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court’s decision to deny the motion for new trial” (footnote omitted, pointing out that witness was not actually unavailable, since trial court could have ordered her production from prison under OCGA § 24-10-60). Accord, Dunagan (July 3, 2007), above. Harris v. State, 269 Ga.App. 92, 603 S.E.2d 490 (August 11, 2004). Writ of error coram nobis is dead in Georgia, replaced by the extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Based on Waye v. State , 239 Ga. 871, 238 S.E.2d 923 (1977). Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (June 7, 2004). Defendant not entitled to a new trial where his former co- defendant, who did not testify at trial, gives post-trial testimony exonerating defendant. “‘[ T]he once-unavailable defendant who now seeks to exculpate his co-defendant lacks credibility, since he has nothing to lose by testifying untruthfully regarding the alleged innocence of the defendant seeking a retrial.’ [Cit.]” Co-defendant’s testimony does not constitute “newly discovered evidence;” a new trial on this ground “was not authorized. Bryant v. State , 274 Ga. 798, 800, 560 S.E.2d 23 (2002).” Dowd v. State, 261 Ga.App. 306, 582 S.E.2d 235 (May 16, 2003). “ A new trial will not be granted on newly- discovered evidence grounds if the only effect of the evidence will be to impeach the trial testimony of a prosecution witness. The only exception is where there can be no doubt of any kind that the State’s witness’ testimony in every material part is purest fabrication.” Accord , Slack v. State , 265 Ga.App. 306, 593 S.E.2d 664 (January 5, 2004) (witnesses alleging victim told them he lied at trial); Caldwell v. State , 269 Ga.App. 84, 603 S.E.2d 506 (August 11, 2004); Bilow v. State , 279 Ga.App. 509, 631 S.E.2d 743 (May 23, 2006); Chauncey v. State , 283 Ga.App. 217, 641 S.E.2d 229 (January 8, 2007); Haupt v. State , 290 Ga.App. 616, 660 S.E.2d 383 (March 5, 2008) (witnesses’ testimony that defendant in fact disclosed material information to victim during security sale was merely impeaching of victim’s testimony that defendant didn’t disclose); Callaway v. State , 304 Ga.App. 506, 696 S.E.2d 450 (June 18, 2010) (“newly discovered evidence” was merely impeaching of State’s witness). Parnell v. State, 260 Ga.App. 213, 581 S.E.2d 263 (February 20, 2003). Co-defendant’s alleged post-trial declaration that defendant was not involved in the crime is not enough to demand a new trial; the statement “would serve only to impeach the victims’ testimony.” Ingram v. State, 276 Ga. 223, 576 S.E.2d 855 (February 10, 2003). “To carry his burden on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, defendant must show (1) that he did not know of the evidence until after the trial; (2) that his failure to learn of the evidence sooner was not owing to the want of due diligence; (3) that the evidence is so material it would probably produce a different verdict; (4) that it is not merely cumulative; (5) that the affidavit of the witness is attached to the motion or its absence is accounted for; and (6) that the evidence does not solely impeach the credibility of a witness. The motion will be denied if defendant fails to satisfy any one of these six requirements.” Testimony in this murder case that circumstantially suggested another person had a gun fell far short of this standard. Based on Timberlake v. State , 246 Ga. 488, 271 S.E.2d 792 (1980). Accord, Caldwell v. State , 269 Ga.App. 84, 603 S.E.2d 506 (August 11, 2004); Bilow v. State , 279 Ga.App. 509, 631 S.E.2d 743 (May 23, 2006); Ojemuyiwa v. State , 285 Ga.App. 617, 647 S.E.2d 598 (May 31, 2007); Hester v. State , 282 Ga. 239, 647 S.E.2d 60 (June 25, 2007). Morrison v. State, 256 Ga.App. 23, 567 S.E.2d 360 (June 19, 2002). “Under OCGA § 5-5-23, newly discovered evidence that might justify a new trial means material evidence that is ‘not merely cumulative or impeaching in its character but relating to new and material facts[.]’” Thus, a post-trial declaration by a State’s witness that his former testimony was false is not a ground for a new trial. Accord, Leon v. State , 237 Ga.App. 99, 513 S.E.2d 227 (February 24, 1999); Martin v. State , 260 Ga.App. 1, 578 S.E.2d 584 (February 26, 2003). Benn v. State , 244 Ga.App. 67, 535 S.E.2d 28 (May 18, 2000). Shoplifting convictions affirmed. No error in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence; trial court properly found that nephew’s testimony confessing to one of the crimes was not “so material that it would probably produce a different verdict,” and that the only effect of his testimony implicating someone else in the second theft “[would] be to impeach the credit of a witness” who identified defendant as the shoplifter. When determining ‘whether any newly discovered evidence would probably produce a different verdict, a trial court should not consider the new evidence in isolation. Rather, it should consider the strength and weaknesses of both the state's and the defendant's case and the nature and strength of a defendant's new evidence. Moreover, the court should evaluate any credibility problems inherent in the new evidence and determine whether because of such problems, the proffered evidence would not result in a different verdict.’