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(2001), “a case involving a parole revocation proceeding:” “‘Although the habeas court referred to the “constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,” [[defendant]] clearly has no Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The same minimum constitutional due process requirements apply in both probation and parole revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656) (1973); State v. Brinson, 248 Ga. 380(1) (283 S.E.2d 463) (1981); Smith v. State, 171 Ga.App. 279, 281 (319 S.E.2d 113) (1984). As Morrissey [, 408 U.S. 471 (92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484) (1972) and Gagnon make clear, the due process right to confrontation at a parole revocation hearing is less stringent than the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation guarantee in a criminal trial. Evidence that would violate the Sixth Amendment or would be inadmissible hearsay if presented at a criminal trial may, in proper circumstances, be considered at a parole or probation revocation hearing without violating the due process right to confrontation. State of Missouri ex rel. Mack v. Purkett, 825 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Mo.1992).’ (Emphasis added.) Williams, 273 Ga. at 298. Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that the Confrontation Clause did not require the exclusion of the testimony at issue . However, we do not believe that the trial court went far enough in considering whether the evidence was in fact admissible. Although the due process right to confrontation at a probation or parole revocation hearing may be ‘less stringent than the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation guarantee’ the ‘“minimum requirements of due process” include .... the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses ( unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing the confrontation ).’ (Emphasis added.) Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656) (1973), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484) (1972).” Trial court here failed to consider whether good cause existed here. Court of Appeals finds, however, that remand is unnecessary – even if evidence was admissible, it didn’t support defendant’s probation revocation. Mullens v. State, 289 Ga.App. 872, 658 S.E.2d 421 (February 29, 2008). 1. Trial court did not abuse discretion by revoking defendant’s child molestation probation based, in part, on prohibited “incidental” contact with a minor child. “That the condition requires Mullens to report incidental contact and instructs him how to address such contact should it arise does not relieve Mullens from the prohibition of all contact with any children. Further, that the probation officer might exercise discretion with respect to incidental contact does not change the fact that, once a trial court exercises its discretion in revoking probation, this Court will uphold such an exercise absent a manifest abuse.” Evidence also showed intentional contact with child. 2. At defendant’s probation revocation hearing, defendant’s statements to his probation officer, mandated by the conditions of his probation, were properly admitted over his assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege. “[H]aving accepted the original probationary conditions in a negotiated plea, Mullens validly waived his Fifth Amendment right as part of the plea bargaining process. See Allen v. State, 258 Ga. 424, 425(4) (369 S.E.2d 909) (1988) ; Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 164(1) (527 S.E.2d 847) (2000) (noting that a constitutional waiver is ‘valid on the theory that the defendant has voluntarily consented to such a condition of probation as an acceptable alternative to prison’) (punctuation omitted).” Walker v. State, 289 Ga.App. 879, 658 S.E.2d 375 (February 7, 2008). 1. Arrest based on valid affidavit was not prerequisite to revocation of defendant’s probation. “OCGA § 42-8-38(a) provides in part that ‘[a]ny officer authorized by law to issue warrants may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer upon the affidavit of one having knowledge of the alleged violation.’ We see nothing in OCGA § 42-8-38 that ties the affidavit requirement for the issuance of arrest warrants to the validity of a subsequent revocation of probation. See generally Hayes v. State, 157 Ga.App. 659, 661(10) (278 S.E.2d 424) (1981) (even assuming that [defendant’s] arrest on charges of violating his probation was illegal, this is not a bar to the subsequent revocation of his probation).” 2. “Walker claims that the trial court erred in revoking his probation on grounds of conspiracy to commit first degree forgery because he was never accused or indicted for this offense. However, whether Walker was ever charged with or convicted of the crime which formed the basis of his probation revocation does not invalidate the revocation. ‘[A] criminal prosecution and a probation revocation proceeding based on the same occurrence actually have nothing to do with each other.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Morris v. State, 166 Ga.App. 137, 140(2) (303 S.E.2d 492) (1983). See, e. g., Johnson v. State, 142 Ga.App. 124, 125-126(1) (235 S.E.2d 550) (1977) (probation properly revoked on same evidence on which jury found defendant not guilty of criminal charge).” See also Brown (September 3, 2008), above (reversal of conviction on new charges does not require reversal of probation revicaion based thereon) . 3. “‘ Due process requires that a defendant be given written notice of the claimed violation of his probation prior to the revocation hearing .’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wolcott v. State, 278 Ga. 664, 667(2) (604 S.E.2d 478) (2004). Walker received written notice in this case through the revocation petition which alleged that, among other things, he had violated his probation by committing first and second degree forgery, and in connection with those crimes, ‘criminal attempt’ and ‘conspiracy.’ Under the circumstances, Walker had both adequate notice and time to prepare a defense. See id.(petition setting forth crime, approximate time, and venue sufficient to provide adequate notice).” See also Wolcott (October 25,