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found, after hearing evidence, that Simpson had the ability to pay his fines, and the trial court did not err in revoking Simpson's probation thereafter.” Chatman v. Findley, 274 Ga. 54, 548 S.E.2d 5 (June 4, 2001). Trial court provided for probation on the condition that defendant pay restitution in weekly installments. In 1996, the trial court revoked 30 days of the probation when defendant failed to make timely payments. In 1998, the court revoked the entire balance for several reasons, including defendant’s repeated failure to pay restitution. Held: OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c) “authorizes the revocation of the entirety of a probated sentence in those limited instances when the probationer has a prior revocation based on the violation of a special condition or when the special condition violated by the probationer consists of the failure to make court-ordered payments of restitution, reparation, costs or fines.” In the instance of a prior revocation, the special condition now violated must be a “new special condition imposed in [the] previous revocation proceeding or any original condition reimposed therein.” Court-ordered payments do not have to be reimposed, nor does there have to be a previous violation for the balance of probation to be revoked. Overrules Glover (July 10, 2000), below, to the extent inconsistent. See also Williams v. Ayers , 276 Ga. 130, 577 S.E.2d 767 (January 27, 2003). Cheatwood v. State, 248 Ga.App. 617, 548 S.E.2d 384 (March 14, 2001). Probation revocation affirmed. Expert evidence was sufficient to authorize trial court’s finding that the Roche Ontrack TesTstik drug test has “reached a scientific stage of … verifiable certainty,” and thus admissible as evidence that defendant tested positive for marijuana. Accord, Grinstead v. State , 269 Ga.App. 820, 605 S.E.2d 417 (October 1, 2004); Mann v. State , 285 Ga.App. 39, 645 S.E.2d 573 (April 12, 2007); Gaddis (June 20, 2011), above (properly admitted based on expert testimony and judicial notice of another court’s decision). Johnson v. Boyington, 273 Ga. 420, 541 S.E.2d 355 (January 22, 2001). Trial court used boilerplate revocation orders to revoke the balance of defendant’s four probated sentences after he was convicted of felony robbery. Defendant claimed that he was denied due process because the boilerplate orders weren’t satisfactory written statements describing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking parole per Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and State v. Brinson , 248 Ga. 380 (1981). Held: boilerplate orders are sufficient when accompanied by a petition for probation revocation and a full hearing on the petition that places “the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole” on record. Together they “enable both the appellate courts and [defendant] to ‘ascertain the basis for revocation of the defendant’s probation[; thus,] it was unnecessary for the trial court to commit [its] findings to a separate piece of paper,’ when doing so would essentially be an exercise in redundancy.” Lombardo v. State, 244 Ga.App. 885, 537 S.E.2d 143 (July 10, 2000). Trial court could not revoke probation for violation committed prior to commencement of probationary period – here, failing to report to serve portion of sentence under confinement. OCGA § 17-10-1(a) has since been amended; see Huckeba (November 27, 2002), above. Glover v. State, 272 Ga. 639, 533 S.E.2d 374 (July 10, 2000). Reversing 239 Ga.App. 155, 521 S.E.2d 84 (1999) and trial court’s revocation of ten years’ probation. Defendant was on probation for child molestation and related offenses; he violated conditions prohibiting contact with children. Held, OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c) limits probation revocation to two years, except upon violation of special conditions imposed under that section. Carley, writing for Hunstein and Thompson, dissents; noting that there are no probation conditions imposed pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1, dissent would read “this code section in OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c) to mean “sections of this Code.” Majority, however, holds that “what is paramount is that a penal statute must always be interpreted strictly against the State and in favor of human liberty.” This case prompted the revision of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 at the 2001 legislative session; overruled to the extent inconsistent with Chatman (June 4, 2001), above. Bliss v. State , 244 Ga.App. 160, 535 S.E.2d 251 (May 24, 2000). Whole court opinion. On petition to revoke defendant’s first offender status and probation, trial court erred in holding “that it had no discretion in the matter and that it was obliged to adjudicate him guilty and sentence him as a felon.” Disapproving contrary dicta in Mohammed v. State , 226 Ga.App. 387, 486 S.E.2d 652 (1997). “Depending on the severity of the crime committed and all the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court has discretion to determine if it is appropriate to revoke first offender status, enter an adjudication of guilt, and resentence on the underlying offense. That determination should include a consideration of whether the offense concerns the public interest or affects the rights of third persons.” Bowen v. State, 242 Ga.App. 631, 531 S.E.2d 104 (March 8, 2000). Trial court erred in revoking defendant’s probation,