☢ test - Í

… The trial court specifically found the testimony that Millwood did not know Majorie’s last name was not credible. Based on this evidence, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.” Seritt v. State, 237 Ga.App. 665, 516 S.E.2d 366 (April 14, 1999). Convicted of battery of his minor sons, defendant moved for new trial. At motion hearing, defendant presented testimony of a psychologist who testified that victims’ ADD medication may have affected their “‘ability to make sense, to – either not distort reality or to remember it correctly.’ In Dr. Hark’s opinion, both children were undermedicated. An undermedicated ADD child is impulsive, dis-inhibited, and rambunctious. He or she ‘often distorts the truth or distorts reality, has memory problems, will give inconsistent comments, will tend to exaggerate.’” Held, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for new trial; “ such medical opinion evidence is not newly discovered. It is merely newly available from this particular witness . See Davis v. State, 221 Ga.App. 375, 377, 471 S.E.2d 307 [1996], applying Hester v. State, 219 Ga.App. 256(1), 465 S.E.2d 288 (1995). This type of medical opinion evidence could have been offered by the physician who prescribed the medication for ADD. It was not necessary to await the results of Dr. Hark’s court-ordered family assessment in order to obtain an admissible medical opinion as to the behavior, perception, and memory of non-medicated or undermedicated ADD children. For aught that appears of record, defendants did not seek county assistance to obtain an expert witness nor did they move for a continuance of the trial pending the outcome of Dr. Hark’s assessment. As there are no special circumstances present in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Id. at 257(1), 465 S.E.2d 288.” Johnson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 764, 513 S.E.2d 291 (March 3, 1999). Defendant was not entitled to new trial on grounds that child molestation victim later recanted his testimony against defendant. “‘ That a material witness for the State, who at the trial gave direct evidence tending strongly to show the defendant’s guilt, has since the trial made statements even under oath that [his] former testimony was false, is not cause for a new trial. Declarations made after the trial are entitled to much less regard than sworn testimony delivered at the trial,’” quoting Logan v. State, 212 Ga.App. 734, 738(2), 442 S.E.2d 883 (1994). Accord, Sanders v. State , 242 Ga.App. 743, 531 S.E.2d 170 (March 13, 2000). See also Morrison (June 19, 2002),above, and cases cited thereunder. 6. VERDICT AGAINST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE State v. Cash, 298 Ga. 90, 779 S.E.2d 603 (November 16, 2015). Following malice murder and related convictions, no error in granting new trial on general grounds. 1. No prohibition against trial court hearing evidence at new trial hearing before ruling on motion on general grounds. Evidence presented here related to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance. “[T]he General Assembly has provided grounds for motions for new trial that do not require new evidence, see OCGA §§ 5–5–20 and 5–5–21 (the general grounds), and some grounds that do or may require new evidence, see OCGA § 5–5–23 (saying that a new trial may be granted based on newly discovered evidence); OCGA § 5– 5–25 (saying that ‘[i]n all motions for a new trial on other grounds not provided for in this Code, the presiding judge must exercise a sound legal discretion in granting or refusing the same according to the provisions of the common law and practice of the courts’); State v. Reynolds, 332 Ga.App. 818, 820, 775 S.E.2d 187 (2015) (explaining that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel—which may involve the introduction of evidence not heard by the jury—is a ground for motion for new trial permitted under § 5–5–25). In view of these various grounds for a motion for new trial and because OCGA § 5–5–40 says that a motion for new trial ‘may be heard at any time’ (and not that the grounds that may or do require new evidence must be heard after a hearing and ruling on the general grounds), we decline to adopt a rule that requires trial courts to hold multiple hearings on motions for new trial.” 2. “ To the extent that the State argues that the trial court erred in granting a new trial on the general grounds based on its consideration of the evidence introduced at the motion for new trial hearing that was not heard by the jury, the record does not show that the trial court relied on that evidence.” 3. No abuse of discretion in granting motion, based on conflicts in the evidence. Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 778 S.E.2d 205 (October 5, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; “summary” order denying motion for new trial on general grounds did not indicate failure to consider the motion using the proper standard. “Although the order did not explicitly state that the court was exercising its broad discretion as the thirteenth juror in deciding the motion, it is well-established that this Court ‘must presume that the trial judge knew the rule as to the necessity of exercising his discretion, and that he did exercise it.... [W]e can not assume, in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, that the judge knowingly declined to exercise his discretion.’ Martin & Sons v. Bank of Leesburg, 137 Ga. 285, 291 (73 S.E. 387) (1911). Thus, where a trial judge ruling on a new trial motion enters an order that, ‘without more, recites that the new trial is refused or denied, this will be taken to mean that [the judge] has in the exercise of his discretion approved the verdict.’ Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 338 (18 S.E.2d 546) (1942).”