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an aggravated felony, where law mandates deportation, was deficient). 6. ADVICE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION

Taylor v. State, 304 Ga.App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384 (July 8, 2010). Trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea to child molestation; counsel’s failure to advise defendant of sex offender registry requirements attendant to plea was deficient representation. Applying Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (March 31, 2010). Trial court found that sex offender registration was a collateral consequence of defendant’s plea; Supreme Court in Padilla “noted that it had ‘never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally reasonable professional assistance under Strickland.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [Id.]. The Court went on to conclude that even if deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the failure to advise a client of the risk of deportation in pleading guilty constitutes deficient performance, given the ‘unique nature of deportation,’ which has been ‘long recognized [as] a particularly severe penalty, [although] not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction,’ and which is ‘uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [Id.] In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Padilla relied on several factors : the fact that prevailing professional norms support the view that counsel must advise their clients of the risk of deportation, [Cit.]; the fact that deportation is ‘ intimately related to the criminal process’ in that it is ‘ nearly an automatic result’ following certain criminal convictions, [id.]; and the fact that deportation is a ‘ drastic measure’ which is the ‘equivalent of banishment or exile.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [Id.]. The Court further explained that in the case at hand, the terms of the relevant immigration statute were ‘succinct, clear, and explicit’ as to the consequences of the defendant pleading guilty, such that it was ‘not a hard case in which to find deficiency.’ Id.” Same factors apply to sex offender registration: Prevailing professional norms: “the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice with accompanying commentary specifically reference registration as a sex offender as a collateral consequence about which defense counsel should advise their clients before they enter a guilty plea. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty 14-3.2(f), cmt. (3 rd ed., 1999). See also National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation § 6.2 (1995) (noting that defense counsel should advise their clients, prior to entry of a plea, of any ‘civil disabilities’ that are a consequence of the contemplated plea). Furthermore, like deportation, registration as a sex offender is ‘ intimately related to the criminal process’ in that it is an ‘automatic result’ following certain criminal convictions. Drastic measure: “[W]hile sex offender registration is not the equivalent of banishment or exile, there is no denying that registrants face extensive restrictions on where they can live, work, and volunteer. See OCGA § 42-1-15. Indeed, certain registrants are subject to electronic monitoring for the remainder of their lives. See OCGA § 42-1-14(e).” And registration requirement here was ‘succinct, clear, and explicit.’ Remanded for consideration of prejudice prong. 7. ALIBI, NOTICE OF DEFENSE Jones v. State, 266 Ga.App. 679, 598 S.E.2d 65 (March 30, 2004). No prejudice to defendant where counsel failed to give timely notice of alibi defense to prosecutor, although defendant gave counsel the information some two months before. Information went to only one of two similar bank robberies; hinged on testimony of girlfriend, whose bias in his favor raised credibility issues; and evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Accord, Prince v. State , 295 Ga. 788, 764 S.E.2d 362 (October 6, 2014) (failure to provide notice of alibi defense wouldn’t have prejudiced defendant where the proposed alibi evidence didn’t foreclose the possibility that defendant commited the murder). 8. APPELLATE COUNSEL, EFFECTIVENESS OF Seabolt v. Norris, 298 Ga. 583, 783 S.E.2d 913 (March 7, 2016). Following murder and related convictions, habeas court properly granted Norris relief, based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, on other grounds; however, appellate counsel couldn’t successfully “argue on appeal that the trial court erred by improperly limiting trial counsel’s closing argument to one hour.” Appellate counsel couldn’t successfully challenge the limitation given that trial counsel had acquiesced to it. Prior opinion, 782 S.E.2d 264, 2016 WL 366902 (February 1, 2016), vacated. State v. Garland, 298 Ga. 482, 781 S.E.2d 787 (January 19, 2016). Following conviction for sexual battery, habeas court properly granted relief based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. State concedes that appellate counsel was deficient, but argues no prejudice. Deficient performance: counsel, without defendant’s knowledge or consent, “in order to secure Garland’s release from confinement, … reached an agreement with the State which required him to withdraw the motion for new trial, and in exchange, Garland would be returned to probation to be served in his home state of Texas.” Defendant testified at habeas hearing that he never would have agreed to waive this; he also presented uncontradicted expert testimony that he was both insane at the time of the crime and incompetent at the time of his trial. Held, this evidence was sufficient to establish prejudice. “The prejudicial effects of appellate counsel’s failure to advise and consult with Garland are heightened because of the uncontradicted evidence of Garland’s lack of competence