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evidence to prove that the search of the hotel room was lawful because conducted pursuant to such a warrant.” “The trial court's order revoking Sosebee's first offender probation, therefore, must be reversed. [Cit.]” Laytart v. State, 301 Ga.App. 621, 689 S.E.2d 50 (November 20, 2009). Defendant’s probation revocation affirmed. On probation for child molestation, defendant was found to be living with his girlfriend and her small children, in violation of instructions of his sex offender counseling. “Laytart had sufficient notice of his probation conditions, even though the term ‘sex offender treatment’ in the final disposition was not further explained. ” “At the revocation hearing, the State introduced testimony and evidence that Laytart had been instructed by Tim Jackson, his probation officer, to attend sex offender treatment, and Laytart had selected Stop, Inc.'s program in December 2007. [fn] Raymond Mullis, a sex offender counselor with Stop, testified that when a probationer begins the program, the probationer is required to sign several documents, one of which is Stop's rules and regulations for sex offender treatment. Mullis observed Laytart read the rules and regulations and asked him if he understood them; Laytart replied ‘yes’ and signed the paper on February 4, 2008.” One of those rules required defendant not “to be around minors without an approved supervisor.” “[W]e have upheld probation conditions prohibiting a probationer from ‘be[ing] alone with any child under 18 years of age,’ Harrell v. State, 253 Ga.App. 440, 559 S.E.2d 155 (2002).or ‘initiat[ing] contact with [ ]or continu[ing] uninitiated contact with a child under the age of 18.’ Tyler v. State, 279 Ga.App. 809, 817(4), 632 S.E.2d 716 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007). However, a probation condition that prohibits a probationer from merely being in the presence of any minor has been held to be over broad because it could literally be interpreted to ‘prohibit [a probationer] from shopping at virtually any store without an approved supervisor accompanying him.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 818(4), 642 S.E.2d 56. See also Ellis v. State, 221 Ga.App. 103, 104, 470 S.E.2d 495 (1996).” Defendant’s instructions were similar to the latter instruction, but not overbroad as applied to Laytart, who had moved in with his girlfriend and her small children. “Regardless of whether the condition could be interpreted in an overly broad manner, [fn] it was sufficient to put Laytart on notice that he could not reside with minors without supervision and approval.” “‘[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand,' and [ ] a person who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Izzo v. State, 257 Ga. 109, 110(1), 356 S.E.2d 204 (1987).” Miller v. State, 301 Ga.App. 706, 689 S.E.2d 46 (November 20, 2009). 1. In a case of first impression, Court of Appeals holds that indigent defendant is not entitled to “a State-provided transcript of his probation revocation hearing.” “[O]ur Supreme Court has held that ‘[w]hile an indigent is entitled to a copy of his trial transcript for a direct appeal of his conviction, such is not the case in collateral post-conviction proceedings.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Orr v. Couch, 244 Ga. 374 (260 S.E.2d 82) (1979). See Billups v. State, 234 Ga. 147, 148 (214 S.E.2d 884) (1975). ‘[T]here is no absolute constitutional or statutory right to a transcript for use in a collateral attack on a conviction.’ Boddie v. State, 259 Ga. 676 (386 S.E.2d 362) (1989). This is because ‘[t]he duty of the State ... is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process.’ (Punctuation omitted.) United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 328(III) (96 S.Ct. 2086, 48 L.Ed.2d 666) (1976). Given these circumstances, we see no reason why a probationer should be afforded a benefit not afforded to an incarcerated appellant seeking to reverse his original conviction. Therefore, we hold that Miller is similarly not entitled to a transcript of his probation-revocation hearing.” Distinguishing Nix v. Dept. of Human Resources, 236 Ga. 794, 794 (225 S.E.2d 306) (1976), holding “that an indigent parent whose parental rights have been terminated is entitled to ‘a paupered transcript of the proceedings’ for use in appealing the decision of the trial court. … [T]he Supreme Court's decision in Nix was based upon a consideration of the ‘permanent jeopardy to the precious rights in issue’ in termination cases. Nix, supra, 236 Ga. at 796. In that regard, our Supreme Court has found that termination of parental rights cases are more akin to initial criminal prosecutions and therefore are not analogous to probation-revocation cases.” “As noted, Miller argues that because he is entitled to appointed counsel in a probation-revocation hearing, he must also be entitled to a free transcript of the hearing. However, Miller's absolute entitlement to appointed counsel in a probation-revocation hearing is a right only recently conferred upon him by statute. See OCGA § 17-12-23(a)(2). Prior to the enactment of that statute, the right to counsel in such proceedings was not absolute. See Banks v. State, 275 Ga.App. 326, 328 (620 S.E.2d 581) (2005) (probationer has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel but only a limited due process right). In this context, any argument that a probationer should be absolutely entitled to a free transcript is more appropriately addressed to the General Assembly.” 2. Trial court was not required “to make a written statement setting forth the evidence upon which it relied in revoking [defendant’s] probation.” “The record in this matter includes a petition for revocation, which alleges that Miller violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for use of cocaine. A full hearing was held on the revocation petition, after which the trial court entered an order finding that Miller had violated his probation by possession