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State v. Reid, 331 Ga.App. 275, 770 S.E.2d 665 (March 18, 2015). Following defendants’ RICO convictions, trial court erred by granting motions for new trial on general grounds where one defendant didn’t raise the general grounds, and the court failed to apply the proper standard as to the other defendant. 1. Court granted the motion “based upon the court's doubts as to the credibility of a State witness,” stating “that she ‘[could not] presume that [the testimony] did not impact the jury's verdict as to [Reid and Pope].’” But that’s not the standard using the general grounds; rather, “the trial court has an ‘affirmative duty’ not only to assess witness credibility, but also to consider conflicts in the evidence and to weigh the evidence as a whole in order to determine whether the verdict is so decidedly against the weight of the evidence and/or the principles of justice and equity so as to warrant the Court setting it aside. Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 713(4), 739 S.E.2d 332 (2013). … The court's discretion ‘should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial on this ground should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Alvelo v. State, 288 Ga. 437, 438(1), 704 S.E.2d 787 (2011).” 2. Trial court’s sua sponte grant of new trial was untimely. “If a trial court grants a new trial on its own motion, it must do so within 30 days from entry of the underlying judgment. See OCGA § 5–5–40(h) (‘The court ... shall be empowered to grant a new trial on its own motion within 30 days from entry of the judgment ...’). Moreover, outside of that statutorily defined 30–day window, a trial court considering a timely motion for new trial is confined to the grounds raised in the motion itself. See State v. Jones, 284 Ga. 302, 303(1), 667 S.E.2d 76 (2008); Bean v. Landers, 215 Ga.App. 366, 368(2), 450 S.E.2d 699 (1994).” Strapp v. State, 326 Ga.App. 264, 756 S.E.2d 333 (March 14, 2014). Conviction for riot in a penal institution affirmed; defendant induced any error on trial court’s part in not reweighing the evidence. Although the motion for new trial alleged that the verdict was “contrary to the facts,” “Strapp did not cite OCGA §§ 5–5–20 or 5–5–21 in his motion or at the hearing on the motion. At the outset of the hearing, however, Strapp stated that he was ‘traveling under the motion for new trial originally filed by [trial counsel]’ and stated that the first issue at the hearing was whether the verdict was ‘against the weight of the evidence.’” In colloquy with the trial court, however, defense counsel “recast the issue he had attempted to raise as one of sufficiency—whether there was any evidence to survive a motion for directed verdict and to support the jury's verdict that Strapp was guilty of the crime as charged in the indictment—rather than matters of conflicting evidence or credibility.” Counsel thus induced any error by the trial court in failing to reweigh the evidence (assuming the issue was even raised by the written motion). Sellers v. State, 325 Ga.App. 837, 755 S.E.2d 232 (February 27, 2014). Rape and related convictions affirmed; order denying motion for new trial showed that trial judge did not fail to exercise its discretion to review the weight of the evidence. “[I]n order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court acknowledged Sellers's ‘claims that the verdict was contrary to—and against the weight of—the evidence’ and found that ‘while the case against Defendant was indeed largely circumstantial, the proven facts were so numerous and compelling that the Court finds the evidence to have justified the verdict.’ This specific reference to Sellers's general grounds argument, coupled with the trial court's statements concerning the nature and quantum of the evidence, establish that the trial court did, in fact, consider whether the verdict was contrary to or against the weight of the evidence under the proper legal standard, and contrary to Sellers's contentions on appeal, properly fulfilled his role to sit as the thirteenth juror.” Accord, Copeland v. State , 327 Ga.App. 520, 759 S.E.2d 593 (June 11, 2014); Perdue v. State , S16A0296, ___ Ga. ___, 785 S.E.2d 291, 2016 WL 1294999 (April 4, 2016) (order denying motion for new trial “directly cites the trial court’s personal observations of the witnesses and evidence at trial, and expressly acknowledges that Perdue had ‘moved this Court to act in its capacity as the thirteenth jury [sic].’ The order further evidences the trial court’s exercise of its discretion by its express ultimate determination that it ‘will not disturb the jury’s verdict..’”). Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions, and death penalty, affirmed. 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, order denying motion for new trial showed that trial court exercised its discretion to determine whether the verdict was contrary to the evidence or against the weight of the evidence. “Even though the trial court did not explicitly cite OCGA §§ 5–5–20 and 5–5–21, the language used by the trial court in its discretionary determinations that the evidence at trial was not ‘ sufficiently close ’ to warrant the grant of a new trial as to either the guilt/innocence or the sentencing verdicts indicates that the trial court did in fact exercise its discretion under the relevant statutory provisions. See OCGA § 5–5–42(c) and (d) (setting forth the suggested ‘form for motion for new trial in criminal cases’ and providing as one of the enumerated grounds for the granting of a new trial that, ‘[a]lthough the state proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence was sufficiently close to warrant the trial judge to exercise his discretion to grant the defendant a retrial’ (emphasis supplied)). This language is regularly used to describe the standard of review used in a trial court's grant of a new trial on the discretionary ground that the verdict is against the weight of, or contrary to, the evidence.” 2. “[T]he fact that the trial