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based on violation of agreement to pay $100,000 in victim restitution. “In the instant case, as in Bearden, supra, although Johnson entered a negotiated plea, he was sentenced to general fines, costs, and fees. Thus, in order to revoke his probation based solely on the failure to pay these costs, the trial court was required to make a finding as to Johnson's wilfulness, and if it concluded that Johnson was not at fault, it was required to consider other punishment alternatives, which it did not do. [fn: See Reid v. State, 204 Ga.App. 358, 362(4) (419 S.E.2d 321) (1992) (a Bearden hearing is required if probation is about to be revoked for failure to pay a fine). Compare Cannon v. State, 260 Ga.App. 15, 16-17 (579 S.E.2d 60) (2003) (no inquiry as to wilfulness required where the defendant admitted that he violated the restitution condition but promised to pay the next month, which necessarily admitted willfulness). ] Therefore, we reverse the revocation of probation and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the law.” Accord, Odom v. State , 312 Ga.App. 403, 718 S.E.2d 329 (November 4, 2011) (probation revocation affirmed; “the trial court considered Odom's testimony regarding his failure to secure employment over the course of his probation, and the court determined that those efforts were not sufficient and were not valid reasons for failing to pay restitution.”). Marks v. State, 306 Ga.App. 824, 703 S.E.2d 379 (November 16, 2010). Revocation of probation reversed. 1. “ We have held that service of probation is a privilege, and that while a person is on probation, ‘his private life and behavior may be regulated by the State to an extent that would be completely untenable under ordinary circumstances.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mullens v. State, 289 Ga.App. 872, 873-874(1) (658 S.E.2d 421) (2008). Nevertheless, the trial court has the authority to revoke a probationary sentence only when the defendant has violated rules and regulations prescribed by the court. Farmer v. State, 216 Ga.App. 515, 520(5)(a) (455 S.E.2d 297) (1995). Moreover, the trial court has the obligation to make criminal sentences, including the terms of probation, ‘certain, definite and free from ambiguity, and the benefit of any doubt shall be given the accused.’ Id.” 2. Evidence didn’t support finding that defendant violated probation by “contacting” his ex-wife where he “posted untrue statements about her on several websites.” “While a probationary condition that forbids a defendant from ‘contacting’ the victim may also be interpreted as proscribing ‘indirect contacts,’ such contacts must still be for the purpose of getting in touch with or communicating with the victim. Murden v. State, 258 Ga.App. 585, 586(1) (574 S.E.2d 663) (2002) (indirect contacts included going to the victim's workplace and asking for her and calling the victim's workplace and asking for her). Here, no evidence was presented suggesting that Marks authored the web postings in order to get in touch with or communicate with his ex-wife. Instead, this case is more like Collins v. Bazan, in which we found that a defendant's publication and discussions with third parties regarding his ex-girlfriend's private medical condition ‘obviously does not constitute ... contacting that person.’ 256 Ga.App. 164, 165(2) (568 S.E.2d 72) (2002). As a result, the evidence was insufficient to find that Marks violated the ‘no contact’ condition of his probationary sentence.” 3. Evidence didn’t support trial court’s finding that defendant “violated the terms of his probation by failing to attend a domestic violence intervention program or completing any of his community service requirement.” “Marks' sentence required him to “enter into and successfully complete” a domestic violence intervention program. The sentence did not require Marks to complete the program by any specific date during the term of his ‘Intensive Probation Supervision.’ In fact, no evidence was presented that it was even possible for Marks to have completed such a program during the approximately three months that he served on probation prior to being arrested for violating the terms of his probationary sentence. Similarly, Marks' sentence required him to ‘perform a minimum of 96 hours, and up to a maximum of 132 hours, of community service as directed by the probation staff.’ No evidence was presented that Marks was ever directed to begin his community service on any specific date or at all.” Barnes v. State, 303 Ga.App. 903, 695 S.E.2d 339 (May 6, 2010). Defendant’s twenty-year sentence for burglary was entered with “the first 10 years of this sentence be served in confinement, and that following the Defendant's release from confinement the remainder of the sentence herein imposed be served by the Defendant on probation.” After his release on parole, State brought a petition to revoke probation based on new offenses, and the trial court “ordered him to serve the balance of his 20-year sentence in confinement (13 years, 3 months and one day).” Held, “[w]e agree that the trial court erred by revoking Barnes's probation for a period that exceeded the ten year probationary period in its initial sentence. … Because the balance of Barnes's probation period was ten years, this lesser amount of time was therefore the maximum amount the trial court could revoke under OCGA § 42-8-34.1(d). See Gibson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 838, 840 (632 S.E.2d 740) (2006) (trial court erred by revoking term of probation greater than that authorized by OCGA § 42-8-34.1(d)).” Sosebee v. State, 303 Ga.App. 499, 693 S.E.2d 838 (March 10, 2010). Defendant’s probation revocation reversed; State failed to prove that search of her hotel room (revealing illegally-possessed gun) was supported by valid search warrant. Only evidence of a warrant was provided by sheriff’s testimony, and he “conceded that he never personally saw the warrant or supporting affidavit;” he only knew that a detective told him a warrant had been issued. “Because the sheriff lacked personal knowledge concerning the existence of the search warrant, the state failed to produce any competent