☢ test - Í

Agnew v. State, 309 Ga.App. 163, 709 S.E.2d 567 (March 9, 2011). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty pleas; record showed that pleas were affirmatively based on erroneous representation by State that defendant had three prior felony convictions and was facing a life without parole sentence ; in fact, that was true in only one of the two cases to which defendant simultaneously pled. “Because Agnew decided to plead guilty to both cases at the same time, we cannot separate the harm caused by the State's erroneous representation that he was facing life without parole in one of the cases from the other. And because Agnew was given affirmative erroneous information at the time he decided to enter his guilty pleas, the trial court should have granted the motion to withdraw his guilty plea in both [cases] to correct a manifest injustice.” Watson v. State, 307 Ga.App. 839, 706 S.E.2d 194 (February 14, 2011). Trial court erred by denying defendant’s timely-filed motion to withdraw guilty plea without a hearing, finding that it had been abandoned. When original counsel requested a continuance from the original hearing date, “the trial court said that ‘counsel can request [the hearing] to be put down at any time that you choose.’” Almost two years later, the court dismissed the motion after hearing, finding that it had been abandoned. “Here, as in McKiernan [ v. State, 286 Ga. 756, 692 S.E.2d 340 (2010)] , Watson brought his initial motion to withdraw his plea before the end of the term in which the sentence was rendered, even though a hearing on the motion was not held until well after the expiration of that term. There is no dispute in this case that the State had adequate notice of the motion. Compare McKiernan, 286 Ga. at 758-759, 692 S.E.2d 340. Nor can we conclude that the timely motion was abandoned when Watson attached a rule nisi to both the original motion and the amended motion and where, as here, the trial court authorized Watson to reschedule the hearing on the motion ‘at any time that you choose.’ It follows that the trial court's denial of the motion on the ground of abandonment was error. Id. at 759-760, 692 S.E.2d 340 (vacating dismissal of motion to withdraw guilty plea and remanding for a rehearing on the motion); compare Vaughn v. State, 161 Ga.App. 265, 266, 287 S.E.2d 728 (1982) (finding no abuse of discretion in dismissal of motion to withdraw guilty plea when defendant failed to attach a rule nisi to the motion).” Accord, Andrews v. State , 320 Ga.App. 816, 739 S.E.2d 445 (March 7, 2013) (physical precedent only). Clark v. State, 306 Ga.App. 352, 702 S.E.2d 657 (October 5, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea to failing to register as a sex offender. Defendant contended that when he entered his plea, he didn’t know “that one of the special conditions of probation was that he could not have any contact or reside with any minor under the age of 16, including his own daughter, who at that time was residing with him at his parents' residence.” “However, we have specifically held that special conditions of probation are collateral consequences of a plea, and that there is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of such collateral consequences in order for his guilty plea to be valid as voluntary and knowing. Hermann v. State, 249 Ga.App. 535, 536-537 (548 S.E.2d 666) (2001). See Smith [ v. State, 287 Ga. 391, 394(2)(a) (697 S.E.2d 177) (2010)] (‘“the defendant's lack of knowledge of such collateral consequences does not affect the voluntariness of the plea”’); McLeod v. State, 251 Ga.App. 371, 372(1) (554 S.E.2d 507) (2001) (‘[a] guilty plea will not be set aside because the defendant is not advised of possible collateral consequences of her guilty plea’). A defendant need only be informed of a direct consequence of a guilty plea, which is a consequence ‘that lengthens or alters the pronounced sentence.’ Taylor [ v. State , 304 Ga.App. 878(1), fn. 3, 698 S.E.2d 384 (July 8, 2010)]. ‘[T]he distinction between direct and collateral consequences of a plea turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment.’ (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id.” Accord, Stinson (February 8, 2010), below, and cases collected thereunder. Hill v. State, 306 Ga.App. 285, 701 S.E.2d 909 (September 30, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s out-of-time motion to withdraw his guilty plea to child molestation. “‘[A]n out-of-time appeal is not warranted because issues of voluntariness of the plea and the effectiveness of trial counsel, which are bound together in this case, cannot be determined wholly by reference to the facts of record, but require development in a post-plea hearing.’ (Citations omitted.) Stewart v. State, 268 Ga. 886, 887 (494 S.E.2d 665) (1998).” Accord, Shelton v. State , 307 Ga.App. 599, 705 S.E.2d 699 (January 24, 2011) (“‘[W]here a defendant appeals a guilty plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, the issues which he seeks to raise on appeal can be developed only in the context of a post-plea hearing,’” quoting Olguin v. State, 296 Ga.App. 208, 209 (674 S.E.2d 89) (2009).); Martin v. State , 329 Ga.App. 10, 763 S.E.2d 363 (September 4, 2014) (claim of ineffectiveness of counsel must be developed in a post-plea hearing). Murray v. State, 306 Ga.App. 106, 701 S.E.2d 579 (September 16, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea to armed robbery, based on ineffective assistance – failure to file motion to suppress. “[W]here the ineffectiveness claim underlying the motion to withdraw the plea is based on counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress, the defendant must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the