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proceeding against the victim [for failing to appear pursuant to subpoena] following Thompson’s trial, the victim testified that she was the aggressor. Based on this testimony, Thompson contends that his motion for new trial should have been granted, because the testimony was new evidence. However, [victim] Pope’s alleged aggressor status was known to Thompson prior to trial, as was Pope’s alleged willingness to testify about it. Thus, ‘[t]he proffer that [Thompson] did make shows that the proposed testimony was merely newly available, rather than newly discovered, evidence.’ Bryant v. State, 274 Ga. 798, 800(3) (560 S.E.2d 23) (2002).” Davis v. State, 283 Ga. 438, 660 S.E.2d 354 (March 17, 2008). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s extraordinary motion for new trial, without hearing. Defendant’s motion was supported by affidavits a) recanting their trial testimony; b) claiming that another person, Coles, admitted to shooting and killing the policeman/victim; c) claiming to have seen Coles dispose of a gun shortly after the killing; and d) new eyewitness accounts casting doubt on defendant’s guilt. “Extraordinary motions for new trial are ‘not favored,’ and ‘a stricter rule is applied to an extraordinary motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly available evidence than to an ordinary motion on that ground.’ Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582, 590-591(15) (458 S.E.2d 799) (1995) (punctuation and citation omitted).” Recantation : See Parker (July 12, 2005), below . “[C]ontrary to the dissent’s implication otherwise, this opinion does not hold and nowhere states that recantations and confessions must be categorically excluded and never considered in cases such as this. Nor do we hold that a trial court has no right to hold a hearing to consider the evidence with which it has been presented. We simply hold that, in dealing with the evidence and in its decision not to hold a hearing, the trial court did not abuse the discretion with which it is empowered by law under the facts of this case.” Alternative perpetrator: “‘It is the long-standing rule in this state that declarations to third persons against the declarant’s penal interest, to the effect that the declarant, and not the accused, was the actual perpetrator of the offense, are not admissible in favor of the accused at his trial ... or to procure a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.’ Timberlake, 246 Ga. at 492(1).” “However, we have held that testimony recounting admissions of guilt by a declarant to a third party are admissible at trial when ‘the declarant is present, testifies, and is subject to cross-examination.’ Guess v. State, 262 Ga. 487, 488-489(2) (422 S.E.2d 178) (1992).” “[O]ur rule against allowing testimony about such alleged admissions to third persons also rests on the separate rationale that ‘a person could subvert the ends of justice by [falsely] admitting the crime to others and then absenting himself.’ Timberlake, 246 Ga. at 492(1).” Statements here were “not sufficiently material” given that Coles testified at trial, proclaimed his innocence, and “the statements about the alleged admissions themselves contain evidence that they are not trustworthy, as the statements show that Coles was someone who wanted to be feared and that at least one of the persons to whom he made his admissions doubted his account.” New eyewitness accounts: One statement was unsworn, while the other didn’t clearly point to defendant’s innocence. “Davis bears a heavy burden to come forward with clear evidence of his innocence, not a craftily-worded and vague account that can be represented as stating one thing when it might very well state the opposite.” Denial without hearing: “‘[I]f the pleadings in an extraordinary motion for new trial in a criminal case do not contain a statement of facts sufficient to authorize that the motion be granted if the facts developed at the hearing warrant such relief, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to conduct a hearing on the extraordinary motion.’ Dick [ v. State, 248 Ga. 898, 899(2) (287 S.E.2d 11) (1982)] (emphasis in original). This requirement mandates that a defendant provide sworn affidavit testimony, or an explanation for the absence of such affidavit testimony, showing with clarity and specificity the facts he or she intends to prove in a hearing and how those proffered facts support his or her claim that a new trial is warranted. Upon our careful review of Davis’s extraordinary motion for new trial and the trial record, we find that Davis failed to present such facts in his motion and, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion without a hearing.” Three justices dissent, would require trial court to conduct hearing. Concern about third-party confessions “could be addressed by requiring the witness to appear in the trial court before his or her alleged confession may be considered.” Sears, writing for Hunstein and Benham: “I believe that this case illustrates that this Court’s approach in extraordinary motions for new trials based on new evidence is overly rigid and fails to allow an adequate inquiry into the fundamental question, which is whether or not an innocent person might have been convicted or even, as in this case, might be put to death.” Effect of majority opinion “is to categorically exclude recantations except in those exceedingly-rare instances when the fabrication is proven by extrinsic evidence.” “I would order the trial court to conduct a hearing, to weigh the credibility of Davis's new evidence, and to exercise its discretion in determining if the new evidence would create the probability of a different outcome if a new trial were held.” Accord, Hill (September 22, 2014), above (extraordinary motions for new trial not favored). Adams v. State, 290 Ga.App. 299, 659 S.E.2d 711 (March 14, 2008). 1. Evidence that child molestation victim had been molested by his older cousin was not “newly discovered evidence” warranting new trial. “On appeal, Adams does not simply contend that J.P. is a sexual predator who molested D.L.A. on several occasions. He argues that J.P. committed the specific acts giving rise to the indictment, … At trial, however, D.L.A. testified that Adams committed the acts. And