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because it provides two maximum sentences, one of life imprisonment and another of 20 years.” Based on Corey v. State, 216 Ga.App. 180, 180-181, 454 S.E.2d 154 (1995) (“The courts of this state have consistently held that the maximum penalty upon conviction for armed robbery is life imprisonment. As an alternative to imposing this maximum sentence, under OCGA § 16–8–41(b), a court also has the discretion to impose a determin[ate] sentence of any period of time between five and twenty years.”). “Because OCGA § 16–8–41(b) is not ambiguous in its provision for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and because Hudson’s sentence of life imprisonment falls within the statutory range of punishment, his sentence is not void.” Humphrey v. State, 297 Ga. 349, 773 S.E.2d 760 (June 15, 2015). Following negotiated plea and sentence of guilty but mentally ill to murder, trial court erred by denying motion to vacate void sentence. 1. When defendant was by law eligible for parole after 14 years, superior court had no power to prohibit parole sooner than 25 years, even with defendant’s consent. “It is true that Humphrey consented to his sentence, including the provision that he would be ineligible for parole for the first 25 years of that sentence. But when a court imposes a criminal punishment that the law does not allow, the sentence is not just an error, it is void. See Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 611(1) (409 S.E.2d 517) (1991) (‘A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.’ (Citation omitted.)). And as we have indicated in a number of cases, the consent of the parties cannot validate a void sentence. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 293 Ga. 705, 706(1) (749 S.E.2d 660) (2013) (‘[A] defendant who knowingly enters into a plea agreement and accepts the benefit of that bargain does not waive or ‘bargain away’ the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.’ (Citations omitted.)); Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 8(2) (749 S.E.2d 672) (2013) (‘A defendant who knowingly enters into a plea agreement does not waive the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.’ (Citation omitted.)); von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 573(2) (748 S.E.2d 446) (2013) (‘[A] sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.’ (Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.)); Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 487(2)(c) (746 S.E.2d 109) (2013) (‘Void convictions and illegal sentences have never been subject to general waiver rules.’).” 2. Attempt to limit parole violates separation of powers. “ By imposing such a sentence, a court intrudes upon the constitutional prerogative of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles to extend clemency to persons under sentence. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. II(a) (‘[T]he State Board of Pardons and Paroles shall be vested with the power of executive clemency, including the powers to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles....’),” citing “ Terry v. Hamrick, 284 Ga. 24, 25(2) (663 S.E.2d 256) (2008). And whatever the prosecuting attorneys and defendant in a criminal case might agree to, they cannot simply by agreement confer upon the judicial branch an extraconstitutional power to limit the constitutional prerogatives of another branch of the government. See Perez v. State, 254 Ga.App. 872, 873(1) (564 S.E.2d 208) (2002) (‘The authority to grant parole or other relief from the sentence imposed by the trial court rests with the State Board of Pardons & Paroles, not the district attorney's office .’ (Citation omitted.)). To the extent that we held otherwise in Baker v. State, 284 Ga. 280, 281(2) (663 S.E.2d 261) (2008), we overrule that decision.” 3. Suggests, however, that defendant may be held to his bargain. “[Defendant] also promised that he would not seek parole for 25 years. No one should misunderstand our decision as holding that his promise not to seek parole is unenforceable. When a defendant promises the State that he will not ask for parole, his promise is a personal one. It does not require a court to do anything, and it does not purport to limit the constitutional power of the Board. If Humphrey breaks his promise and applies to the Board for parole before he has served 25 years, the State may ask the Board itself or a court to enforce the promise. We express no opinion today about the availability of a remedy for the State, but our decision does not foreclose the possibility of such a remedy.” Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 766 S.E.2d 1 (October 20, 2014). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed, but Supreme Court, on its own motion, corrects error in sentencing. Trial court improperly merged underlying felonies with felony murder, then merged felony murder with malice murder. Correct procedure would be to vacate felony murder based on malice murder conviction, then also enter sentence on any of the other felonies that aren’t included in the malice murder as a matter of fact – here, firearms and armed robbery charges. “Obviously, Hulett has no reason to complain about these sentencing errors on appeal, as they do no harm to him. The record clearly shows that the State induced the error, which may explain the State's failure to appeal; however, ‘[i]nduced error cannot serve to render a void judgment valid.’ Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 408, 410 n. 2(2), 577 S.E.2d 570 (2003).” “In so doing, we disapprove the dicta in Wright v. State, 243 Ga.App. 167, 169, n. 2, 532 S.E.2d 724 (2000) indicating that an appellate court should decline to review a void sentence where the State has failed to appeal it.” Accord, Busby v. State , 332 Ga.App. 646, 774 S.E.2d 717 (June 29, 2015) (defendant could argue on appeal that sentences should have merged although counsel agreed at sentencing that they did not; “‘the illegality of such a judgment is not a waivable issue,’” quoting Hulett at 54(2) ). Little v. State, 327 Ga.App. 252, 7585 S.E.2d 133 (April 30, 2014). Trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to correct his void sentence; court lacked authority to revoke defendant’s suspended sentence for child abandonment