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Accord, Schlau v. State , 282 Ga.App. 460, 638 S.E.2d 895 (November 17, 2006); Henry v. State , 284 Ga.App. 439, 644 S.E.2d 191 (March 22, 2007); Greason v. State , 312 Ga.App. 859, 720 S.E.2d 311 (November 23, 2011). Norris v. State, 277 Ga.App. 289, 626 S.E.2d 220 (January 19, 2006). “It is true that ‘[j]udicial participation in the plea negotiation process is prohibited in this state.’ Wyman v. State, 267 Ga.App. 118, 120-121(3) (598 S.E.2d 855) (2004). For example, the court may not call a special in-chambers conference for the purpose of discussing a guilty plea and then in that conference repeatedly inform the defendant that if he pled guilty, there were ‘90 percent odds’ that the court would impose a life-without-parole sentence rather than a death sentence (only then to impose a death sentence following a guilty plea). McDaniel v. State, 271 Ga. 552, 554(2) (522 S.E.2d 648) (1999). A court may only indicate whether it will concur with a tentative plea agreement; it may not participate in the plea negotiation process. Id. at 553-554(2). See Skomer v. State, 183 Ga.App. 308, 309-310 (358 S.E.2d 886) (1987). No such participation occurred here. Rather, responding simply to inquiries from defense counsel, the court refused to give any assurances as to what sentence would be imposed if a guilty plea were entered and instead reminded Norris that although 30 years seemed like the high end, he would face up to possibly 90 years in prison if he pled guilty. This hardly constitutes participation in the plea negotiation process but instead reflects straight-forward, non-committal statements by the court that gave Norris no assurances nor in any way misled him. The court specifically referenced that it would have to consider the victim-impact testimony before it could decide on a sentence. Norris’s claim that such statements – solicited by his own counsel – constituted improper participation by the court in the plea negotiation process must fail. Thus, Norris has failed to show that the court manifestly abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on this ground.” Storch v. State, 276 Ga.App. 789, 625 S.E.2d 70 (December 12, 2005). 1. “Storch contends that the trial court erred in failing to inform him prior to sentencing that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. It is true that an accused has an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea before ‘judgment is pronounced.’ OCGA § 17-7-93(b). See also Brown v. State, 261 Ga.App. 448, 450(2) (582 S.E.2d 588) (2003). The trial court, however, is only obligated to inform the defendant personally of this right if it intends to reject a negotiated plea agreement. See State v. Germany, 246 Ga. 455, 456(1) (271 S.E.2d 851) (1980); McMillan v. State, 266 Ga.App. 749, 750 (598 S.E.2d 371) (2004). In this case, the trial judge accepted the negotiated agreement and thus was not required to tell Storch about his right to withdraw the plea. See id.” Accord, Ethridge v. State , 283 Ga.App. 289, 641 S.E.2d 282 (January 19, 2007); Belcher v. State , 304 Ga.App. 645, 697 S.E.2d 300 (June 28, 2010); Usman v. State , 330 Ga.App. 521, 768 S.E.2d 110 (January 7, 2015). 2. Defendant’s right to withdraw plea ended when sentence was orally pronounced by court. Accord, McCroskey v. State , 280 Ga.App. 638, 634 S.E.2d 824 (July 25, 2006); Kaiser v. State , 285 Ga.App. 63, 646 S.E.2d 84 (March 28, 2007). 3. Trial court’s jurisdiction to permit withdrawal of plea ended when defendant filed his notice of appeal. Accord, Arnold v. State , 278 Ga.App. 188, 628 S.E.2d 605 (March 10, 2006); Carleton v. State , 302 Ga.App. 29, 690 S.E.2d 426 (January 13, 2010). Buff v. State, 276 Ga.App. 249, 622 S.E.2d 915 (November 4, 2005). “‘It is well settled that after a sentence is pronounced, as here, permission to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea lies within the trial court’s sound discretion, and the court’s decision will not be disturbed unless that discretion is manifestly abused.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sibley v. State, 249 Ga.App. 664, 550 S.E.2d 104 (2001).” No abuse of discretion shown here, where request to withdraw was based solely on defendant changing his mind after entering his plea. Accord, Wells v. State , 276 Ga.App. 844, 625 S.E.2d 90 (December 13, 2005); Lawton v. State , 285 Ga.App. 45, 645 S.E.2d 571 (April 12, 2007). Trimble v. State, 274 Ga.App. 536, 618 S.E.2d 163 (July 21, 2005) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)). “The trial court did not err when it denied Trimble’s motions [without hearing] on the ground that new counsel’s conflict letter failed to comply with Uniform Superior Court Rule 17.1. See Withrow v. Withrow, 278 Ga. 525, 525-526(1) (603 S.E.2d 276) (2004) (prioritization of cases under Rule 17.1 cannot be changed without agreement of presiding judge in each case); Jones v. State, 276 Ga. 171, 173 (575 S.E.2d 456) (2003) (unauthorized request for leave of absence amounts to waiver of right to hearing on motion for new trial).” Rosser v. State, 273 Ga.App. 745, 615 S.E.2d 842 (June 17, 2005). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea (to charges not disclosed in opinion). USCR 33.10, which requires that a defendant be given an opportunity to withdraw a negotiated plea where the trial court intends to vary from the recommended sentence, does not apply to non-negotiated pleas such as Rosser’s. Accord, James v. State , 326 Ga.App. 231, 756 S.E.2d 312 (March 13, 2014); Usman v. State , 330 Ga.App. 521, 768 S.E.2d 110 (January 7, 2015). Hardeman v. State, 273 Ga.App. 550, 615 S.E.2d 611 (June 7, 2005). “[The] testimony raised a factual issue of whether Hardeman was under the influence of a drug at the time of the plea and, even if he was, of whether it effected [sic] him