☢ test - Í

(462 S.E.2d 132) (1995). “A probationer only has a more limited due process right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment,” and whether [she] is entitled to counsel must be determined on a case-by-case basis.’ Kitchens v. State, 234 Ga.App. 785(1) (508 S.E.2d 176) (1998). ‘It is only in a revocation proceeding “in which fundamental fairness – the touchstone of due process —” mandates the appointment of counsel that the State [is] required to provide [a] probationer with legal representation.’ (Citations omitted.) Vaughn, 265 Ga. at 774(2). While there is no precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining whether counsel should be appointed to meet due process requirements, the United States Supreme Court set forth certain criteria in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-791 (93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656) (1973). ‘ Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of [her] right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that [she] has not committed the alleged violation of the condition upon which [she] is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing upon a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for [herself].’ Scarpelli, supra at 790-791. At the outset, we note the trial court failed to analyze Banks’ request for counsel in accordance with the Scarpelli criteria and relied upon improper grounds for denying the request. Scarpelli makes no distinction for ‘technical’ probation violations or for probation violations involving new criminal charges pending in a different jurisdiction. As such, we disapprove of the proffered reason set forth in the trial court’s form memorandum. Nonetheless, we conclude that the trial court’s application of erroneous reasoning was harmless in this case. [Cit.] ‘[ Banks’] admission to having committed another ... crime creates the very sort of situation in which counsel need not ordinarily be provided. ’ Scarpelli, supra at 791. See also Hunter v. State, 139 Ga.App. 676, 677(1) (229 S.E.2d 505) (1976) (where this Court held that a probationer could not claim harm from the lack of counsel because of his admission that he had violated the condition of probation). Moreover, Banks has not claimed any reasons justifying or mitigating her violations and the record reveals that Banks capably spoke for herself. Banks has made no showing that the appointment of counsel for the revocation proceedings was necessary to satisfy due process concerns of fundamental fairness. [Cit.] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to appoint counsel to represent Banks at the probation revocation hearing.” White v. State, 274 Ga.App. 805, 619 S.E.2d 333 (July 28, 2005). Board of Pardons and Paroles’ order discharging defendant from parole “further ordered that pursuant to its constitutional powers of clemency set forth in the Georgia Constitution, ‘all disabilities resulting from the above stated conviction(s) and sentences(s), as well as, any imposed prior thereto, be and each and all are hereby removed on the above discharge date.’ The Board also ordered that ‘all civil and political rights, excluding the right to receive, possess, or transport in commerce a firearm, lost as a result of the above stated convictions(s) and sentence(s) ..., be and each and all are hereby restored on the above discharge date.’” Held, this terminated the sentence even though he had some 30 years of probation left, and trial court thus erred in subsequently purporting to revoke his probation. Wolcott v. State, 278 Ga. 664, 604 S.E.2d 478 (October 25, 2004). 1. “‘ Due process requires that a defendant be given written notice of the claimed violation of his probation prior to the revocation hearing. [Cit.]’ Collins v. State, 151 Ga.App. 116, 117(2) (258 S.E.2d 769) (1979). Here, the petitions filed by [probation supervisor] did not charge Wolcott generally with a violation of unspecified rules or laws. Compare Collins v. State, supra at 117(2) (‘broad allegation that the defendant violated “the rules at the Athens Diversion Center,” without any specification of which rules were violated....’). Instead, the petitions alleged that he committed the specific offense of aggravated assault on or about September 2, 2003 in DeKalb County. Thus, they set forth the crime, the approximate date and the particular venue. Based upon these allegations, ‘[i]n neither case could [Wolcott] reasonably argue that he was not aware of the specific grounds upon which the revocation was based or that he could not adequately prepare his defense. [Cit.]’ Wilson v. State, 152 Ga.App. 695, 697(2) (263 S.E.2d 691) (1979). Therefore, the petitions were sufficient to comply with due process requirements. Hayes v. State, 168 Ga.App. 94(1) (308 S.E.2d 227) (1983); Edge v. State, 164 Ga.App. 52(1) (296 S.E.2d 368) (1982); Hubbard v. State, 139 Ga.App. 336(1) (228 S.E.2d 362) (1976). Moreover, ‘[t]he inadequacy of a petition is not necessarily a basis for setting aside a revocation where the factual grounds are established at the hearing. [Cit.]’ Oliver v. State, 169 Ga.App. 716, 717(3) (314 S.E.2d 722) (1984). In accordance with OCGA § 42-8-34.1(b), the proof offered by the State at the revocation hearing was sufficient to authorize the trial court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Wolcott committed the offense of aggravated assault in DeKalb County in early August 2003. The one-month variance between the date alleged in the petitions and that proved at the hearing is not fatal. ‘“The (petition[s]) contained ‘on or about language,’ which was sufficient to put [Wolcott] on notice that the exact date might vary from the date contained in the (petition[s] ).” [Cit.]’ Jacoway v. State, 225 Ga.App. 712, 713 (484 S.E.2d 757) (1997). See also Lockett