☢ test - Í

Maness v. State, 265 Ga.App. 239, 593 S.E.2d 698 (January 20, 2004). “‘Following the jury’s verdict, the trial court sentenced [Maness] to a prison term followed by probation. [Maness] contends the trial court erred in imposing a waiver of [her] Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of [her] probation. [Maness] is correct that a Fourth Amendment waiver should not have been imposed absent a negotiated plea or a valid waiver of such a right. However, any error that might have taken place at sentencing is harmless. In the present case, no warrantless search has taken place in assertion of [Maness]’s Fourth Amendment waiver, and we will not presume that any search that may take place in the future under the authority of a probation officer will be unreasonable, even if it is warrantless. Because the trial court’s conditions of probation are not unlawful per se, the trial court need not modify them,’” quoting and following Millsap (May 30, 2003), below. Accord, Woods v. State , 275 Ga.App. 471, 620 S.E.2d 660 (September 9, 2005) (quoting same language). Millsap v. State, 261 Ga.App. 427, 582 S.E.2d 568 (May 30, 2003). After conviction at trial, court sentenced defendant to incarceration followed by probation, imposing as condition of probation a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. Held, “a Fourth Amendment waiver should not have been imposed absent a negotiated plea or a valid waiver of such a right.” Cited authority, Harrell v. State , 253 Ga.App. 440, 559 S.E.2d 155 (January 24, 2002) , does not seem to support this proposition, and in any event holds that “regardless of whether Fourth Amendment rights have been validly waived, if the search of a probationer is reasonable under the circumstances, it is not prohibited even if warrantless.” See also Maness (January 20, 2004), above. Cook v. State, 256 Ga.App. 353, 568 S.E.2d 482 (April 25, 2002). A condition of probation providing that the defendant is not permitted to defend himself if attacked is invalid because it could place him in danger. Massey v. Georgia Board of Pardons & Paroles, 275 Ga. 127, 562 S.E.2d 172 (April 15, 2002). Parole Board did not abuse its discretion in requiring defendant, convicted of armed robbery, kidnaping and aggravated assault, to undergo sex offender counseling. Although defendant was not convicted of a sex crime, “[s]exual offender counseling may be required of defendants who are convicted of crimes other than those designated as sexually violent offenses, such as where the crimes have sexual overtones.” Harrell v. State, 253 Ga.App. 440, 559 S.E.2d 155 (January 24, 2002). A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing to impose conditions reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the rehabilitative goals of probation. For example, in convictions for statutory rape or child molestation, it is reasonable to impose probation conditions prohibiting a probationer from being present at locations where children are present and from associating with groups dealing with children. However, such conditions must be stated with “reasonable specificity” to afford a probationer notice of the groups and places he must avoid. Therefore, following a guilty plea to statutory rape, a special condition of probation prohibiting Defendant from residing in a home with persons under 18, uniting with a family unit with children under 18 or working or volunteering for any business, organization, or activity that provides care or services to children under 18 and a special condition prohibiting Defendant from lingering, loitering or spending time at locations where children under 18 are present did not afford Defendant with required notice of groups and locations he must avoid and were too broadly worded to be related rationally to the purpose of the sentencing objective. Accord, Tyler (June 15, 2006), above. Stephens v. State, 247 Ga.App. 719, 545 S.E.2d 325 (January 29, 2001). The defendant was convicted after a bench trial of nine counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals by forcing numerous dogs to live in unsanitary wet and muddy conditions in extremely cold temperatures. As a condition of probation, the defendant was forbidden from owning any dogs. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the trial court erred by depriving him of possession of the dogs that the court found he did not treat cruelly. Held, a trial judge has broad discretion in imposing conditions of probation, and in the absence of express authority to the contrary, there is no reason why any reasonable condition of probation should not be approved. Accord, Morgan v. State , 285 Ga.App. 254, 645 S.E.2d 745 (May 8, 2007) (defendant convicted of eight counts of cruelty to animals could be ordered not to “own, possess, or care for any animal during the term of [his] sentence,” although it would prevent him from “carrying out his livelihood” as an animal groomer.). Yother v. State , 243 Ga.App. 422, 532 S.E.2d 696 (March 27, 2000). Escape conviction affirmed; sentence ordering defendant to serve probation in the county jail on work release was not illegal. Under OCGA § 16-10-52(a)(5), “a person commits the offense of escape when he: ‘[i]ntentionally fails to return as instructed to lawful custody or lawful confinement or to any residential facility operated by the Georgia Department of Corrections after having been released