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move which any competent attorney in the same situation would have made, by comparing the strength of the errors raised against the significance and obviousness of the alleged error passed over. The presumption of effective assistance of counsel can be overcome only when the ignored issue was so clearly stronger than the errors presented that the tactical decision must be deemed an unreasonable one which only an incompetent attorney would have adopted,’” quoting Battles v. Chapman, 269 Ga. 702(1)(a), 506 S.E.2d 838 (1998). Remanded for consideration in light of this standard. 9. ARRAIGNMENT, WAIVER Biggs v. State, 281 Ga. 627, 642 S.E.2d 74 (February 26, 2007). Trial counsel was not “ineffective based on his decision to waive arraignment in this case. Waiver of arraignment provides a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only if the defendant can show he was unaware of the charges against him. McArthur v. State, 169 Ga.App. 263(1) (312 S.E.2d 358) (1983). In the absence of any claim or evidence that Biggs was not aware of the charges against him, he has failed to show that counsel’s performance was deficient. We similarly reject Biggs’ claim that the waiver of arraignment violated his right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings against him. See generally 1983 Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII; Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 74 (90 S.E.2d 557) (1955).” Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga.App. 14, 512 S.E.2d 640 (January 8, 1999). “Waiver of arraignment provides no basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when Gomillion does not claim he was unaware of the charges against him, which is the purpose of arraignment. [Cit.]” 10. AT TRIAL, GENERALLY, See also subheading THEORY OF DEFENSE, below Long v. State, 307 Ga.App. 669, 705 S.E.2d 889 (January 27, 2011). Burglary conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on trial counsel having alcohol on his breath on day of trial. “The record shows that, on the second day of trial, Long's counsel was cross-examining an investigator when, outside the presence of the jury, the investigator told the trial judge that counsel's ‘breath reek[ed] of alcohol.’ Counsel responded to this by admitting that he had had a drink before going to bed the previous evening but stated that he was clear-headed and sober that morning and that his judgment was not impaired. Long volunteered that he wanted his attorney to continue to represent him. The trial judge evaluated counsel's performance that morning and found that there were no deficiencies in how he was cross-examining the investigator. The trial judge adjourned the trial until the following day. Long failed to show that his trial counsel was actually intoxicated on the second morning of the trial. See Laymon v. State, 261 Ga.App. 488, 490 (583 S.E.2d 165) (2003) (The appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because her claim that her attorney was under the influence of alcohol was supported by nothing more than speculation.). Nothing in the record shows that the trial court erred in finding that there were no deficiencies in counsel's performance that morning. Furthermore, Long failed to show that his counsel's performance after consuming alcohol affected the outcome of his trial, and, therefore, he failed to satisfy his burden of showing prejudice. Id.” Nava v. State, 301 Ga.App. 497, 687 S.E.2d 901 (November 23, 2009). “Nava … argues that his attorney was ineffective in failing to object to the State's violation of the rule of sequestration in keeping Douglasville police officer Zach Ardis at the prosecution table throughout the trial. He asserts his attorney should have objected to Ardis's presence or at the very least requested that the detective testify first in the case. But Nava failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by Ardis's presence at trial. Although he asserts generally that Ardis was ‘influenced’ by the other witnesses' testimony and was given ‘the opportunity to explain, clarify or corroborate their testimony,’ he points to no examples of improper influence, nor does he explain how any such instances resulted in prejudice to him. Accordingly, he failed to establish his ineffectiveness claim on this ground. See Hargett v. State, 285 Ga. 82, 85(3)(c) (674 S.E.2d 261) (2009).” Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 675 S.E.2d 28 (March 9, 2009). At defendant’s trial for murder, aggravated assault, possession of firearm by convicted felon, and other charges, no prejudice shown where counsel didn’t stipulate to defendant’s status as convicted felon. “Henderson has failed to show that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for this deficiency. See Burgess v. State, 278 Ga. 314(2) (602 S.E.2d 566) (2004).” Prior conviction here: “felonious assault with a dangerous weapon. … Henderson testified that his cousin committed the 1995 assault at issue, and that he was only implicated because he had given his cousin the gun used in the crime.” Seems to conflict with Starling (May 21, 2007), below (prejudice shown from failure to stipulate status as convicted felon, thus unnecessarily exposing the jury to the details of his prior offenses, “which were the same as two of the charges for which he was being tried, and some details surrounding them (including that both involved a handgun)).” Kelley v. State, A08A1702, 295 Ga.App. 663, 673 S.E.2d 63 (January 26, 2009). No ineffective assistance for allowing sister of seven-year old aggravated sodomy victim to sit next to victim during victim’s testimony. “Kelley has failed to