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evidence of D.L.A.’s alleged statement to his aunt serves only to impeach his very specific trial testimony. Accordingly, the trial court properly found this evidence insufficient to support a new trial. See Parnell v. State, 260 Ga.App. 213, 217(4) (581 S.E.2d 263) (2003) (co-defendant’s post-trial statement that defendant took no part in crime did not support grant of new trial because statement operated to impeach victims’ positive identification of defendant at trial); Waddell v. State, 224 Ga.App. 172, 175(4) (480 S.E.2d 224) (1996) (newly discovered evidence that victim had denied defendant’s involvement in crime did ‘nothing more than contradict the victim’s trial testimony’ and thus did not require a new trial); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 304, 306(4) (396 S.E.2d 288) (1990).” 2. Defendant’s post-trial diagnosis of genital herpes was not newly-discovered evidence; defendant testified at trial about his symptoms. “Given that Adams could have obtained an exact medical diagnosis before trial with minimal effort, the trial court properly denied his motion for new trial on this ground. See Croy v. State, 195 Ga.App. 500, 500-501 (393 S.E.2d 756) (1990).” Woodard v. State, 289 Ga.App. 643, 658 S.E.2d 129 (January 30, 2008). Physical precedent only. No grant of new trial based on newly discovered evidence where defendants “made no showing that they exercised due diligence in obtaining the additional evidence; indeed, defense counsel for [driver/co-defendant] Lewis admitted at the hearing that the reason for not obtaining the evidence sooner was a failure to believe that the computer check of Lewis’ license would be a ‘key issue.’” Here, defendants learned after trial that officer conducting traffic stop never called in driver’s license information, which was justification for extension of traffic stop (allowing time for drug dog to sniff car). Dunagan v. State, 286 Ga.App. 668, 649 S.E.2d 765 (July 3, 2007). “‘ A witness’s evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ when the defendant is with the witness at the scene and knows of his existence. Fetter [ v. State, 271 Ga.App. 652, 654 (610 S.E.2d 615) (2005)] (‘newly available’ evidence is not necessarily ‘newly discovered’).” Witness here gave defendant his business card at scene of traffic accident, but apparently defendant misplaced it. Reversed on another issue, 283 Ga. 501, 661 S.E.2d 525 (May 19, 2008). Accord, Hill (September 22, 2014), above. Claritt v. State, 280 Ga.App. 384, 634 S.E.2d 81 (June 16, 2006). Trial court properly denied new trial based on alleged newly-discovered evidence. “At trial, still photographs from the package store’s surveillance camera videotape were tendered into evidence. The quality of the pictures was not good, however, and Claritt’s trial attorney apparently argued that the person in the video did not look like Claritt. During the hearing on the motion for new trial, Claritt presented the testimony of George Pearl, ‘an expert in the field of photography and reverse projection photogrammetry.’ Pearl testified that, based upon his comparison of Claritt’s measurements to the measurements of the perpetrator in the videotape, the perpetrator was one and a half to two inches taller than Claritt. On appeal, Claritt argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for new trial based on Pearl’s testimony. We disagree. Claritt apparently was aware of the existence of the surveillance photos, and his trial attorney drew comparisons between the perpetrator and Claritt. Under these circumstances, Claritt had the evidence at trial: the photographs from the videotape. He desires a new trial so he can present testimony from a newly discovered witness, who will extrapolate meaning from the evidence. But this is not newly discovered evidence for purposes of granting a new trial .” Parker v. State, 274 Ga.App. 347, 617 S.E.2d 625 (July 12, 2005). “ The law is well settled that a post-trial declaration by a State’s witness that his trial testimony was false does not form the basis for the grant of a new trial . Morrison v. State, 256 Ga.App. 23, 25(4) (567 S.E.2d 360) (2002); Leon v. State, 237 Ga.App. 99, 104(3) (513 S.E.2d 227) (1999). Moreover, ‘[a]bsent proof of a conviction for perjury of a material witness, a verdict cannot be set aside for perjury.’ Lopez v. State, 267 Ga.App. 532, 539(7) (601 S.E.2d 116) (2004). ‘The only exception to the rule against setting aside a verdict without proof of a material witness’ conviction for perjury, is where there can be no doubt of any kind that the State’s witness’ testimony in every material part is purest fabrication.... [Cit]. A recantation impeaches the witness’ prior testimony. [Cit]. However it is not the kind of evidence that proves the witness’ previous testimony was the purest fabrication.’ Johnson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 764, 765(1) (513 S.E.2d 291) (1999).” Accord, Anderson v. State , 276 Ga.App. 216, 622 S.E.2d 898 (November 3, 2005); Cowan v. State , 279 Ga.App. 532, 631 S.E.2d 760 (May 24, 2006); Hammond v. State , 282 Ga.App. 478, 638 S.E.2d 893 (November 17, 2006); Hill v. State , 290 Ga.App. 140, 658 S.E.2d 863 (March 7, 2008); Davis v. State , 283 Ga. 438, 660 S.E.2d 354 (March 17, 2008); Cooper v. State , 287 Ga. 861, 700 S.E.2d 593 (October 4, 2010) (witness only recanted when defendant came to be in same prison block with witness); Glover v. State , 296 Ga. 13, 764 S.E.2d 826 (October 20, 2014). Fetter v. State, 271 Ga.App. 652, 610 S.E.2d 615 (February 15, 2005). Witness’s testimony did not qualify as “newly discovered” evidence since she testified of defendant’s conversation with accomplice, and testified that defendant was aware of her presence. “Fetter’s claim that [witness] was in a local prison at the time of Fetter’s trial and that she is now free shows at most that the evidence is newly available, not newly discovered, and thus is not grounds for overturning the