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32.1.” Von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 748 S.E.2d 446 (September 9, 2013). Vacating 317 Ga.App. 696, 732 S.E.2d 780 (2012); trial court erred in reaching merits of defendant’s motion to vacate sentence. Years into his sentence, defendant contended he was improperly sentenced as a recidivist, as he was, he claimed, unrepresented on one of the underlying convictions; but this contention didn’t raise a claim that the sentence was void, and therefore should have been dismissed. Importantly, defendant didn’t challenge use of the prior conviction at sentencing; if he had, the State would have had the burden of showing that he was represented by counsel in the prior conviction, per Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281 (519 S.E.2d 893) (1999). Since defendant didn’t raise the issue at sentencing, he waived it. Hampton v. State, 289 Ga. 621, 627(6) (713 S.E.2d 851) (2011). “Because such claims can be waived, they necessarily do not amount to claims that the sentence imposed was void, inasmuch as ‘a sentence which is not allowed by law is void[,] and its illegality may not be waived. ’ Funderburk v. State, 276 Ga. 554, 556(2) (580 S.E.2d 234) (2003) (citation omitted and emphasis added).” As defendant hasn’t raised a claim that his sentence was void, “the sentencing court was without jurisdiction to vacate his sentence, and neither the sentencing court nor the Court of Appeals ought to have reached the merits of the motion.” Accord, Kimbrough (January 14, 2014), above; Thomas v. State , 334 Ga.App. 4, 778 S.E.2d 18 (September 24, 2015) (“Claims challenging the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions for recidivist sentencing purposes do not amount to claims that the sentence imposed was void.”). See also Garza (January 8, 2014), above (ineligible grand juror made indictment void, but guilty plea waived issue so resulting sentence wasn’t void). Phillip v. State, 313 Ga.App. 302, 721 S.E.2d 214 (December 14, 2011). Void sentence for dogfighting and aggravated cruelty to animals reversed. “The trial court sentenced Phillip to seventeen years imprisonment, with ten to serve; the final judgment includes the phrase ‘each ct. [sic] concurrent.’” Given that each count was designated as concurrent, defendant correctly argues that the seventeen-year sentence “exceeds the maximum of five years imprisonment for each count.” Trial court erred in denying motion to correct void sentence because it was filed outside term of court in which sentence entered, see Brown (July 18, 2003), below . Ross v. State, 310 Ga.App. 326, 713 S.E.2d 438 (June 29, 2011). Defendant couldn’t challenge his allegedly void sentence by motion where he previously tried to do so in an appeal that was dismissed as untimely filed. “It is well established that ‘[a]ny issue that was raised and resolved in an earlier appeal is the law of the case and is binding on this Court,’ Perez v. State, 263 Ga.App. 411, 412 (588 S.E.2d 269) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9– 11–60(h) (providing, inter alia, that ‘any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals as the case may be’). and that ‘[t]he law of the case doctrine is not confined to civil cases, but applies also to rulings made by appellate courts in criminal cases.’ Perez, 263 Ga.App. at 412 (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Moon v. State, 287 Ga. 304, 309 (696 S.E.2d 55) (2010) (same), Roulain v. Martin, 266 Ga. 353, 354 (466 S.E.2d 837) (1996) (same). And here, Ross's current appeal involves the exact same subject matter as his previous appeal, which we dismissed for being untimely filed. In this respect, it matters not that the dismissal of Ross's previous appeal did not reach the merits of Ross's claim because the dismissal, nevertheless, constitutes binding law of the case. Cf. Howard v. State , 289 Ga. 207, 710 S.E.2d 761 (May 16, 2011) (holding that because defendant's current appeal raised the same issue as a previous appeal that was dismissed as untimely, party's current appeal was barred under the doctrine of res judicata); Norris v. Norris, 281 Ga. 566, 567–68(2) (642 S.E.2d 34) (2007) (same); Mitchell v. Oliver, 254 Ga. 112, 114(1) (327 S.E.2d 216) (1985) (same). Although the Supreme Court dismissed those appeals under the doctrine of res judicata as opposed to the law of the case, see State v. Mizell, 288 Ga. 474, 478(3) (705 S.E.2d 154) (2011), the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in those two opinions supports our holding in the case sub judice. ” “Finally, while Ross is correct in noting that a void sentence is a mere nullity and may be vacated at any time in any court where it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it, [cit.], this important legal principle is, nevertheless, subject to the equally well established principles of res judicata and the law-of-the-case rule once the issue has been raised and ruled upon. Ross is not entitled to multiple bites at the apple. He was given an opportunity to challenge the legality of his sentence in April 2006, and then to appeal the trial court's rejection of his argument. Ross failed to appeal that decision in a timely manner, and he is now bound by same. See [ Howard, supra ]; cf. Jordan v. State, 253 Ga.App. 510, 511 (559 S.E.2d 528) (2002) (holding that once a motion to vacate a void sentence has been raised and considered that decision is res judicata); Day v. State, 242 Ga.App. 899, 899 (531 S.E.2d 781) (2000) (same).” Accord, Paradise v. State , 321 Ga.App. 371, 740 S.E.2d 238 (March 19, 2013) (repeated motions to vacate void sentence barred by law of case rule). Bass v. State, 289 Ga. 101, 709 S.E.2d 767 (April 18, 2011). Habeas court erred in denying petition for relief; defendant couldn’t receive 10-year sentence for escape which occurred prior to conviction. Rather, maximum sentence was five