☢ test - Í

into the passenger’s side of a white car, and sped off.” Found at the scene: a sunflower seed with Barfield’s DNA. More sunflower seeds were found in the getaway car, but without Barfield’s DNA, and no other evidence linked Barfield to the assailant or the car. “The State failed to provide any evidence at the probation revocation hearing to show his participation in the commission of the armed robbery.” Singleton v. State, 332 Ga.App. 484, 773 S.E.2d 438 (June 12, 2015). Physical precedent only. Following guilty plea to sale of marijuana, trial court erred by revoking eight years’ probation based on technical violations and commission of new offenses. New offenses: misdemeanor marijuana possession and felony obstruction of officer. Court of Appeals agrees with defendant “that the trial court was not authorized to revoke the balance of his probation because there were no special conditions on his probation, and the trial court could only revoke five years of his probation based on his commission of felony obstruction.” OCGA § 42–8–34.1 addresses probation revocation, and subsection (c) of the statute provides for the revocation of up to two years of probation for the violation of any general condition. When the defendant commits a felony offense, subsection (d) authorizes the trial court to revoke no more than the lesser of the balance of probation or the maximum time of the sentence authorized to be imposed for the felony offense. Subsection (e) provides for revocation of the balance of probation if the defendant is shown to have violated a special condition. ” Here, maximum sentence for new offenses was five years for obstruction; and as defendant correctly notes, no condition of the sentence was designated as a special condition, as required by OCGA § 42-8-34.1(a). Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 169–170(3) (626 S.E.2d 92) (2006). Haji v. State, 331 Ga.App. 116, 769 S.E.2d 811 (March 11, 2015). Probation revocation, based on commission of new offense while on probation, affirmed. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the written revocation order need not state the basis for the revocation where the court stated the basis on the record and it was supported by the evidence at hearing. “‘We are not constrained to read the revocation order in isolation. “From the record, both the defendant and the appellate court can ascertain the basis for revocation of the defendant's probation.”’ Henderson v. State, 167 Ga.App. 808, 809(1) (307 S.E.2d 704) (1983) (quoting Brinson, supra, 148 Ga. at 381(1)). At the revocation hearing, the trial court expressly found that Haji was in violation of his probation because he committed the offense of cruelty to children, which was one of the grounds for revocation alleged in the petition. The transcript of this hearing is sufficient written record for us to determine the ground upon which the trial court revoked Haji's probation. Smallwood v. State, 163 Ga.App. 140, 141(1) (293 S.E.2d 15) (1982).” Harrison v. State, 330 Ga.App. 570, 768 S.E.2d 762 (January 30, 2015). Following guilty plea to child molestation, trial court erred in revoking eight years of defendant’s probation based on subsequent offense of theft, which carried a maximum sentence of five years. “Pursuant to OCGA § 42–8–34.1(d): ‘If the violation of probation ... alleged and proven by a preponderance of the evidence or the defendant's admission is the commission of a felony offense, the court may revoke no more than the lesser of the balance of probation or the maximum time of the sentence authorized to be imposed for the felony offense constituting the violation of the probation.’” Allison v. State, 320 Ga.App. 679, 740 S.E.2d 690 (March 22, 2013). Probation revocation order affirmed. On probation for aggravated assault, defendant pled guilty to multiple new felony theft and property damage offenses. “Based upon this plea, the trial court revoked 15 years of Allison's probation. Allison objected to the amount, arguing that under OCGA § 42–8–34.1(d), the court was limited to revoking the lesser of the balance of his probation or the maximum penalty for a felony offense, which in this case would be ten years for one felony theft by taking offense. See OCGA § 16–8–12(a). The trial court then clarified its order, stating that it was revoking ten years as to the first violation for theft by taking and five years consecutive on the remaining counts. Allison appeals, arguing that nothing in OCGA § 42–8–34.1(d) permits the court to sentence him for multiple crimes in connection with probation revocation. OCGA § 42–8–34.1(d) provides that ‘[i]f the violation of probation or suspension alleged and proven by a preponderance of the evidence or the defendant's admission is the commission of a felony offense, the court may revoke no more than the lesser of the balance of probation or the maximum time of the sentence authorized to be imposed for the felony offense constituting the violation of the probation.’” Contrary to defendant’s argument, this subsection doesn’t limit the court to consideration of only one new offense where defendant commits multiple new offenses. Citing OCGA § 1-3-1(d)(6), relating to construction of statutes: “ The singular or plural number each includes the other, unless the other is expressly excluded.” “Further, we do not believe it was the intent of the legislature to prevent the trial court from revoking cumulative portions of a lengthy term of probation consistent with multiple offenses committed by the probationer.” Sheppard v. State, 319 Ga.App. 813, 738 S.E.2d 662 (February 20, 2013). Probation revocation reversed. Defendant’s sentence for cocaine possession and related offenses failed to designate any terms as “special conditions,” so none of them