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these services does not violate due process. Nothing on the face of the statute allows Sentinel or any other private probation company to deprive an individual of his or her property or liberty without due process of law nor is there anything which authorizes the creation of a private probation system that is so fundamentally unfair that it fails to comport with our notions of due process. The due process clause does not prohibit the State from entering into a contract with a private entity for the provision of probation supervision services but requires that when it chooses to do so the State continue to provide due process to individuals under its supervision.” “To the extent plaintiffs argue that the statute is unconstitutional as applied, we find the trial court did not distinctly rule on this issue in its orders.” Also, “the statute does not on its face unconstitutionally condone imprisonment for debt. … This Court has recognized a distinction between imprisonment for debt and imprisonment for criminal behavior. See Connally v. State, 265 Ga. 563, 458 S.E.2d 336 (1995) (Georgia constitution does not forbid imprisonment for criminal conduct, even though the criminal conduct also results in a civil debt).” 2. Superior Court properly ruled that private probation company could not provide services to superior court absent entry of a valid contract pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-100. “Under Georgia law, a private probation company can act as a probation provider and its employees may serve as probation officers only if the company complies with the terms and provisions of OCGA § 42–8–100(g)(1). … Because the record supports the trial court's finding that there never was an approved contract for probation services between Sentinel and the Columbia County governing authority within the contemplation and provisions of the statute, we agree that Sentinel's contract with Columbia County is invalid.[fn] Purported contracts with public entities that are entered without observance of the legal requirements are ultra vires and void. See City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc., 293 Ga. 19, 27–29, 743 S.E.2d 381 (2013) (contract with the city which had not been properly approved as required by the city charter was ultra vires and void); H.G. Brown Family Ltd. Partnership v. City of Villa Rica, 278 Ga. 819, 820, 607 S.E.2d 883 (2004). Without a valid contract, Sentinel lacked the statutory authority to provide probation supervision services to the Superior Court of Columbia County and thus had no right to collect probation supervision fees from the plaintiffs.” “Absent a valid contract, it similarly was not within the lawful power of the Columbia County courts to require probationers to submit to probation supervision provided by Sentinel or any other unauthorized person or entity, thus it was unlawful for Sentinel to extract payment from the plaintiffs for the performance of these services.” Wolcott v. State, 278 Ga. 664, 604 S.E.2d 478 (October 25, 2004). OCGA § 42-8-29, allowing probation officers to file revocation petitions, does not violate “the constitutional principal of separation of powers.” “[N]ot unlike a district attorney, [probation supervisor] works for the executive branch of state government and is charged with providing the trial court with information relevant to pending criminal proceedings over which the court alone exercises judicial authority. See In re Pending Cases, Augusta Judicial Circuit, 234 Ga. 264, 266 (215 S.E.2d 473) (1975). Accordingly, by authorizing a probation supervisor to file a revocation petition, OCGA § 42-8-29 does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers.” Huzzie v. State, 253 Ga.App. 225, 558 S.E.2d 767 (January 10, 2002). Following on Leverette v. State , below, it’s not unauthorized practice of law for an employee of a private probation company to prepare and file a revocation petition. See OCGA § 15-19-51 for the definition of practicing law. Leverette v. State, 248 Ga.App. 304, 546 S.E.2d 63 (February 27, 2001). State probation officer’s signing and submitting to the court a probation revocation petition does not constitute unauthorized practice of law under OCGA § 15-19-51. The probation officer was acting as a State agent in the preparation and filing of the petition. OCGA § 15-19-52 states in pertinent part that “nothing contained in this article shall prevent any corporation, voluntary association, or individual from doing any act or acts set out in Code Section 15-19-50.” The probation officer was a party to the action, as contemplated by the statute. Accord, Wolcott v. State , 278 Ga. 664, 604 S.E.2d 478 (October 25, 2004). Edwards v. State, 247 Ga.App. 835, 545 S.E.2d 143 (February 6, 2001). A private probation officer is an officer in or of any court under OCGA § 16-10-97, therefore, the revocation of the defendant’s probation for intimidating an officer of the court was warranted. G. REVOCATION OF PROBATION See also subheading CONDITIONS OF PROBATION, GENERAL AND SPECIAL, above Barfield v. State, 335 Ga.App. 674, 782 S.E.2d 726 (February 10, 2016). Following convictions for burglary and related offenses, evidence didn’t support probation revocation. Defendant entered a package store, discussed a purchase with the owner but didn’t make one, and left. “Approximately a minute and half later, a different individual entered the store and proceeded to rob the owner at knife point. At some point during the robbery, the store owner was able to retrieve a handgun and opened fire at her attacker. Several of her shots struck the assailant, and he left the store quickly, climbed