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years. “It follows that the sentence imposed on Bass, ten years on probation, was illegal and void. Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 611(1) (409 S.E.2d 517) (1991) (sentence is void if it imposes punishment the law does not allow). See also Zipperer v. State, 299 Ga.App. 792, 794(2) (683 S.E.2d 865) (2009) (because an illegal sentence is tantamount to no sentence, a defendant's acquiescence to such a sentence, either through plea negotiations or a failure to object, cannot render the sentence valid). The habeas court erred in failing to rule accordingly.” Same principal would apply on motion to vacate void sentence. Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 695 S.E.2d 244 (May 17, 2010). Motion to correct void sentence can’t be used to claim that sentences (here, for malice murder and armed robbery) should have merged. A claim of merger attacks the underlying conviction, not just the sentence, under OCGA § 16-1-7(a). Overrules “ Hamilton v. State, 286 Ga. 572, 572-573 (690 S.E.2d 419) (2010); Hooks v. State, 284 Ga. 531, 532 (668 S.E.2d 718) (2008); Hutchins v. State, 284 Ga. 395 (667 S.E.2d 589) (2008); Chester v. State, 284 Ga. 162(1) (664 S.E.2d 220) (2008); [and] Curtis v. State, 275 Ga. 576-578 (571 S.E.2d 376) (2002) … to the extent they may be read as allowing a direct appeal from the denial of a merger claim.” Accord, Rogers v. State , 314 Ga.App. 398, 724 S.E.2d 417 (February 28, 2012); Simpson v. State , 292 Ga. 764, 740 S.E.2d 124 (March 18, 2013); Gholston v. State , 327 Ga.App. 790, 761 S.E.2d 189 (June 27, 2014). Colbert v. State, 303 Ga.App. 802, 694 S.E.2d 694 (March 31, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to vacate his sentence; defendant’s sentence for kidnapping, aggravated assault, and related offenses was not void. Defendant “asserts that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it simultaneously sentenced him to less than the statutory maximum and sentenced him as a recidivist, pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7(a) and (c). In other words, Colbert claims his sentence was illegal because, although allegedly imposed pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7, the trial court failed to comply with that statute's mandate that it impose the maximum penalty allowed by law.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, OCGA § 17-10-7(a) provides that “the trial judge may, in his or her discretion, probate or suspend the maximum sentence prescribed for the offense.” And “OCGA § 17-10-7(c) mandates that a defendant convicted of a fourth felony ‘must ... serve the maximum time provided in the sentence of the judge .’” Disapproved “to the extent [it] may be understood for the proposition that under OCGA § 17–10–7(a) and (c), a trial court retains jurisdiction to sentence a recidivist defendant to anything less than the maximum penalty,” Lester v. State , 309 Ga.App. 1, 710 S.E.2d 161 (March 30, 2011). Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 690 S.E.2d 804 (March 1, 2010). Trial court erred in refusing to consider defendant’s motion to vacate. “[A]n attack on a sentence as unlawfully consecutive may be made at any time by means of a motion to vacate a void sentence. See Chester v. State, [284 Ga. 162(1) (664 S.E.2d 220) (2008), overruled on other grounds, Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 686 S.E.2d 786 (decided November 23, 2009)]; Johnson v. State, 298 Ga.App. 639, 643(3) (680 S.E.2d 675) (2009). Furthermore, as we stated when previously granting certiorari, the denial of such a motion is directly appealable. Williams v. State, [271 Ga. 686, 689(1) (523 S.E.2d 857) (1999)].” Decides that sentence here was not, however, unlawful, though consecutive. Accord, Simpson v. State , 310 Ga.App. 63, 715 S.E.2d 675 (June 15, 2011). Oglesby v. State, 301 Ga.App. 589, 688 S.E.2d 384 (December 11, 2009). Defendant’s guilty plea to felony theft by taking “necessarily incorporates the defendant's voluntary admission of the existence of the factual element that the stolen property had a value greater than $500. Wharton v. Anderson, 270 Ga. 22, 24(2) (504 S.E.2d 670) (1998); see Wright v. Hall, 281 Ga. 318, 319(1) (638 S.E.2d 270) (2006) (by pleading guilty, a defendant waives all defenses except that the indictment failed to charge him with a crime); Cameron v. State, 295 Ga.App. 670, 674(4) (673 S.E.2d 59) (2009) (a plea of guilty generally waives all defenses except those based upon the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea, and once a defendant solemnly admits in open court that he is, in fact, guilty of the offense charged, he generally may not raise independent claims that occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea).” Thus, sentence was not void. Burg v. State, 297 Ga.App. 118, 676 S.E.2d 465 (March 27, 2009). Sentence was not “void,” authorizing an out-of-time motion to modify sentence, where the sentence was within the limits statutorily authorized, but based on “false and misleading” information from the prosecutor. Here, defendant claims that the prosecutor falsely told the judge that the defendant had penetrated the child molestation victim, and that the defendant had AIDS. “Allegations that merely challenge the sentencing procedure or question the fairness of a sentence do not implicate voidness and cannot form the basis for a direct appeal, Jones [ v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670-671 (604 S.E.2d 483) (2004)].” Distinguishing cases where sentenced based on “evidence of an illegal prior conviction at the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., Ayers v. State, 181 Ga.App. 244, 250(4)(b) (351 S.E.2d 692) (1986), disapproved of on other grounds, Anderson v. State, 267 Ga. 116, 119 n. 4 (2) (475 S.E.2d 629) (1996).” Accord, Coleman v. State , 305 Ga.App. 680, 700 S.E.2d 668 (August 25, 2010)