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(September 22, 2015) (similar facts). Poole v. State, 326 Ga.App. 243, 756 S.E.2d 322 (March 14, 2014). Following plea of guilty but mentally ill to charges of terroristic threats and stalking, trial court properly denied motion to withdraw pleas. Although the procedural requirements for a plea of guilty but mentally ill under OCGA § 17-7-131(b)(2) weren’t met (in that no one stated a factual basis for finding that defendant was mentally ill), defendant would only be entitled to withdraw his plea “to correct a manifest injustice,” not shown here. “At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, Poole presented no evidence whatsoever that he has been harmed or prejudiced by the entry of his plea of guilty but mentally ill.” Analogizing to motions to withdraw pleas generally under USCR 33. Jones v. State, 325 Ga.App. 845, 755 S.E.2d 238 (February 27, 2014). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw guilty plea to theft by deception, despite defendant’s contention that his intent was to enter an Alford plea. “Although sentencing documents suggest an Alford plea, the transcript reflects that Jones chose to enter a guilty plea. In any event, pretermitting whether the trial court erred in failing to question Jones to establish if he wanted to enter an Alford plea, the record demonstrates that Jones was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the legal consequences of his plea. See Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 7–8(1), 749 S.E.2d 672 (2013) (Bell claimed at the hearing to withdraw his plea that he was innocent and pled guilty because he felt that he did not have any other choice, but even ‘[a]ssuming Bell was correct that he entered an Alford plea, the record shows that he was aware of the evidence against him, the availability of a justification defense, and the maximum and minimum sentences he could receive if convicted at a trial and that he made a decision to avoid the possibility of life without parole by pleading guilty.’) There are no additional requirements under Alford regarding the appraisal of the consequences of a guilty plea. See McKiernan v. State, 288 Ga. 140, 142–143(2), 702 S.E.2d 170 (2010) (even when considered under Alford, trial court did not commit a manifest injustice in accepting the guilty plea despite defendant's contention that the shooting of his wife was an accident.) Thus, in these circumstances we discern no manifest injustice demanding the grant of Jones' motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” Smith v. State, 322 Ga.App. 549, 745 S.E.2d 771 (July 1, 2013). Following guilty plea to cocaine possession, trial court properly denied motion to withdraw plea. Sentence was entered with conditional discharge pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-2 based on defendant’s claim that he was a first offender. In fact, defendant had a prior drug conviction in another state. “[A]s Smith knowingly defrauded the trial court by assenting to his eligibility for sentencing under OCGA § 16– 13–2, he cannot request relief from error that his misconduct caused,” citing “ McFadden v. State, 243 Ga.App. 896, 898(2) (534 S.E.2d 566) (2000) (evidence of a prior out-of-state felony conviction for a drug offense established that defendant had defrauded the court in testifying that he had no such conviction, and thus defendant waived any right to complain on appeal of error resulting from his own misconduct); Cunningham v. State, 239 Ga.App. 889, 890–891(1) (522 S.E.2d 480) (2000); Johns v. State, 223 Ga.App. 553, 554(2) (479 S.E.2d 388) (1996).” Valldeparas v. State, 319 Ga.App. 491, 735 S.E.2d 816 (December 21, 2012). Trial court erred by failing to treat defendant’s post-judgment pleading, styled “Motion to Modify Sentence,” as either a habeas petition or as his third motion to modify sentence; instead, trial court dismissed it as untimely motion to withdraw guilty pleas. Defendant pled guilty to child molestation. “We agree with Valldeparas that the trial court erred in interpreting the Third Motion as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and in dismissing it as untimely. Valldeparas clearly expressed his understanding in his motion, and at the hearing, that the time had passed to file a motion to withdraw his plea and that he was not asserting such a motion. Moreover, we agree with Valldeparas that the trial court should have looked past the form of the Third Motion to its substance to determine whether it could have been considered as a valid petition for habeas corpus. Valldeparas asserted in the Third Motion that his guilty plea was not fully understood, knowing or voluntary, but rather was entered under duress, stress and anxiety. The motion also asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the form of withheld facts, misrepresentations and undue time pressure at the time of entering his plea. The proper remedy for making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea is ‘to move to withdraw the plea or, if the term of court in which the plea was entered has expired, to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.’ (Citation omitted.) Beaver v. State, 308 Ga.App. 380, 382(3) (707 S.E.2d 590) (2011). Here, because a motion to withdraw would have been untimely, the trial court should have considered whether it was appropriate to treat the Third Motion as a habeas petition. See Waye v. State, 239 Ga. 871, 875(1) (238 S.E.2d 923) (1977) (petition for writ of coram nobis and/or motion to vacate plea should have been treated as a habeas petition where the petition/motion alleged that plea was not voluntary, was not knowingly made and the assistance of counsel was ineffective); Sims v. State, 230 Ga. 589 (198 S.E.2d 298) (1973) (same for petition for writ of coram nobis seeking to set aside a sentence on ground that defendant was insane at time of plea), overruled on other grounds, Parris v. State, 232 Ga. 687, 690 (208 S.E.2d 493) (1974) (same for petition