. 355, 662 S.E.2d 135 (April 18, 2008). No new evidence: “during the contempt