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for coram nobis on ground that defendant denied right to counsel at time of plea); Moss v. State, 255 Ga.App. 107, 108 (564 S.E.2d 516) (2002) (same where petition for writ of coram nobis alleged that Moss entered plea without being informed of his rights and no effort to ensure factual basis existed for plea). [fn] Compare Martin v. State, 240 Ga. 488 (241 S.E.2d 246) (1978) (Supreme Court treated motion to vacate and set aside as an extraordinary motion for new trial, and not as habeas petition where trial court lacked venue to consider habeas and defendant failed to file application in Supreme Court following the denial of the motion).” Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 95, 734 S.E.2d 382 (November 19, 2012). Trial properly denied motion to withdraw guilty pleas to felony murder and aggravated assault, although court didn’t advise defendant on the record of the mandatory minimum sentence. “[E]ven if an appellant enters a plea without being advised of his rights by the court, he must still prove that the withdrawal of the plea is required to correct a manifest injustice. State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332, 336, 454 S.E.2d 468 (1995). The test for manifest injustice ‘will by necessity vary from case to case, but it has been said that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges.’ Id. Here, the record of the guilty plea hearing shows appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her rights. Furthermore, although the trial court did not inform appellant of the mandatory minimum sentence for the charges to which she was entering a guilty plea, … counsel's testimony that he correctly advised appellant concerning the length of her sentence was deemed credible by the trial court. It follows that appellant has not demonstrated she should be permitted to withdraw her plea to correct a manifest injustice and that the court did not err in denying appellant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea. See Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 748, 683 S.E.2d 586 (2009); Maddox v. State, 278 Ga. 823, 826(4), 607 S.E.2d 587 (2005).” Douglas v. State, 317 Ga.App. 425, 731 S.E.2d 109 (August 14, 2012). In prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea reversed; trial court erred by failing to either appoint counsel or secure waiver of counsel. “‘Because [Douglas] was not appointed counsel for his motion to withdraw his plea, the record does not reveal that the court informed him of his right to counsel, and no waiver of counsel appears in the record, “we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a re-hearing on [Douglas's] motion to withdraw his guilty plea to be conducted in conformity with this opinion.” Fortson [ v. State, 272 Ga. 457, 461(2) (532 S.E.2d 102) (2000)]; Kennedy v. State, 267 Ga.App. 314, 314–315 (599 S.E.2d 290) (2004).’ Ford v. State, 312 Ga.App. 80, 81(1) (717 S.E.2d 676) (2011).” Accord, Young v. State , 328 Ga.App. 91, 761 S.E.2d 504 (July 9, 2014). Turner v. State, 314 Ga.App. 263, 724 S.E.2d 6 (February 21, 2012). Where one of multiple convictions was held on appeal to have merged with another, defendant wasn’t entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas to counts not affected by the appellate decision. “See Diaz v. State, 279 Ga.App. 134 (630 S.E.2d 618) (2006) (defendant had no right to withdraw his guilty plea to a rape charge prior to resentencing where he had entered a negotiated plea of guilty on rape and aggravated child molestation charges, and the sentence on the aggravated child molestation conviction was later found to be void because it did not comply with statutory sentencing guidelines; the trial court had imposed separate and distinct sentences for each of the convictions, and there was no basis for finding that the sentence on the rape conviction was void).” Distinguishing Kaiser (March 28, 2007), below. Accord, New case!Humphrey v. State , S16A0197, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3144337 (June 6, 2016) (defendant couldn’t withdraw his guilty plea to murder after one provision of his sentence was reversed on appeal, “expressly leaving all other provisions of his sentence intact.”). Roseborough v. State, 311 Ga.App. 456, 716 S.E.2d 530 (August 19, 2011). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea to child molestation. “‘Although Roseborough challenges the information he was provided regarding the minimum possible sentence, a defendant's otherwise voluntary guilty plea is not invalidated merely because the range of punishment on the plea was never recited to him, when he makes no claim that he was disadvantaged by the omission or even that he was in fact unaware of the possible sentence which could be imposed.’ Hill v. Hopper, 233 Ga. 633, 634 (212 S.E.2d 810) (1975).” Defendant here claimed he was improperly told, both by the court and his attorney, that the possible sentence was 1 to 20 years, when in fact it was 5 to 20 years; but defendant failed to establish “the reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would have proceeded to trial rather than enter a guilty plea.” Beaver v. State, 308 Ga.App. 380, 707 S.E.2d 590 (March 10, 2011). Denying motion to withdraw guilty pleas to two counts of cruelty to children, trial court properly found that adequate factual basis for pleas was set out. “The Georgia Supreme Court … has expressly held ‘that an indictment alone may contain enough information to establish that the facts alleged by the State actually satisfied the elements of the charges to which a defendant was pleading guilty.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 748(4)(b) (683 S.E.2d 586) (2009).”