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power to grant a new trial on this ground should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.” Trial court erred by failing to exercise the discretion granted by the code section. Accord, Walker v. State , 292 Ga. 262, 737 S.E.2d 311 (January 7, 2013); Choisnet v. State , 292 Ga. 860, 742 S.E.2d 476 (April 29, 2013); Gordon v. State , 329 Ga.App. 2, 763 S.E.2d 357 (September 3, 2014); Wiggins v. State , 330 Ga.App. 205, 767 S.E.2d 798 (November 18, 2014); Gomillion v. State , 296 Ga. 678, 769 S.E.2d 914 (March 2, 2015). Jones v. State, 332 Ga.App. 506, 773 S.E.2d 463 (June 15, 2015). Judgment on guilty plea to sale of cocaine affirmed. “Georgia law is clear that ‘a criminal defendant does not have an unqualified right to file a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on a guilty plea; however, where the question on appeal is one which may be resolved by facts appearing in the record, a direct appeal will lie.’ (Internal punctuation omitted.) Kennedy v. State, 319 Ga.App. 498 (735 S.E.2d 819) (2012). See also Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687 (470 S.E.2d 436) (1996); Smith v. State, 253 Ga. 169 (316 S.E.2d 757) (1984). As a result, ‘the merits of [Jones'] appeal can be addressed if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record, including the transcript of his guilty plea hearing.’ Kennedy, 319 Ga.App. at 498–499 (citing Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421 (467 S.E.2d 570) (1996)). … Jones … argues that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was under the influence of marijuana during the plea hearing. However, ‘[i]ssues of mental competency cannot be resolved with reference only to facts appearing in the record of the plea and sentence.’ Gray v. State, 273 Ga.App. 441, 442(1)(a) (615 S.E.2d 248) (2005). It follows that Jones' claim of intoxication is not an issue which may be pursued by direct appeal from a guilty plea. See Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; Smith, 253 Ga. at 169; Kennedy, 319 Ga.App. at 498.” Barton v. State, 331 Ga.App. 887, 769 S.E.2d 96 (February 3, 2015). Following pleas to sexual battery charges, trial court properly denied motion to withdraw those pleas; where trial court didn’t orally “pronounce” sentence, but did enter written sentence, the right to withdraw pleas ended upon entry of the written sentence. Distinguishing State v. Germany, 246 Ga. 455–456(1), 271 S.E.2d 851 (1980) (right to withdraw pleas ended upon oral pronouncement of sentence). “Despite Barton's intimations to the contrary, however, Germany does not grant a defendant the right to withdraw his guilty plea where the trial court simply neglects to pronounce orally the sentence at the plea hearing but does enter a written judgment of sentence. In such a case, a defendant loses his absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea at the time the written sentence is filed and any motion to withdraw the plea must be made in the same term of court in which the sentence was filed. See Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga.App. 63, 65(1), 646 S.E.2d 84 (2007).” DeToma v. State, 296 Ga. 90, 765 S.E.2d 596 (October 6, 2014). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw guilty plea to malice murder, despite defendant’s claim that his attorneys were “bullying” and “intimidating” and “forced” him to plead guilty. “‘Entering a guilty plea as a result of advice received does not amount to coercion. [Cit.]’ Walden v. State, 291 Ga. 260, 261(1) (728 S.E.2d 186) (2012). And, a guilty plea certainly may be freely and voluntarily entered, even though family pressure persuades a defendant to make that decision. See Shaheed v. State, 276 Ga. 291(2) (578 S.E.2d 119) (2003); Walker v. State, 304 Ga.App. 55, 57(1) (695 S.E.2d 375) (2010); Pirkle v. State, 240 Ga.App. 24, 25(1) (522 S.E.2d 526) (1999). In deciding whether to go to trial, DeToma was faced with a choice among very poor options, and, of course, it is not uncommon for a defendant to regret the choice to plead guilty. See State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332, 336(3) (454 S.E.2d 468) (1995). But, the State's burden is to show that a guilty plea was entered intelligently and voluntarily, King [ v. State, 270 Ga. 367 (509 S.E.2d 32) (1998)] ; there is no burden on the State to show that, before entering a plea, a defendant resolved to do so without wavering or agonizing over the decision, or that after his plea, he had no second thoughts as to entering it. See Walden, supra.” Young v. State, 328 Ga.App. 91, 761 S.E.2d 504 (July 9, 2014). Following defendant’s guilty plea to robbery and related offenses, trial court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider motion to withdraw plea. Although plea was entered and sentence orally pronounced in May term of court, written sentence was actually signed and filed in August term; defendant’s motion to withdraw plea, also in August term, was thus timely. “‘An oral declaration as to what the sentence shall be is not the sentence of the court; the sentence signed by the judge is. [Cit.]’ Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 185(4), 281 S.E.2d 604 (1981). See also Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 8–9(2), 749 S.E.2d 672 (2013) (sentence signed by the judge, not his oral declaration, is the sentence of the court). Indeed, the ‘criminal proceedings against appellant were [still] pending in the trial court until such time as his sentence was entered in writing and became final.’ Crolley v. State, 182 Ga.App. 2, 3(1), 354 S.E.2d 864 (1987) (punctuation omitted). Because the judge did not sign and enter the written sentence until the end of August 2013, Young was not sentenced pursuant to the guilty plea until the August 2013 term of court, which began on the first Monday of that month.” Accord, Allen v. State , 333 Ga.App. 853, 777 S.E.2d 699