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show that the older sister influenced the victim's testimony or that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the sister to sit by the victim while she testified.” Starling v. State, 285 Ga.App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (May 21, 2007). Charged with aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel as to the aggravated assault charge when counsel failed to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon, thus unnecessarily exposing the jury to the details of his prior offenses. “Here, the facts surrounding Starling’s felon status were not relevant to the charges for which he was tried (nor did the State proffer a similar transaction argument, per Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641(2) (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991), yet the jury was informed of both the nature of Starling’s prior convictions, which were the same as two of the charges for which he was being tried, and some details surrounding them (including that both involved a handgun). Moreover, the trial court gave no limiting instruction to the jury. In this scenario, failing to either obtain an effective stipulation or a limiting instruction, and not objecting to the evidence detailing the facts surrounding the two prior crimes – which were the same as those at issue during trial – was not within the range of reasonable professional conduct to which a criminal defendant is entitled. See Vann v. State, 266 Ga.App. 238, 240(1) (596 S.E.2d 722) (2004); Whitaker v. State, 276 Ga.App. 226(1) (622 S.E.2d 916) (2005).” Seems to conflict with Henderson (March 9, 2009), above (no ineffective assistance in similar circumstances). Dixon v. State, 285 Ga.App. 211, 645 S.E.2d 692 (May 2, 2007). No prejudice where defense counsel moved for mistrial in jury’s presence. “When Dixon’s trial counsel made the statement, ‘I’m going to object, Judge, and I’m going to ask for a mistrial,’ the jury was excused from the courtroom and did not return until after the motion was overruled. The jury was then given a curative instruction, which would have been given even if the motion had not been made until after the jury left the courtroom. In view of the court’s curative instruction and the evidence against Dixon, no reasonable probability exists that the outcome of his case would have been different had counsel requested that the jury be excused before he moved for a mistrial. See Pittman v. State, 243 Ga.App. 564, 565-566(2)(a) (533 S.E.2d 769) (2000).” Makes no express finding that seeking a mistrial in jury’s presence is, or is not, error. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 870, 635 S.E.2d 259 (August 2, 2006). “Lawson … contends that trial counsel admitted to Lawson’s mother that he ‘could have done a better job’ at trial and that this admission demonstrates his ineffectiveness. But we fail to see how trial counsel’s post-conviction musings about how he could have improved his performance constitute ineffective assistance. ‘A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is judged by whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.’ [Cit.]” Accord, McNeal v. State , 326 Ga.App. 429, 756 S.E.2d 660 (March 21, 2014) (“hindsight has no place in an assessment of the performance of trial counsel and a lawyer second-guessing [her] own performance with the benefit of hindsight has no significance for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim”); Hampton v. State , 295 Ga. 665, 763 S.E.2d 467 (September 22, 2014); Phillips v. State , 329 Ga.App. 279, 764 S.E.2d 879 (October 15, 2014) (“hindsight has no place…”); Arbegast v. State , 332 Ga.App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (June 3, 2015) (not deficient to fail to object to evidence which appeared to be helpful to the defense, and which only appeared harmful in hindsight); Mohamud v. State , 297 Ga. 532, 773 S.E.2d 755 (June 15, 2015) (counsel’s testimony that he should have subpoenaed witness did not establish deficient performance); Redding v. State , 297 Ga. 845, 778 S.E.2d 774 (October 19, 2015) (counsel’s effort to cross-examine witness about his motivations for testifying against defendant without eliciting reference to defendant’s gang leadership was not unreasonable, though counsel acknowledge that “clearly looking back at it, it didn’t work.”); Simpson v. State , 298 Ga. 314, 781 S.E.2d 762 (January 19, 2016) (“hindsight has no place” in evaluating counsel’s failure to save a strike for a sheriff’s employee from another county, who was not subject to excusal for cause.). Copeland v. State, 269 Ga.App. 424, 604 S.E.2d 223 (August 17, 2004). Following forgery convictions, trial court properly denied motion to correct void sentence; defendant received no ineffective assistance. “[A]cknowledging a fact that appears on the face of the record is not ineffective assistance of counsel. ” Cross v. State, 271 Ga. 427, 520 S.E.2d 457 (September 13, 1999). “Cross … fails in his claim that [trial counsel] was ineffective in not seeking curative instructions after a spectator at trial made an inflammatory statement about Cross, possibly within the hearing of the jury. Prince moved for a mistrial, which was denied, and he then declined the court's offer to give curative instructions to the jury. He stated to the court that he thought such instruction would ‘just compound’ anything the jury might have heard. Prince's decision not to get curative instructions was part of a legitimate trial strategy and is within the range of reasonable professional conduct. Fargason v. State, 266 Ga. 463, 464(2), 467 S.E.2d 551 (1996).”