☢ test - Í

and consumption of cocaine based on his testing positive for use of that drug. Given that finding, the trial court revoked part of Miller's probated sentence. We find that the revocation petition and the trial court's order “are sufficient to enable both the appellate courts and [Miller] to ascertain the basis for revocation of [his] probation; thus, it was unnecessary for the trial court to commit its findings to separate piece of paper, when doing so would be essentially an exercise in redundancy.” (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. Boyington, 273 Ga. 420, 423 (541 S.E.2d 355) (2001). See [ State v. Brinson, 248 Ga. 381(1) (283 S.E.2d 463) (1981)]; Hill v. State, 270 Ga.App. 114, 120(3) (605 S.E.2d 831) (2004). Vacated on other grounds, 288 Ga. 153, 702 S.E.2d 137 (November 1, 2010). Legere v. State, 299 Ga.App. 640, 683 S.E.2d 155 (August 7, 2009). Trial court erred in revoking defendant’s probation based on violation of work release center rules absent proof “that the conduct that formed the basis of the court's revocation order was expressly forbidden by any terms of his work release program,” or that defendant had been notified of the program rules. Defendant here used MySpace to arrange a date at a bar over lunch, unaware that his date was a sheriff’s office employee. “According to our Supreme Court, the ‘essential requirements of OCGA § 42-8-34.1(a) are that the trial court warn of the consequences of violating a special condition; that the warning be in writing; and that the warning be in the court's sentence.’ Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 169-170(3) (626 S.E.2d 92) (2006). Accord Gardner v. State, 259 Ga.App. 375, 378(1) (577 S.E.2d 69) (2003) (special condition must be expressed in writing and sentencing document must reflect in writing that violation of the condition will result in revocation and service of the balance of the probated sentence).” “[T]he state did not prove at the hearing that Legere was notified of any rule specifying the parameters of the work-release program. … Despite Legere's dubious behavior, the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation where the state failed to offer any evidence that he was informed of the rules of the work-release program to which he was required to adhere.” “We recognize that under Georgia law, ‘[a]n inmate assigned to a work-release program who, without proper authority, leaves the work area or site to which he is assigned, ... or who leaves the vehicle or route of travel in going to or returning from his assigned place of work shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.’ OCGA § 42-1-9(e). But the revocation petition did not allege that Legere committed a misdemeanor, and the trial court did not revoke his probation on this basis. Accordingly, contrary to the state's contention, the trial court's order cannot be affirmed based on this statute.” Wright v. State, 297 Ga.App. 813, 678 S.E.2d 506 (May 13, 2009). Insufficient evidence supported defendant’s probation revocation: “Shorn of hearsay testimony, as well as non-probative character evidence, [fn] the only admissible evidence of Wright's commission of the crimes of sale of cocaine and sale of marijuana on March 29, 2008, was that a drug investigator observed Wright take something out of his pocket and give it to two men in exchange for money, and then took the two men into custody and found cocaine and marijuana in their possession. Although Wright and his cohort were also taken into police custody, no evidence was given as to any money or drugs in their possession. This evidence is insufficient to render it more probable than not that Wright sold the two men the cocaine and marijuana found in their possession.” Jowers v. State, 284 Ga. 478, 668 S.E.2d 703 (October 27, 2008). Habeas court properly denied defendant’s petition; exhibit attached to defendant’s original sentence specifically notified child-molestation defendant that his entire 20-year sentence could be revoked for violation of conditions ordering him to avoid contact with all children. “Jowers's 1999 sentence contains a virtually verbatim reproduction of the language required by the statute to create a special condition of probation. [fn] Nothing in the 2003 modification order remotely suggested that the warnings contained in Jowers's original 1999 sentence were no longer applicable. Accordingly, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of OCGA § 42-8-34.1.” Accord, Germany v. State , 315 Ga.App. 717, 727 S.E.2d 240 (April 12, 2012) (“The language warning him that if his probation were revoked, ‘the Court may order the execution of the sentence which was originally imposed or any portion thereof’—exactly the language reviewed in Jowers —sufficiently complied with OCGA § 42–8– 34.1 and authorized the court to revoke more than two years of his probation.”). Brown v. State, 294 Ga.App. 1, 668 S.E.2d 490 (September 3, 2008) 1. Probation could still be revoked though new criminal conviction (which formed basis of revocation) was reversed on appeal. 2. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s probation revocation based on alleged possession of drugs. “None of Brown’s belongings were found inside the house; Brown did not reside at this residence; and there was no testimony that Brown had ever been inside the house. The only evidence putting Brown near the cocaine was that Brown was sitting in front of the house where the cocaine was found.” Ware v. State, 289 Ga.App. 860, 658 S.E.2d 441 (February 29, 2008). Physical precedent only; Crawford doesn’t apply to probation revocation hearings. Adopts reasoning of Williams v. Lawrence, 273 Ga. 295, 296 (540 S.E.2d 599)