☢ test - Í

11. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, VIOLATION OF Grayer v. State, 282 Ga. 224, 647 S.E.2d 264 (June 25, 2007). No ineffective assistance where defense counsel improperly turned over to prosecution, as a part of reciprocal discovery, items that were covered by attorney-client privilege and work product (notes of witness interviews, defendant’s notes thereon, etc.); State agreed to return all of the disputed items except one statement from a witness; defendant fails to show how this witness’s “testimony actually undercut his defense.” 12. BIFURCATION, FAILURE TO SEEK Slan v. State, 316 Ga.App. 843, 730 S.E.2d 565 (July 13, 2012). Convictions for robbery and simple battery affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to seek bifurcation of charge of felon in possession of firearm. Defendant intended to testify at trial, and underlying felony would be admissible in impeachment regardless of bifurcation. “‘Trial counsel's decision not to move for a bifurcated trial was ... the result of his choice of trial tactics based on his conversations with [Slan]....’ Harris v. State, 234 Ga.App. 126, 129(3) (505 S.E.2d 49) (1998) (citation omitted).” Vann v. State, 266 Ga.App. 238, 596 S.E.2d 722 (March 12, 2004). Defendant received ineffective assistance when counsel failed to seek bifurcation of possession of firearm by convicted felon charges from other charges without any “compelling reason.” State’s argument that subject was only raised by certified copy of prior conviction, and mentioned only briefly during closing argument, is unavailing. Evidence against defendant was not overwhelming, thus defendant’s convictions are reversed and remanded for new trial. Tucker v. State, 245 Ga.App. 551, 538 S.E.2d 458 (August 15, 2000). Convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer and related offenses affirmed; no prejudice shown from counsel’s failure to seek bifurcation of trial on possession of firearm by convicted felon. “Assuming without deciding that trial counsel was deficient in not moving to bifurcate the trial, Tucker has not shown that but for the deficiency, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Evidence showing his prior drug conviction was properly presented to the jury as a similar transaction. Therefore, trying the aggravated assault charge apart from the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge would not have prevented the jury from hearing that Tucker was a convicted felon.” 13. BOLSTERING WITNESS CREDIBILITY, FAILURE TO OBJECT, See also subheading EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT, FAILURE TO OBJECT, below Ponder v. State, 332 Ga.App. 576, 774 S.E.2d 152 (June 25, 2015). Rape and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to bolstering by victim’s mother. “[T]rial counsel explained that his theory of defense was that the victim's mother was so biased against Ponder that she was ready to believe whatever bad things the victim said about him, so he wanted her to keep talking as much as possible to display her bias. Additionally, he thought that the more the mother testified, the crazier she sounded and therefore he did not object when she testified about her suspicions, her gut instincts, her ‘woman instincts,’ and her spirituality. Trial counsel testified at the new trial hearing that he used the mother's testimony to his advantage during his cross-examination of her, which brought out that, despite her professed suspicions, she continued to let her daughter go stay with Ponder overnight. During closing, he argued that the fact that the victim's mother did not like Ponder was apparent from her demeanor on the stand, and that she was ‘quite willing to believe the very worst of Mr. Ponder the second she heard’ the victim's accusations. Trial counsel's decision not to object to the testimony of the victim's mother that she believed her daughter was thus strategic in nature, and the trial court did not err in concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective on this ground.” Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 593, 740 S.E.2d 147 (March 18, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective performance based on counsel’s failure to object to GBI agent’s testimony bolstering credibility of victim’s mother. Counsel failed to object when agent was asked if the mother’s statements to him had been consistent, and whether the agent believed she had been truthful. At hearing on motion for new trial, counsel acknowledged that the testimony “was probably objectionable” and gave no strategic reason for not objecting, but Supreme Court supplies “several reasons that a reasonable lawyer might not have objected to the bolstering testimony at issue”: to show that the investigation wasn’t thorough or objective; that counsel didn’t deem the testimony to be harmful; and that counsel didn’t want to emphasize the testimony or make the jury think “that the defense was worried about” it. Benham concurs specially, would find counsel’s performance deficient but find no prejudice. “In the absence of evidence that counsel made a strategic decision, it seems peculiar for this Court to go through a litany of possible reasonable strategies and assume defense counsel acted pursuant to one of them,” Benham comments in a footnote, to which the majority responds: “[t]hat approach, however, is precisely what Strickland compels, inasmuch as ‘counsel is strongly presumed to