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(Citations omitted.) Carl v. State, 234 Ga.App. 61, 62(1), 506 S.E.2d 207 (1998). The trial court followed this mandate and concluded, based upon numerous inaccuracies in [nephew] Williams' description of the store and the merchandise taken, that his testimony would probably not result in a different verdict with regard to the Saddle Rack theft. The trial court also found that Williams' testimony that another person talked about shoplifting at Red Wing Shoes was not so material that it would produce a different verdict.” Green v. State , 242 Ga.App. 868, 532 S.E.2d 111 (March 17, 2000). Aggravated sodomy and related convictions affirmed; newly-discovered evidence that defendant had a sexually transmitted disease didn’t warrant new trial. “The inference defendant would have us draw is a negative one: because the victim J.AG. did not have any indications of HSV II, defendant was not the perpetrator. Compare Reece v. State, 192 Ga.App. 14, 16, 383 S.E.2d 572 (1989) (in prosecution for rape, statutory rape, and child molestation, proof that the victim sustained a sexually transmitted disease authorized proof that the accused and his wife did not to rebut the inference that defendant was the perpetrator). Given the low risk of asymptomatic transmission, we agree with the trial court that this evidence is not so material that it probably would have produced a different verdict. See Johnson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 764, 765(1), 513 S.E.2d 291 (1999) (victim's post-trial recantation only impeaching and not material); Ortiz v. State, 222 Ga.App. 432, 433(1), 474 S.E.2d 300 (1996) (rape victim's post-trial affidavit stating no vaginal penetration not so material as to show probability of a different verdict). While proof that either the victim or the aggressor in a sexual assault had (or did not have) a sexually transmitted disease certainly can be relevant, [cits.] this newly discovered evidence does not show the falseness, impossibility, or even improbability of the victim's direct testimony at trial that defendant committed the acts for which he was convicted. See Williams v. State, 197 Ga.App. 274, 398 S.E.2d 381 (1990). Compare Fugitt v. State, 251 Ga. 451, 452(1), 307 S.E.2d 471 (1983). We cannot say the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in overruling defendant's motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.” Peppers v. State, 242 Ga.App. 416, 530 S.E.2d 34 (February 17, 2000). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for new trial based on witness’s claim to have fabricated trial testimony. “This Court has held … that simply because ‘a material witness for the State, who at the trial gave direct evidence tending strongly to show the defendant's guilt, has since the trial made statements even under oath that his former testimony was false[ ] is not cause for a new trial. Declarations made after the trial are entitled to much less regard than sworn testimony delivered at the trial. This difference in value must be recognized, so long as there has been no conviction of perjury. Provision is made for setting aside verdicts resting on perjury, but there must first be a conviction. The only exception to the rule against setting aside a verdict without proof of a material witness' conviction for perjury, is where there can be no doubt of any kind that the State's witness' testimony in every material part is purest fabrication.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 764, 765, 513 S.E.2d 291 (1999). See also Miller v. State, 226 Ga.App. 509, 515(4), 486 S.E.2d 911 (1997). While a witness' recantation may impeach his prior testimony, it is not the type of evidence that proves the trial testimony was the ‘purest fabrication.’ Miller v. State , supra; see also McKnight v. State, 211 Ga.App. 653(1), 440 S.E.2d 249 (1994). As noted in Johnson v. State, supra, the type of evidence that proves, beyond any doubt, that trial testimony was false is evidence which removes the issue of the witness' credibility, such as evidence that shows that the witness' trial testimony was physically impossible. See, e.g., Fugitt v. State, 251 Ga. 451, 452-453(1), 307 S.E.2d 471 (1983).” Accord, State v. Abernathy , 295 Ga. 816, 764 S.E.2d 387 (October 6, 2014) (evidence that State’s witness gave his own attorney information different from his testimony at trial was “merely impeaching”). O’Neal v. State, 238 Ga.App. 446, 519 S.E.2d 244 (June 7, 1999). “‘Under OCGA § 5-5-23, newly discovered evidence that is merely impeaching in its character cannot be the basis for a new trial.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga.App. 70, 74, 487 S.E.2d 608 (1997).” Trial court properly denied motion for new trial based on “allegations that the arresting officers were under investigation at the time of O'Neal's trial and the Macon Police Department later dismissed one or both of them; that one officer did not prove the existence or reliability of an informer from whom he received information; and that one officer's testimony at a pretrial hearing differed from his testimony at trial.” Accord, Hayes v. State, 244 Ga.App. 12, 534 S.E.2d 577 (May 12, 2000). Millwood v. State, 237 Ga.App. 748, 516 S.E.2d 799 (April 23, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for new trial; defendant claimed he couldn’t find witness prior to trial because he didn’t know her last name or where to find her, although he was staying with her at the time of the crimes. Witness “testified that her apartment had been leased in her name, and that Millwood knew she was going to visit her parents in New Orleans. Millwood testified at trial that he thought Majorie was in Louisiana somewhere.” “[E]vidence presented during the motion hearing supports the conclusion that Millwood could have learned his alibi witness’s last name and whereabouts if he had been diligent.