☢ test - Í

Gould v. Patterson, 253 Ga.App. 603, 560 S.E.2d 37 (January 16, 2002). Modification of Defendant’s probation pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34(g) to require sex offender counseling at his expense did not require prior notice or a hearing because it did not result in an increase in his sentence or additional punishment; rather, the purpose of the modification was clearly rehabilitative. E. PROBATION, GENERALLY O’Neal v. State, 304 Ga.App. 548, 696 S.E.2d 490 (June 22, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation affirmed; “good cause” was shown to require more than two years of supervised probation “to protect children” and to require that defendant have no contact with the child victims. Humphrey v. State, 301 Ga.App. 877, 689 S.E.2d 102 (December 30, 2009). Contrary to defendant’s assertion, OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(2) requires only that probation supervision, not probation itself, terminate after two years if all financial obligations are met, “unless specially extended or reinstated by the sentencing court upon notice and hearing and for good cause shown.” “For those sentenced to probation for longer than two years, at the end of the two-year supervised period provided in the statute, the probation does not end but merely becomes unsupervised.” Hwang v. State, 293 Ga.App. 815, 668 S.E.2d 325 (October 3, 2008). Trial court erred in ruling that defendant’s conviction for driving on suspended license carried mandatory minimum sentence of ten days to serve in jail which could not be probated. On second offenses for driving on suspended license, “OCGA § 40-5-121 provides that the defendant ‘shall be guilty of a high and aggravated misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten days nor more than 12 months,.’ … Relying on the statute's use of the word ‘shall,’ the trial court stated that it was without discretion to probate or suspend Hwang's ten day jail term. This holding, however, was incorrect as a matter of law. Under OCGA § 17-10-1, a judge may ‘suspend or probate all or any part of a sentence’ unless: (i) the crime of which the defendant is convicted is punishable by ‘life imprisonment, life without parole, or the death penalty’ (OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1)); or (ii) the statute under which the defendant was convicted explicitly prohibits the trial judge from probating or suspending any part of the statutorily required sentence. Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 774(2) (257 S.E.2d 182) (1979); Blevins v. State, 270 Ga.App. 388, 395(5) (606 S.E.2d 624) (2004). Such circumstances were not present in this case, and the trial court therefore had the discretion to suspend or probate any or all of Hwang's ten day jail sentence.” Williams v. State, 253 Ga.App. 10, 557 S.E.2d 473 (December 13, 2001). After Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction, on December 26, 2000, he was required to begin his sentence of probation. On January 3, 2001, the trial court ordered Defendant to appear for a hearing on February 14, 2001, “to show cause ... why he should not start serving his sentence.” Defendant failed to report to his probation officer on January 9 th , 2001, and his probation officer swore out an arrest warrant on January 10, 2001. Held, Defendant could be required to report to his probation officer after December 26, 2000, the date the remittitur of the appellate court was made the judgment of the court; therefore, Defendant was subject to arrest for failure to report, regardless of the fact that a subsequent hearing was scheduled to address Defendant’s sentence. Additionally, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument that he was subjected to double jeopardy when he was required to serve his probation sentence after he was required to report to his probation officer during the pendency of his appeal. The record failed to reflect that Defendant was on probation during the pendency of his appeal and the trial court apparently gave Defendant credit for meeting with his probation officer prior to the start of his sentence. Smith v. State, 250 Ga.App. 128, 550 S.E.2d 683 (June 18, 2001). Probation revocation hearing was held before a magistrate judge sitting by designation. Defendant claimed that the judge did not have the authority to hear his case because “he was not specifically appointed to hear [it]” and “because he was not the original ‘sentencing judge’ within the meaning of OCGA § 42-8-34(g).” Held: The magistrate judge had the authority to hear the revocation petition per the § 15-1-9.1 order designating the scope and length of his assistance to the requesting court. Meanwhile, “the term ‘sentencing judge’ refers to the office and not the person.” Both the judge who sentenced defendant and the judge who revoked his probation were sitting for the same judge and thus the same office and authority. F. PROBATION OFFICERS Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (November 24, 2014). In civil case challenging operation of misdemeanor probation system, judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 1. Superior Court properly held that OCGA § 42-8-100(g)(1), “Georgia’s private probation statute,” is not unconstitutional. “While the supervision of probation is a function historically performed by state probation officers, the mere act of privatizing