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and diminished mental condition, factors which were neither investigated by trial counsel nor presented to the trial court on motion for new trial and which clearly call into question the fairness of his trial.” Williams v. Rudolph, 298 Ga. 86, 777 S.E.2d 472 (September 14, 2015). Following Rudolph’s conviction for statutory rape, habeas court erred by granting relief, based on alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Habeas court found appellate counsel ineffective for failing to appeal on grounds that statutory rape is never a lesser-included offense of rape. Supreme Court reverses this holding; at the time of defendant’s 2011 appeal, Court of Appeals caselaw held that statutory rape could be a lesser-included offense to rape. The Court of Appeals overruled this holding in Stuart v. State , 318 Ga.App. 839, 734 S.E.2d 814 (2012); Supreme Court here expresses no opinion as to whether Stuart is correct. “The habeas court’s order, due to its reliance on Stuart, addresses the claim of ineffective assistance from a perspective and state of the law after Rudolph’s appeal had already been decided. This perspective would require Rudolph’s appellate counsel to argue beyond existing precedent at the time of his appeal; however, there is no requirement for an attorney to prognosticate future law in order to render effective representation. At the time of Rudolph’s appeal, there was caselaw indicating that statutory rape could be a lesser included offense of forcible rape as a matter of fact. Therefore, examining appellate counsel’s perspective at the time of Rudolph’s appeal, it was not unreasonable for her not to challenge the trial court’s decision to charge Rudolph’s jury on the crime of statutory rape.” Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 771 S.E.2d 879 (April 20, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Tepanca complains that first appellate counsel abandoned his case and “argues that, pursuant to United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657) (1984), prejudice must be presumed in his case due to a constructive denial of counsel. However, ‘for the Cronic ‘constructive denial of counsel’ exception to apply, the ‘attorney's failure must be complete and must occur throughout the proceeding and not merely at specific points.’ Turpin v. Curtis, 278 Ga. 698, 699 (606 S.E.2d 244) (2004) (Citation and punctuation omitted.). [Tepanca's] assertion that his [appellate counsel abandoned him at the motion for new trial stage] does not meet this stringent standard.’ Charleston v. State, 292 Ga. 678, 682–683(4)(a) (743 S.E.2d 1) (2013).” Biggs v. State, 319 Ga.App. 631, 737 S.E.2d 734 (January 31, 2013). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; claim of ineffective assistance by first appellate counsel was procedurally barred where second appellate counsel had opportunity to raise the issue before the trial court and didn’t. Defendant pled guilty, then moved to withdraw plea; post- conviction counsel was appointed for the motion to withdraw. After the motion was denied, a third appointed attorney sought and obtained right to pursue out-of-time appeal. Third counsel then immediately appealed instead of challenging second counsel’s effectiveness before the trial court. “‘Because his current appellate counsel was appointed [before] the grant of the out-of-time appeal [and] prior to the filing of the notice of appeal, the earliest opportunity in which [Biggs] could have raised a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel would have been in a second motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Thus, under the dictates set forth by our Supreme Court, [Biggs'] claim is barred and may only be addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dawson [ v. State, 302 Ga.App. 842, 843-844 (691 S.E.2d 886) (2010)].” Griffin v. Terry, 291 Ga. 326, 729 S.E.2d 334 (July 2, 2012). Habeas court properly found no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel following defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses. At trial, colloquy with a juror took place outside defendant’s presence, but in presence of counsel for both sides; “[a]t no time during the trial proceedings was there any objection to Griffin's absence during the juror colloquy, nor was this issue raised on direct appeal.” If the issue had been raised on appeal, it would have required reversal, without any showing of prejudice – prejudice is presumed where defendant’s right to be present at trial is violated. In the context of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, however, “ to show prejudice under Strickland where appellate ineffectiveness is alleged due to the failure to assert an error that carries presumed prejudice on direct appeal, the appellant must establish a reasonable probability that the error would have been reversible on appeal, and, to do so, must establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial had the error been prevented or corrected. Because Griffin has not satisfied this standard, his claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails.” Notes that the usual standard for prejudice in determining ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is “‘a reasonable probability that the result of the appeal would have been different.’ (Emphasis in original.) Nelson v. Hall, 275 Ga. 792, 794, 573 S.E.2d 42 (2002).” “To the extent the standard we have articulated here is inconsistent with a literal reading of our general prejudice standard for appellate ineffectiveness, we find it prudent and reasonable to deviate from the general standard where trial errors carrying presumed prejudice are involved, so as to avoid straying too far from the fundamental purpose of Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claims: ‘to ensure a fair trial .... [and] a just result.’ Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 686.”