☢ test - Í

Alvelo v. State, [288 Ga. 437, 439(1) (704 S.E.2d 787) (2011)].” “In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated the following: ‘While the Court personally disagreed with the jury's verdict, the Court is not empowered to overturn it where there were two competent and arguably credible witnesses whom the jury believed and there was sufficient evidence to sustain it.’ Although the State contends that we may infer that the trial court applied the appropriate discretionary standard from the fact that this order was issued in response to a motion specifically addressing that standard, the language in the order ‘fails to indicate that the trial court fulfilled its duty of exercising its discretion under the applicable standard set forth in OCGA § 5–5–21....’ Rutland v. State, [296 Ga.App. 471, 476(3) (675 S.E.2d 506) (2009)]. It has long been the rule in this state that ‘“the trial judge is vested with the strongest of discretions to review the case and to set the verdict aside if he is not satisfied with it.”’ Bhansali v. Moncada, 275 Ga.App. 221, 222(1) (620 S.E.2d 404) (2005). See also Alvelo v. State, supra at 438(1); Ricketts v. Williams, 242 Ga. 303, 304 (248 S.E.2d 673) (1978); Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337 (18 S.E.2d 546) (1942); Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 625 (4 S.E.2d 453) (1939); Thompson v. Warren, 118 Ga. 644 (45 SE 912) (1903); Rutland v. State, supra; Holton v. Jones, 174 Ga.App. 654, 655 (331 S.E.2d 26) (1985). We are unable to discern how the trial court can declare that it personally disagreed with the jury's verdict and not believe that the verdict was strongly against the weight of the evidence. ” Distinguished, Copeland v. State , 327 Ga.App. 520, 759 S.E.2d 593 (June 11, 2014) (Trial court: ““I paid close attention during this trial, and I felt then and feel now that there was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Alvelo v. State, 288 Ga. 437, 704 S.E.2d 787 (January 10, 2011). In defendant’s murder prosecution, trial court erred by refusing to consider the credibility of the witnesses upon defendant’s motion for new trial asserting “that the verdict was ‘against the weight of the evidence.’” “The trial court, however, … explicitly declined to consider the ‘credibility of witnesses,’ stating that ‘[i]t is solely within the purview of the jury to weigh conflicting evidence and judge credibility of witnesses.... [T]he Court will not usurp the jury's function....’” The trial court thus failed to exercise its discretion as required. Judgment vacated and remanded with direction. Souder v. State, 301 Ga.App. 348, 687 S.E.2d 594 (November 2, 2009). Trial court’s denial of motion for new trial, on grounds that verdict was “decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence,” OCGA § 5-5-21, “affords no basis for reversal. ‘The motion is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial on this ground should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rutland, [March 5, 20009, below] at 476(3). ‘A trial judge's denial of a motion for new trial on evidentiary grounds will be reversed on appeal only if there is no evidence to support the verdict.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 244 Ga.App. 419, 421(2) (535 S.E.2d 795) (2000).” Accord, Teele v. State , 319 Ga.App. 448, 738 S.E.2d 277 (December 14, 2012). Hartley v. State, 299 Ga.App. 534, 683 S.E.2d 109 (August 5, 2009). Trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion where defendant filed motion for new trial on general grounds. “Notably, where a defendant raises a claim under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 in his motion for new trial, the law imposes upon the trial court an affirmative duty to exercise its discretion and weigh the evidence to determine whether a new trial is warranted. See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 (240 S.E.2d 41) (1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 902 (98 S.Ct. 3119, 57 L.Ed.2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460(1) (128 S.E.2d 496) (1962); Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 338(1) (18 S.E.2d 546) (1942); Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 622 (4 S.E.2d 453) (1939). If the record reflects that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion and sit as the thirteenth juror, we will vacate and remand for the trial court to fulfill its affirmative statutory duty. See State v. Jones, 284 Ga. 302, 303-304(2) (667 S.E.2d 76) (2008); Rutland v. State, 296 Ga.App. 471, 476(3) (675 S.E.2d 506) (2009).” Rutland v. State, 296 Ga.App. 471, 675 S.E.2d 506 (March 5, 2009). Trial court erred in applying wrong standard to defendant’s contention, in motion for new trial, that verdict was against “the weight of the evidence.” “In evaluating Rutland's challenge to the weight of the evidence, the trial court applied the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979), whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, this standard is applicable to appellate courts, which unlike trial courts, are limited to reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and are precluded from evaluating its weight. OCGA § 5-5-21 specifically empowers trial courts with the authority to weigh the evidence. It provides that a trial judge, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may grant a new trial ‘in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some slight evidence in favor of the finding.’ (Emphasis supplied.) On a motion for new trial alleging this ground, the court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ricketts v. Williams, 242 Ga. 303, 304 (248 S.E.2d 673) (1978). ‘The motion ... is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the