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v. State, 143 Ga.App. 629, 630(5) (239 S.E.2d 238) (1977).” See also Walker (February 7, 2008), above. 2. “A guilty plea obtained in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used ‘either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense....’ Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319) (1967). However, that constitutional right does not apply in revocation proceedings. Vaughn v. Rutledge, 265 Ga. 773, 774(1) (462 S.E.2d 132) (1995). Thus, the fact that Wolcott was not represented by an attorney in the prior revocation proceedings does not affect the admissibility of the orders entered therein. Therefore, the trial court did not err in considering evidence of the previous revocation of Wolcott’s probationary status.” Postell v. Humphrey, 278 Ga. 651, 604 S.E.2d 517 (October 25, 2004). “OCGA § 17-10-1 [allowing revocation of probation prior to commencement of term of probation] is not a law that implicates ex post facto concerns.” “[L]egislative acts which implicate the ‘core concern of the Ex Post Facto Clause’ ( Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30) (1990)) under the Georgia Constitution are those which make criminal an act which was innocent when done, inflict a greater punishment than was permitted by the law in effect at the time of the offense, change the quality or degree of the offense, require less or different evidence for conviction than that required at the time of the offense, or deprive the defendant of a substantial right or immunity he possessed at the time of the offense. Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398(1) (517 S.E.2d 53) (1999). See also Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. at 42, limiting the types of legislative acts which implicate the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution to the first four listed above, and Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63) (1997) (‘To fall within the ex post facto prohibition [of the U.S. Constitution], a law must be retrospective ... and must disadvantage the offender affected by it by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime....’).” Hill v. State, 270 Ga.App. 114, 605 S.E.2d 831 (October 19, 2004). Any condition of probation, such as, here, reporting to probation officer, can be designated a special condition of probation pursuant to OCGA § 42-8- 34.1(a), even if it is also a general condition of probation. Under that subsection, the term “special condition of probation… now means ‘a condition of a probated or suspended sentence which: (1) Is expressly imposed as part of the sentence in addition to general conditions of probation and court ordered fines and fees; and (2) Is identified in writing in the sentence as a condition the violation of which authorizes the court to revoke the probation or suspension and require the defendant to serve up to the balance of the sentence in confinement.” On defendant’s sentence, “the words ‘special conditions’ are stamped beside the titles ‘general conditions of probation’ and ‘other conditions of probation,’ indicating the court’s intent that all conditions of probation be considered special conditions under Georgia law. At the top of the sentencing form appears the following stamped notification: ‘Any violation of these special conditions may result in the revocation of the entire balance of probation and may require the defendant to serve up to the balance of the sentence in confinement.’” Court thus could revoke more than two years of the balance upon defendant’s failure to report. Lewis v. Sims, 277 Ga. 240, 587 S.E.2d 646 (October 20, 2003). Subsequent dismissal of new felony charges does not affect probation revocation based thereon. Decided under former OCGA § 42-8-34.1(d). “After a full evidentiary hearing, the revoking court specifically found, ‘by a preponderance of the evidence,’ that Sims committed the felonies alleged. The fact that these charges were later dismissed is of no moment.” Dugger v. State, 260 Ga.App. 843, 581 S.E.2d 655 (April 11, 2003). Trial court could find by preponderance of evidence that defendants violated probation by possessing cocaine where white powdery substance was seized from their possession; witness testified that one of them offered to sell him cocaine; and defendants themselves referred to the substance as “dope,” notwithstanding that the seized substance disappeared from police custody before it could be tested. Distinguished from Patterson v. State , 238 Ga. 204, 232 S.E.2d 233 (1977) (“Where the defendant’s conviction or acquittal is dependent upon the identification of the substance as contraband, due process of law requires that analysis of the substance not be left completely within the province of the state.”) because conviction or acquittal not at issue, and “revocation of Dugger’s probation was not solely dependent upon the actual identification of the substance” since there was other evidence of the nature of the substance. Compare Jordan (May 15, 2006), above. Jones v. State, 260 Ga.App. 401, 579 S.E.2d 827 (March 19, 2003). Amendment to OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1), allowing revocation of probation for violations occurring before probation period begins, applies only as to violations of probation occurring on or after the effective date of the amendment, July 1, 2001. Overruled, Postell v. Humphrey , 278 Ga. 651, 604 S.E.2d 517 (October 25, 2004). State v. Huckeba, 258 Ga.App. 627, 574 S.E.2d 856 (November 27, 2002). Probation could be revoked based on new criminal offense occurring between sentencing and commencement of sentence. Based on 2001 amendment to OCGA §