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not. A defendant needs no reminder from the court that if he rejects the proposal, stands upon his right to trial and is convicted, he faces a significantly longer sentence.’ Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).” “We are bound by precedent … to hold that the trial judge improperly inserted himself into the plea bargaining process when he … advised Gibson that he would not give him the same sentence considerations in the event that he opted to proceed to trial rather than accept the proposed plea. Skomer, 183 Ga.App. at 309. Immediately following this exchange, the oft-wavering Gibson agreed to the entry of his guilty plea. We must conclude under these circumstances that there was a substantial likelihood that Gibson was unduly influenced to plead guilty by the judge’s comments. Consequently, the trial court erred in refusing to allow Gibson to withdraw his guilty plea.” Compare Ray v. State , 292 Ga.App. 575, 665 S.E.2d 345 (June 12, 2008) (defendant can’t complain that trial court inserted itself into plea negotiations where defendant didn’t accept plea deal). Foster v. State, 281 Ga.App. 584, 636 S.E.2d 759 (September 18, 2006). “‘After sentence is pronounced, withdrawal of a guilty plea is allowed only to correct a manifest injustice, and the trial court’s refusal to allow withdrawal will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.’ Johanson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 181(1) (581 S.E.2d 564) (2003) (See also USCR 33.12(B) [quoted]. ‘USCR 33.9 requires the trial court to make such inquiry on the record as may satisfy him that there is a factual basis for the plea.’ (punctuation omitted) State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332, 334(2) (454 S.E.2d 468) (1995). A trial court may glean the factual basis for a plea from facts put on the record at the guilty plea hearing, or the court may learn the factual basis from parts of the record outside the plea hearing so long as the court makes clear on the plea hearing record that it is relying on those other parts of the record and so long as those parts are included in the record for appeal. Id at 334-335(2).” Rodriguez v. State, 280 Ga.App. 423, 634 S.E.2d 182 (July 11, 2006). No manifest injustice requiring that defendant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea: “the waiver of rights form signed by Rodriguez incorrectly states that the maximum term of imprisonment he faced was 30 years, rather than 31 years. Nevertheless, given that Rodriguez was correctly informed of the maximum sentence at the plea hearing and that he acknowledged his understanding that the maximum possible sentence was 31 years, we find that the mistake on the waiver of rights form is not a manifest injustice requiring reversal of the trial court’s refusal to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea.” Williams v. State, 279 Ga.App. 388, 631 S.E.2d 417 (May 12, 2006). 1. “A defendant has an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea at any time before sentence is orally pronounced by the trial court. OCGA § 17-7-93(b). After sentence is pronounced, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea only upon a timely motion for withdrawal showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Wells v. State, 276 Ga.App. 844 (625 S.E.2d 90) (2005). Moreover, after the defendant has been sentenced, the question of whether he may withdraw his guilty plea is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly abused. Smith v. State, 249 Ga.App. 666 (549 S.E.2d 487) (2001).” No abuse of discretion here: “Williams has cited nothing in the record to indicate his guilty plea was anything other than knowing and voluntary. Nor has he cited any manifest injustice in the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” Accord, Hollman v. State , 280 Ga.App. 53, 633 S.E.2d 395 (June 21, 2006). 2. “When a defendant challenges the validity of his guilty plea, the state bears the burden of showing that the plea was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. See Carter v. State, 272 Ga.App. 158, 160(2) (611 S.E.2d 790) (2005). The state may meet this burden in two ways: (1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or (2) filling a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Smith, supra.” State was able to do so here through transcript and written petition to enter guilty plea. Accord, Luviano v. State , 291 Ga.App. 677, 662 S.E.2d 770 (May 23, 2008). David v. State, 631 Ga.App. 714, 631 S.E.2d 714 (May 8, 2006). “David appears to argue that her guilty plea on the felony obstruction charge should be set aside because there purportedly was evidence that she had a meritorious defense to the charge. However, the simple fact that a defendant may have a meritorious defense is not sufficient to set aside a guilty plea; indeed, one of the primary effects of a guilty plea is that it ‘acts as a waiver of all defenses, known and unknown.’ (Citation omitted.) Ramsey v. State, 267 Ga.App. 452, 454 (600 S.E.2d 399) (2004). Furthermore, it is clear from David’s own testimony at the motion hearing that she was aware of her potential defense prior to the entry of her plea, and she acknowledged in the Petition she signed that she had been advised by her counsel of ‘any possible defenses [she] may have including the right to challenge the legality of any statement, confession, or other evidence obtained or seized from [her].’ Thus, David’s argument lacks merit.” See also Carr (October 30, 2006), above (guilty plea specifically agreeing to concurrent sentences in return for dismissal of other charges waived right to claim merger).