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ruling on the merits of the claim). “An assertion that a judgment is void because venue is improper is cognizable under OCGA § 17-9-4, and the denial of such a motion is directly appealable. Wallace v. State, 284 Ga. 429, 667 S.E.2d 591 (2008). See also Chester v. State, 284 Ga. 162, 163(2), 664 S.E.2d 220 (2008).” But see Harper (November 23, 2009), above. Brown v. State, 297 Ga.App. 7, 678 S.E.2d 172 (May 8, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to void judgment, “in which he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the voluntariness of his confession, and his trial counsel's effectiveness. Brown also argued in his motion that the state violated his constitutional rights when it failed to reveal all deals.” “‘To qualify for consideration as a motion filed pursuant to OCGA § 17-9-4, a motion to vacate a conviction as void must allege a ground upon which the judgment of conviction entered against a criminal defendant can be declared void. The denial of the motion is directly appealable if the convicted defendant raised in his motion allegations which would render his conviction void. If the ground raised is not one which would void the conviction, the motion does not qualify as [a] § 17-9-4 motion. In the latter circumstance, a convicted defendant must raise the issue in a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, an extraordinary motion for new trial, a petition for writ of habeas corpus, or a motion in arrest of judgment.’ (Citations omitted.) Chester v. State, 284 Ga. 162, 163(2) (664 S.E.2d 220) (2008). See also Shields v. State, 276 Ga. 669, 670-671(3) (581 S.E.2d 536) (2003) (requires dismissal of an appeal from the denial of a § 17-9-4 motion where a convicted defendant raises sufficiency of the evidence as an issue).” But see Harper (November 23, 2009), above. Johnson v State, 287 Ga.App. 759, 652 S.E.2d 836 (October 9, 2007). Twenty years after pleading guilty to eight offenses including burglary, armed robbery and aggravated assault, defendant filed a pro se motion in the trial court styled “Motion to Correct Void Judgment and to Correct Illegally Merged Sentence.” “In support of his contention that the judgment was void, Johnson alleged that various counts in the indictment should have merged; that there were no facts to establish essential elements of the burglary charge and both armed robbery charges, and that the indictment was fatally defective for lack of notice on the burglary charge. Based on these allegations, Johnson moved for the superior court to void the judgment pursuant to OCGA § 17-9-4, which provides that ‘[t]he judgment of a court having no jurisdiction of the person or subject matter, or void for any other cause, is a mere nullity and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it.’ [fn] Johnson’s motion, which essentially seeks to vacate the judgment of conviction, is contrary to the longstanding rule that ‘a motion to vacate a judgment will not lie in a criminal case.’ Wright v. State, 277 Ga. 810, 811 (596 S.E.2d 587) (2004). Moreover, OCGA § 17-9-4 is not at odds with this rule and ‘does not authorize a departure from the recognized procedures for challenging a criminal conviction.’Id.” Wright v. State, 277 Ga. 810, 596 S.E.2d 587 (May 3, 2004). Thirteen years after pleading guilty to murder, armed robbery, and other felonies, defendant filed an “extraordinary motion to modify void sentence” based on an alleged defect in the indictment and ineffective assistance of counsel. Held, while defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is cognizable in a habeas proceeding, he has no remedy in the trial court. His claim as to a void indictment (no allegation of venue) “is cognizable in a motion in arrest of judgment under OCGA § 17-9-61 [cit.],” but such a motion “must be filed within the same term of court in which the judgment was entered,” and “a motion to vacate a judgment will not lie in a criminal case.” Accord, Jackson v. State , 269 Ga.App. 477, 604 S.E.2d 576 (September 7, 2004); Williams v. State , 283 Ga. 94, 656 S.E.2d 144 (January 8, 2008); Jones v. State , 290 Ga.App. 490, 659 S.E.2d 875 (March 24, 2008). Barber v. State, 240 Ga.App. 156, 522 S.E.2d 528 (September 14, 1999). After entry of defendant’s plea of guilty but mentally ill on child molestation charges, trial court properly denied defendant’s out-of-term “petition to correct a void judgment, claiming that, at the time he entered his plea, the sentencing court failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of OCGA § 17-7-131(b)(2).” Procedures here satisfied the code section, but even if they didn’t, “the ‘guilty but mentally ill’ plea is for the benefit of the defendant, because (1) it provides for mental health treatment during the sentence, and (2) it recognizes a reduced level of culpability. Therefore, if the sentencing court failed to strictly comply with OCGA § 17-7-131(b)(2), such failure inured to Barber's benefit and was harmless error. See Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga.App. 478, 482(2), 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983).” W. VOID SENTENCE, MOTION TO VACATE Hudson v. State, 334 Ga.App. 166, 778 S.E.2d 406 (October 14, 2015). Following defendant’s conviction for armed robbery and related offenses, no error in denying motion to correct void sentence. Contrary to defendant’s argument, “OCGA § 16-8-41(b), which provides that a person convicted of the offense of armed robbery shall be punished by ‘imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years,’” is not “unconstitutionally vague