☢ test - Í

1. Expert opinion. “An expert witness … testified as to the drug testing procedures used in this case, noting that the Georgia Bureau of Investigation uses the same type of procedures. He testified that the OnTrak TesTstik has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration and that its testing method is accepted within the scientific community, and he provided a list of cases from Georgia and other jurisdictions which have approved the test. He further gave his expert opinion that the tests are accurate and have met a scientific standard of verifiable certainty. … Given the probation officer's testimony that Gaddis tested positive for marijuana and the expert's opinion that the test used is scientifically reliable, the evidence ‘is sufficient to authorize the trial court's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Gaddis failed a drug test].’ Carlson [ v. State, 280 Ga.App. 595, 599(2) (634 S.E.2d 410) (2006)]. Accordingly, the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in revoking Gaddis' probation. See Cheatwood v. State, 248 Ga.App. 617, 621(2) (548 S.E.2d 384) (2001).” 2. Judicial notice of other court rulings. “Gaddis claims that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of another superior court ruling that found the drug test in question to be of verifiable certainty. The claim is without merit. … ‘Once a procedure has been recognized in a substantial number of courts, a trial judge may judicially notice, without receiving evidence, that the procedure has been established with verifiable certainty, or that it rests upon the laws of nature,’” quoting Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525-526(1) (292 S.E.2d 389) (1982). “Furthermore, contrary to Gaddis' claim, the trial court did not err in taking judicial notice of another court's ruling. “[I]f a trial court intends to take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mann v. State, 285 Ga.App. 39, 42 (645 S.E.2d 573) (2007). Here, the trial court did just that, announcing its intention to take judicial notice of the prior court ruling in question and giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on that issue.” State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (May 31, 2011). Reversing 303 Ga.App. 718, 694 S.E.2d 136 (2010), holds that the exclusionary rule doesn’t apply to probation revocation proceedings. Based on “ Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344) (1988) (refusing to apply exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings because it would hinder function of state parole systems and alter flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings); Immigration & c. Services v. Lopez–Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778) (1984) (rule not applicable in civil deportation proceedings due to high social costs of allowing immigrant to remain illegally in United States and incompatibility of rule with civil, administrative nature of proceedings; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046) (1976) (exclusionary rule not applicable in civil tax proceedings because costs of exclusion would outweigh marginal deterrence benefits); [ United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561) (1974)] (exclusionary rule not applicable in grand jury proceedings because flexible, non-adversarial nature of those proceedings would be jeopardized by application of the rule).” Overrules Amiss v. State, 135 Ga.App. 784 (219 S.E.2d 28) (1975), and “the following cases to the extent they hold illegally seized evidence is inadmissible in probation revocation hearings: Colvert v. State, 237 Ga.App. 670 (516 S.E.2d 377) (1999) (vacating and remanding where trial court revoked probation based on evidence that may have been subject to suppression); Owens v. State, 153 Ga.App. 525(2) (265 S.E.2d 856) (1980) (reversing revocation of probation based on improper admission of illegally seized evidence at revocation hearing); Adams v. State, 153 Ga.App. 41 (264 S.E.2d 532) (1980) (holding illegally seized evidence inadmissible in revocation hearing); Porter v. State, 142 Ga.App. 481 (236 S.E.2d 172) (1977) (same); Giles v. State, 149 Ga.App. 263(1) (254 S.E.2d 154) (1979) (same); Austin v. State, 148 Ga.App. 784(1) (252 S.E.2d 696) (1979) (same).” Benham dissents. Johnson v. State, 307 Ga.App. 570, 707 S.E.2d 373 (January 19, 2011). Defendant’s probation revocation reversed, based on trial court’s failure to make required findings regarding defendant’s willful failure to pay fines and fees. Based on Bearden v. Georgia , 461 U.S. 660 (103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221) (1983): “‘in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing authority. If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternative measures of punishment other than imprisonment. Only if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.’ (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 672-673(II). Applying Bearden in Massey v. Meadows, 253 Ga. 389, 390 (321 S.E.2d 703) (1984), our Supreme Court held that the Bearden requirements also applied to cases where the payment of a fine is a condition precedent to probation and that a defendant's probation could not be withheld for failure to pay a fine absent a showing of wilfulness on his part or that alternative punishments are inadequate.” Distinguishing Dickey v. State, 257 Ga.App. 190 (570 S.E.2d 634) (2002), where revocation was upheld