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sufficiently to establish that his plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Because resolution of factual questions are for the trial court, we find no abuse of discretion. See Caudell v. State, 262 Ga.App. 44, 47 (584 S.E.2d 649) (2003) (denial of motion to withdraw plea affirmed despite defendant’s new claim that he was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of his plea hearing); Hogue v. State, 163 Ga.App. 543, 544(1) (295 S.E.2d 214) (1982).” Payne v. State, 271 Ga.App. 619, 610 S.E.2d 572 (February 11, 2005). “‘When the validity of a guilty plea is challenged, the state bears the burden of showing affirmatively from the record that the defendant offered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. However, if the motion to withdraw is based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant bears the burden of showing that, had it not been for his attorney’s deficient representation, a reasonable probability exists that he would have insisted on a trial.’ (Footnotes and punctuation omitted.) Hill v. State, 267 Ga.App. 357-358 (599 S.E.2d 307) (2004).” Transcript showed thorough review of due process rights being waived, satisfaction with counsel, acknowledgment of guilt, and denial of promises or coercion inducing the plea. “‘After the trial court accepts a plea based on these procedural safeguards, a defendant seeking to withdraw a plea must prove that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 268 Ga.App. 723, 725(2) (603 S.E.2d 73) (2004).” Accord, Norris v. State , 277 Ga.App. 289, 626 S.E.2d 220 (January 19, 2006); Moon v. State , 286 Ga.App. 360, 649 S.E.2d 355 (July 6, 2007). State v. Stinson, 278 Ga. 377, 602 S.E.2d 654 (September 13, 2004). Having pled guilty and entered into a “drug court” contract with the trial court, defendant could not withdraw that guilty plea upon being dismissed from the drug court program. “A defendant like Stinson, who has pled guilty and utilized the benefits of a rehabilitative option in order to avoid an adjudication of guilt may not withdraw the plea as a matter of right under OCGA § 17-7-93(b).” Analogized to Davenport v. State , 136 Ga.App. 913, 222 S.E.2d 644 (1975) (guilty plea entered pursuant to First Offender Act cannot be withdrawn although adjudication of guilt has been withheld; to allow such would “frustrate the purpose of the First Offender Act.”). Reverses Stinson v. State , 264 Ga.App. 774, 592 S.E.2d 141 (November 26, 2003). Accord, Winkles v. State , 275 Ga.App. 351, 620 S.E.2d 594 (September 1, 2005) (but note, here sentence had not yet been pronounced – an apparent misconstruction of Stinson ); Brundidge (February 25, 2010), above. United States v. Dominguez-Benitez, 542 U.S.74, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (June 14, 2004). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, “a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11 [regarding recital of the rights waived by pleading guilty], must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is ‘“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”’ of the proceeding. Strickland [ v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668] at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, [80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)]; [Unites States v.] Bagley, [473 U.S. 667] at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, [87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)] (opinion of Blackmun, J.).” Court may consider, among other things, the strength of the State’s case and the defendant’s apparent willingness to go to trial. Expressly notes that this test has no application “when the record of a criminal conviction obtained by guilty plea contains no evidence that a defendant knew of the rights he was putatively waiving;” there, “the conviction must be reversed. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).” Applicable only in federal courts, but may be persuasive authority in state courts. Hill v. State, 267 Ga.App. 357, 599 S.E.2d 307 (May 11, 2004). “When the validity of a guilty plea is challenged, the state bears the burden of showing affirmatively from the record that the defendant offered his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. [Cit.] However, if the motion to withdraw is based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant bears the burden of showing that, had it not been for his attorney’s deficient representation, a reasonable probability exists that he would have insisted on a trial. [Cit.]” See also Payne (February 11, 2005), above. Rice v. State, 277 Ga. 649, 594 S.E.2d 335 (March 8, 2004). “‘It is well settled that when the term of court has expired in which a defendant was sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea the trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the plea. Jarrett v. State, 217 Ga.App. 627 (458 S.E.2d 414) (1995). [Rice’s] only available means to withdraw his guilty plea is through habeas corpus proceedings, id . at 628, and the trial court therefore properly denied [Rice’s] application.’ Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 (507 S.E.2d 419) (1998).” Accord , Martin v. State , 266 Ga.App. 190, 596 S.E.2d 705 (March 10, 2004); McMillian v. State , 266 Ga.App. 749, 598 S.E.2d 371 (April 2, 2004); Deloach v. State , 267 Ga.App. 472, 600 S.E.2d 414 (May 18, 2004); Woodson v. State , 267 Ga.App. 636, 600 S.E.2d 717 (June 2, 2004); Darley v. State , 278 Ga. 121, 598 S.E.2d 507 (June 28, 2004); Reese v. State , 269 Ga.App. 119, 603 S.E.2d 685 (August 12, 2004); State v. Manders , 271 Ga.App. 315, 609 S.E.2d 658 (January 20, 2005) (“‘[T]his rule applies even if