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on the condition that he or she will so return; provided, however, such person shall be allowed a grace period of eight hours from the exact time specified for return if such person can prove he or she did not intentionally fail to return.’ ” Defendant contends that his sentence was void “because it purported to place him on probation, but also impermissibly required him to serve a period of confinement as a special condition of probation, which this court specifically found unauthorized in Pitts v. State, 206 Ga.App. 635, 639(3), 426 S.E.2d 257 (1992). However, under the terms of Yother's probation: ‘[a]s now crafted, the sentence does not require continuous and uninterrupted incarceration and therefore does not violate the holding of Pitts. In fact the Court in Pitts specifically recognizes that confinement for intermittent periods, such as weekends, or confinement in a facility other than a jail or penitentiary for a continuous period are appropriate conditions of probation. Id.’ Johnson v. State, 226 Ga.App. 503, 504, 487 S.E.2d 90 (1997). See also McKinney v. State, 240 Ga.App. 812, 815(2), 525 S.E.2d 395 (1999). Therefore, Yother's confinement was lawful, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a directed verdict.” Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 527 S.E.2d 847 (March 6, 2000). Condition of probation was invalid where not disclosed to defendant until sentencing concluded. Defendant was told by a probation officer, outside the presence of his attorney and the trial court, that his probation would be conditioned on the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant did not agree to this condition during the negotiations for his plea agreement, nor did the court explain the condition to him during sentencing. Held: “[W]aivers are valid on the theory that the defendant has voluntarily consented to such a condition of probation as ‘an acceptable alternative to prison.’” The defendant must be “given the option to consider whether prison was an acceptable alternative in light of this condition of probation.” Here Defendant was not told of the condition until after the sentence was already imposed. Therefore, he was not given the chance to consider prison as a viable alternative to this particular circumstance. His waiver, in turn, was invalid. See also Luke v. State , 178 Ga.App. 614 (1986) (“The condition [must be] specifically acknowledged…[and] at least impliedly consented to by [Defendant] as an acceptable alternative to prison.”). McKinney v. State, 240 Ga.App. 812, 525 S.E.2d 395 (November 16, 1999). Trial court was authorized, as a condition of probation, to sentence defendant to probation boot camp pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-35.1. “And in Penaherrera v. State, 211 Ga.App. 162, 438 S.E.2d 661 (1993), this court held that a trial court has the discretion to condition probation upon limited confinement in a detention or diversion center or in the defendant's own home. Such limited confinement does not constitute incarceration, which ‘refers to continuous and uninterrupted custody in a jail or penitentiary. [Cit.]’ Id. at 163, 438 S.E.2d 661. [fn] It therefore is the nature of the facility, as well as the length of the term, that determines whether the sentence is permissible. This distinguishes Pitts v. State, 206 Ga.App. 635, 426 S.E.2d 257 (1992), relied upon by McKinney, from this case. In Pitts, the defendant was sentenced to serve 48 months in a county correctional institution as a condition of probation. Id. at 637(3), 426 S.E.2d 257. We held that this sentence was not within the limits fixed by law. ‘[T]he trial court can, in accordance with law, sentence appellant to a fully probated sentence upon such conditions as it is authorized to impose, including either confinement in a local jail for intermittent periods, such as weekends, or limited confinement, other than in a jail or penitentiary, for a continuous period. However, the trial court will not be authorized to make a term of continuous and uninterrupted incarceration in a jail or penitentiary a condition of that probation. ’ Id. at 639, 426 S.E.2d 257.” Goode v. Nobles, 271 Ga. 30, 518 S.E.2d 122 (May 3, 1999). “[A] waiver of extradition as a condition of probation, and by extension, as a condition of a modification of probation favorable to the probationer, is valid.” “‘In some instances a condition of probation involves a waiver of a defendant’s rights including those protected by state or federal constitutions. However, the conditions of probation are not imposed involuntarily, but are accepted by convicted criminals as a condition necessary to avoid incarceration in the penitentiary. [Cit.] Whether the waiver of rights required under the condition of probation amounts to an abuse of discretion depends upon whether it is “related to a legitimate purpose underlying the criminal justice system ... [or whether defendant’s loss] of rights relates in a rational way to the purpose underlying the sentencing objective, to prevent his involvement in criminal activity by monitoring his conduct while he serves the probationary part of his sentence.” [Cits.]’ Tuttle v. State, 215 Ga.App. 396(2), 450 S.E.2d 863 (1994). See also Mann v. State, 154 Ga.App. 677, 269 S.E.2d 863 (1980) (submission to polygraph examination valid condition); Parkerson v. State, 156 Ga.App. 440, 274 S.E.2d 799 (1980) (banishment from county valid condition); Biddy v. State, 138 Ga.App. 4, 225 S.E.2d 448 (1976) (restitution valid condition).” C. JUVENILE PROBATION In re: C.M., 331 Ga.App. 16, 769 S.E.2d 737 (March 5, 2015). Order revoking probation and placing juvenile in restrictive custody affirmed. 1. Requirement of OCGA § 15-11-504 that placement “be made in the least restrictive facility available consistent with the best interests of the child” didn’t apply “as C.M. had already been adjudicated