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based on positive result on Roche Abuscreen Ontrak test; State failed to lay foundation for the scientific test. “‘A review of the decisions of this court, our Supreme Court and the courts of other states reveals no decision in which the “ontrack system” has been discussed as a reliable method of drug detection,’” quoting Hubbard v. State, 207 Ga.App. 703, 429 S.E.2d 123 (1993); also citing Kendrick v. State, 240 Ga.App. 530, 532(2), 523 S.E.2d 414 (1999) (physical precedent only). But see Gaddis (June 20, 2011), above. Merneigh v. State, 271 Ga. 883, 525 S.E.2d 362 (January 18, 2000). Probation revocation reversed; first revocation made no mention that any part of sentence would remain upon release. Trial court revoked two years of defendant’s 20 year probated sentence in 1991. After serving that time, State again sought to revoke defendant’s probation. 1. “In 1976, we construed OCGA § 42-8-34(g) in conjunction with former OCGA § 17-10-1(a), and held that ‘ a trial judge can revoke a probated sentence that is to begin at a future date.’ Parrish v. Ault, 237 Ga. 401, 402, 228 S.E.2d 808 (1976). The statutory language upon which Parrish relied remained unchanged until after entry of the trial court's 1991 probation revocation order. See Ga. L.1992, pp. 3221, 3223, 3224-3225, § 1; OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(5)(A).” 2. “Nothing in [the 1991] order limits the revocation to only one of the counts in Case No. CR86-758 or excludes the future probated sentence for the theft. Indeed, the language of the order is comprehensive, revoking the ‘probation provisions’ and imposing two years incarceration by reference to the case number, without distinguishing between the burglary and the theft counts. Therefore, the trial court apparently intended for its 1991 order to apply to both offenses for which Merneigh had received probated sentences. See Fulp v. State, 217 Ga.App. 603, 604-605, 458 S.E.2d 395 (1995). … ‘There is no indication in the [two-year] sentence that any portion of [Merneigh's] probation was to be reinstated upon his release. Consequently, that sentence was fully satisfied when [he] was released from jail ....’ Hulen v. State, [207 Ga.App. 465, 466(1), 428 S.E.2d 405 (1993)]. Thus, the trial court's later attempt to revoke part of the probated sentence for theft was a nullity.” Parks v. McClung, 271 Ga. 795, 524 S.E.2d 718 (November 23, 1999). Defendant’s conditional, probated sentence cannot be revoked, whether for felony or misdemeanor, if defendant was denied the right to counsel when he was placed on probation. Overruled on other grounds, Barnes v. State , 275 Ga. 499, 570 S.E.2d 277 (September 23, 2002). Thompson v. State, 240 Ga.App. 198, 523 S.E.2d 53 (September 29, 1999). Trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss probation warrant; prior order revoking probation and sentencing defendant to detention center made no mention of reinstating defendant’s probation upon completion of that program, nor was an order reinstating probation entered upon defendant’s release from detention center. “A ‘[d]efendant must be given the benefit of the doubt as to the effect of the sentence. In other words, the ambiguous sentence must be given the construction which favors the liberty of the individual.’ (Citation omitted.) Thomason v. State, 199 Ga.App. 875, 876(2), 406 S.E.2d 528 (1991). Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, we are required to give Thompson the benefit of the doubt. Thus, the sentence must be construed as sentencing Thompson to completion of the Detention Center Program in lieu of probation, and the trial court abused its discretion by denying Thompson's motion. State v. Jones, 196 Ga.App. 896, 397 S.E.2d 209 (1990).” Overby v. State, 237 Ga.App. 730, 516 S.E.2d 585 (April 22, 1999). Judgment revoking defendant’s probation reversed; officer’s hearsay testimony that defendant’s sister accused defendant of battering her was insufficient to support revocation . “‘ Hearsay evidence has no probative value and is inadmissible in a probation revocation proceeding. [Cit.] “Thus, such evidence is incapable of supporting a trial court’s findings whether or not objection was lodged.” [Cit.]’ Goodson v. State, 213 Ga.App. 283, 284, 444 S.E.2d 603 (1994), applying the whole court decision in Barnett v. State, 194 Ga.App. 892, 392 S.E.2d 322 (1990).” Accord, Jordan (May 15, 2006), above; Smith v. State , 283 Ga.App. 317, 641 S.E.2d 296 (January 26, 2007) (evidence showed that defendant possessed air compressor, but only hearsay showed that it was stolen). Colvert v. State, 237 Ga.App. 670, 516 S.E.2d 377 (April 14, 1999). Trial court erred in revoking defendant’s probation without considering defendant’s motion to suppress. Citing Amiss v. State, 135 Ga.App. 784, 219 S.E.2d 28 (1975). BOTH COLVERT AND AMISS OVERRULED , see Thackston (May 31, 2011), above. Wells v. State, 236 Ga.App. 607, 512 S.E.2d 711 (February 22, 1999). Trial court erroneously ruled that defendant couldn’t seek review of his probation revocation by motion for new trial. Franklin v. State, 236 Ga.App. 401, 512 S.E.2d 304 (February 10, 1999). Trial court erred in failing to give defendant credit for time served on probation when revoking his first offender status. “In a long line of cases this Court and the