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17-10-1(a), explicitly giving trial courts the “power and authority to suspend or probate all or any part of the entire sentence under such rules and regulations as the judge deems proper including the authority to revoke the suspension or probation when the defendant has violated any of the rules and regulations prescribed by the court, even before the probationary period has begun ” (emphasis in court opinion). Distinguishes Lombardo v. State, 244 Ga.App. 885, 537 S.E.2d 143 (2000), as “inapplicable in this case” because it “dealt solely with revocation before a probationary period has begun, not with revocation during a probationary period for violations” (emphasis in original). Physical precedent only; two judges concur in judgment only. Dickey v. State, 257 Ga.App. 190, 570 S.E.2d 634 (August 28, 2002). Defendant pled guilty to theft by taking of over $160,000 from his employer and pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, was sentenced to 10 years probation requiring restitution of that sum. When defendant failed to pay the first installment of $100,000, the court revoked part of his probation. Defendant argues that the court could not revoke his probation for non-payment without first determining that the non-payment was willful, citing Bearden v. Georgia , 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983). Held, the trial court could revoke the probation. This case is distinguished from Bearden because the payment was part of a negotiated plea agreement, whereas in Bearden , the payments were imposed by the court. By agreeing to the sentence, Dickey represented to the court that he was capable of paying. “When he agreed to the plea bargain, Dickey entered into a contract. ... If Dickey had any doubt concerning his ability to make the payment, he should have informed the other parties before everyone agreed to the terms. There is no evidence that he did so. Dickey’s silence, when he should have spoken, and his ultimate breach, make him culpable. He was not without fault. ... Dickey negotiated payment of restitution to avoid what likely would have been significant time in prison. Having breached the plea agreement that he negotiated, Dickey cannot now insist that he remain on probation and be excused from performance due to indigence. ...’[t]o hold otherwise would permit defendants, either in good or bad faith, to bargain for payment of a fine in exchange for a suspended sentence, renege, and then avoid incarceration or any other punishment for the offense committed.’” Cites numerous cases from other states holding similarly. Distinguished, Johnson (January 19, 2011), above ( Dickey doesn’t apply to negotiated pleas requiring payment of fines and fees). Bolden v. State, 275 Ga. 180, 563 S.E.2d 858 (May 13, 2002). “[U]nder the plain and unambiguous language of OCGA § 17-7-95(c) a nolo contendere plea cannot be used to establish a probation violation.” Reverses 250 Ga.App. 825, 552 S.E.2d 533 (2001). Meadows v. Settles, 274 Ga. 858, 561 S.E.2d 105 (March 11, 2002). Defendant was serving probated sentence, of which six years was remaining, when petition to revoke was filed. Defendant stipulated to violating terms of probation after acknowledging that he was doing so without being threatened by anyone or promised anything. The stipulation was made based upon a mistaken belief that the balance remaining was only two years. The balance was revoked and defendant sought habeas relief, arguing that defendant did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily stipulate to the revocation of six years of his probation. Held, there is no constitutional requirement that a court engage in the Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238 (1969) voluntariness colloquy before accepting a probationer’s admission of probation violations. Admitting to probation violations at a revocation hearing is not the equivalent of pleading guilty to a crime and the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between revocation proceedings and criminal prosecutions and has declined to attach to revocation proceedings “the full panoply of procedural safeguards associated with a criminal trial.” See Black v. Romano , 471 U.S. 606 (1985). Simpson v. State, 252 Ga.App. 1, 555 S.E.2d 247 (October 21, 2001). Revocation of defendant’s probation affirmed; evidence supported trial court’s finding that defendant was able to pay his fines and failed to do so. “‘Under Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), if a court determines that a fine or restitution is the appropriate and adequate penalty for a crime, it may not imprison a person solely because he lacks the resources to pay it. A Bearden hearing as to defendant's ability to pay is required only when a fine is made a condition precedent of probation or probation is about to be revoked for failure to pay a fine.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Hunt v. State, 222 Ga.App. 66, 70(3), 473 S.E.2d 157 (1996). Simpson's probation was not conditioned upon his fine first being paid; therefore, the only issue which remains is whether the trial court improperly revoked his probation for failure to pay the fine without a hearing. The record shows, however, that prior to Simpson's revocation hearing, the trial court asked Simpson to submit information regarding his financial status. In response, Simpson submitted only incomplete records to support his claim of indigence. And, contrary to Simpson's contention, he did have the opportunity to present evidence regarding his ability to pay at the revocation hearing. Based on the evidence and testimony which it did have, the trial court found that Simpson was a signatory on three different bank accounts and that he was solely responsible for payments on a vehicle costing more than the amount of his fines. Accordingly, the trial court properly