☢ test - Í

after the last child reached 18 years of age. OCGA § 19-10-1(j)(2) provides that “‘Service of any sentence suspended in abandonment cases may be ordered by the court having jurisdiction thereof at any time before the child or children reach the age of 18 or become emancipated, after a hearing as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection and a finding by the court that the defendant has failed or refused to comply with the terms and conditions upon which service of the sentence was suspended by the court having jurisdiction thereof.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The record here reveals that on February 2, 2012, when the trial court ordered that Little serve the three-year sentence, his youngest child was 8 days from reaching his 19th birthday. Because none of the children that Little was found guilty of abandoning were under the age of 18 at the time of the revocation of the suspended sentence, the court was without authority to order that he serve the sentence. The sentence is therefore void because it imposes a punishment that the law does not allow.” Kimbrough v. State, 325 Ga.App. 519, 754 S.E.2d 109 (January 14, 2014). Following defendant’s 1993 convictions for selling cocaine and related offenses, trial court should have dismissed defendant’s motion to “vacate/correct void sentence” rather than denying it. Based on von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 748 S.E.2d 446 (2013). 1. Defendant’s motion failed to present a cognizable claim that his recidivist life sentence was void. “In his motion, Kimbrough conceded that former Code section 16–13–30(d) mandated a life sentence upon a second conviction for violating subsection (b), but asserted that his 1991 drug conviction did not constitute a requisite former conviction for a violation of subsection (b). See generally Ward v. State, 299 Ga.App. 63, 64 (682 S.E.2d 128) (2009) (‘[I]n determining whether a purported motion to correct or vacate a void sentence is in fact such a motion, we look to the substance of the motion rather than its nomenclature.’) (citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted). Thereby challenging only the existence or validity of the factual or adjudicative predicate for the 1993 recidivist life sentences, Kimbrough's motion presented no claim that a sentence was void as constituting ‘punishment that the law does not allow.’ von Thomas, supra at 571(2) (citation omitted). … Because Kimbrough's motion presented no cognizable claim that a sentence was void, the trial court should have dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 569, 575(3).” 2. “ Kimbrough complains that the trial court disposed of his motion to vacate without first conducting a hearing. Kimbrough has failed to cite any authority that he was entitled to a hearing, and we find none.” 3. Lack of notice of recidivist sentencing during the original prosecution, not raised prior to this appeal, does not present a cognizable claim that the sentence was void, citing von Thomas and Ward v. State, 299 Ga.App. 63, 64-65 (682 S.E.2d 128) (2009) (“‘[F]ailure to adhere to [notice] procedures, while subject to timely appellate review as to whether sentence was lawfully imposed, does not render sentences imposed without such procedures “void” so as to secure direct appellate review subsequent to the first appeal.’) (citation, punctuation, emphasis, and footnote omitted}”). Garza v. State, 325 Ga.App. 505, 753 S.E.2d 651 (January 8, 2014). Three years after guilty pleas to street gang charges and related offenses, trial court properly denied motion to withdraw pleas and motion for new trial. Claim that grand juror was ineligible, though true, was waived by guilty pleas and didn’t amount to claim that sentence was void. Based on Von Thomas (September 9, 2013), below. Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 749 S.E.2d 672 (October 7, 2013). Following defendant’s guilty pleas on malice murder and related offenses, trial court properly denied motion to vacate void sentence. Contrary to defendant’s argument, sentence didn’t improperly sentence him to probation for murder. “It is the sentence signed by the judge, not his oral declaration, that is the sentence of the court. See Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183(4), 281 S.E.2d 604 (1981). Although both the prosecutor and the trial court during the plea hearing erroneously told Bell that he would be subject to probation, the written sentence signed by the judge and defendant and filed with the clerk shows that the trial court imposed a sentence of life with parole on the murder count and a five-year concurrent term of imprisonment on the criminal damage to property count. The sentence does not include a term of probation.” Accord, Fletcher v. State , 326 Ga.App. 389, 756 S.E.2d 625 (March 20, 2014). Moore v. State, 293 Ga. 705, 749 S.E.2d 660 (October 7, 2013). Following defendant’s convictions for murders convicted at age 17, in 2000, trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to correct void sentence. Defendant accepted sentence of life without parole in lieu of death penalty, and waiving right to appeal. “Four years after Moore was sentenced, the United States Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited the imposition of the death penalty against offenders who were under the age of 18 at the time their crimes were committed.” “Because, as determined by this Court, authority to seek a death sentence was a prerequisite for imposition of a sentence of life without parole under § 17–10–32.1, and because after proper retroactive application of Roper the State could not consistent with federal law seek the death penalty against Moore due to his age, Moore could not legally be sentenced to life without parole under § 17–10–