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based on the same facts. Under these circumstances, Franklin cannot reasonably contend that she was not aware of the grounds on which revocation was sought, or that her ability to prepare a defense was compromised.” Mann v. State, 285 Ga.App. 39, 645 S.E.2d 571 (April 12, 2007). Failure to pay restitution was a violation of a special condition, authorizing revocation of balance of sentence, not just two years. “The trial court was authorized to revoke the balance of Mann’s probation based upon his admitted violation of the special condition of restitution imposed in his initial sentence. See OCGA § 42-8-34.1(e) (court may revoke balance of sentence for violation of special condition of probation); Walker v. Brown, 281 Ga. 465 (639 S.E.2d 470) (2007) (holding 2001 amendments to OCGA § 42-8-34.1 apply retroactively); Hill v. State, 270 Ga.App. 114, 118 n.20 (605 S.E.2d 831) (2004) (payment of restitution is special condition of probation under similar sentencing form); Cannon v. State, 260 Ga.App. 15, 17 (579 S.E.2d 60) (2003) (by admitting violation, defendant waived any challenge to sufficiency of evidence with regard to violation of restitution condition of probation).” Gibson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 838, 632 S.E.2d 740 (June 16, 2006). Trial court revoked balance of defendant’s probation – approximately eight years – based on evidence that he committed new offense of felony obstruction. Felony obstruction carries a maximum five year sentence. OCGA § 42-8-34.1(d) limits revocation of probation based on new offense to the maximum sentence for the new offense (or the balance of probation, whichever is lesser). Held, trial court thus erred in revoking more than five years of defendant’s probation. Accord, Walker v. State , 289 Ga.App. 879, 658 S.E.2d 375 (February 7, 2008) (trial court erred in revoking seven years’ probation based on commission of new offense with maximum sentence of five years). Carlson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 595, 634 S.E.2d 410 (June 12, 2006). Daubert still does not apply to probation revocation hearings, although some cases call them “quasi-criminal.” Jordan v. State, 279 Ga.App. 399, 635 S.E.2d 163 (May 15, 2006). 1. Defendant’s probation revocation partially reversed; State failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that defendant committed a new criminal offense, as the only evidence offered to prove the nature of the alleged cocaine sold by defendant was hearsay. Drug task force agent testified to crime lab results, but had no personal knowledge of the test; no one from the crime lab testified. “See Barnett v. State, 194 Ga.App. 892, 893 (392 S.E.2d 322) (1990) ( hearsay evidence is inadmissible in a probation revocation proceeding ).” 2. Probation officer’s testimony, was sufficient to support finding that defendant violated his probation, although it was almost verbatim to the revocation petition. “We agree that the state should have elicited testimony regarding specific facts which would have made it clear that the probation officer was testifying from his own personal knowledge rather than from the petition he prepared and filed. Nonetheless, the witness did testify that he supervised Jordan’s probation, which implies that he was testifying from personal knowledge regarding probation reporting and payment matters. … A finder of fact could find from the evidence that the probation officer had personal knowledge of the facts set forth in the petition pertaining to Jordan’s non-compliance with the reporting and payment requirements of his probation.” 3. As only technical violations were proven, trial court erred in revoking more than two years of sentence. Based on OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c). Accord, Klicka v. State , 315 Ga.App. 635, 727 S.E.2d 248 (April 13, 2012); Henley v. State , 317 Ga.App. 776, 732 S.E.2d 836 (October 3, 2012); Hunt v. State , 327 Ga.App. 692, 761 S.E.2d 99 (June 24, 2014). Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 626 S.E.2d 92 (January 30, 2006). Habeas court erred in failing to grant petition; trial court erred in revoking five years-plus of probated sentence based on condition not designated in writing as “special condition” – commission of new offenses. “[I]t is clear that the General Assembly recognized the significant consequences to a defendant for violating a special condition of probation, and thus required trial courts to warn defendants of those consequences in a specific manner (in writing) and place (in the sentence) so as to insure that a defendant would be notified of those consequences. Accordingly, we conclude that the substantive or essential requirements of § 42-8-34.1(a) are that the trial court warn of the consequences of violating a special condition; that the warning be in writing; and that the warning be in the court’s sentence. Because these latter two requirements were not met in the present case, we hold that the habeas court erred by ruling that the sentencing court had substantially complied with § 42-8-34.1(a)(2).” Accord, Gardner v. State , 259 Ga.App. 375, 378-379, 577 S.E.2d 69 (2003); Sheppard v. State , 319 Ga.App. 813, 738 S.E.2d 662 (February 20, 2013). Banks v. State, 275 Ga.App. 326, 620 S.E.2d 581 (September 1, 2005). Trial court’s denial of appointed counsel to defendant on probation revocation petition was based on erroneous analysis; however, defendant’s admission of the grounds for revocation made the decision correct. ‘[A] probationer has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a revocation proceeding because it “is not a stage of a criminal prosecution.” Vaughn v. Rutledge, 265 Ga. 773, 774(1)