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Supreme Court of Georgia have held that ‘ probation time must be credited to any [subsequent] sentence received, including cases involving first offender probation .’ Stephens v. State, 245 Ga. 835, 837, 268 S.E.2d 330 (1980). See also Burney v. State, 165 Ga.App. 268, 299 S.E.2d 756 (1983); Tallant v. State, 187 Ga.App. 138, 140, 369 S.E.2d 789 (1988); State v. Boyd, 189 Ga.App. 617, 619, 377 S.E.2d 11 (1988). [T]he law specifically requires that the probationer receive credit for time served on probation. See OCGA § 42-8-38(c) (‘[a]fter the hearing, the court may revoke, modify, or continue the probation. If the probation is revoked, the court may order the execution of the sentence originally imposed or of any portion thereof. In such event, the time that the defendant has served under probation shall be considered as time served and shall be deducted from and considered a part of the time he was originally sentenced to serve’).” Accord, McKinney v. State , 240 Ga.App. 812, 525 S.E.2d 395 (November 16, 1999). H. TOLLING OF PROBATION Anderson v. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, S15Q1816, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1583649 (April 18, 2016). Responding to question from U.S. District Court, “as a matter of common law, the mere passage of time does not extinguish an unserved sentence and that the common law principle has not been abrogated by the State-wide Probation Act.” That act, first adopted in 1958, and first addressing sentence tolling in 1958, “did not abrogate the common law principle of tolling with the 1958 amendment; instead, the General Assembly codified the common law principle.” “Under common law, a misdemeanor sentence—even one to be served on probation—is not extinguished by the mere passage of time, and any unserved term of that sentence may be enforced beyond the expiration of that original sentence; this principle, in effect, tolls the expiration of the sentence and concomitantly extends the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.” “We note, however, that the mere failure of a defendant to abide by the terms of a misdemeanor sentence will not alone toll that sentence; instead, tolling requires a judicial determination of a violation sufficiently serious that the defendant was not serving the sentence imposed and of the time when that violation occurred.” Expresses no opinion on the effect of the 2015 amendment on common-law tolling. Thompson dissents, joined by Benham. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (November 24, 2014). In civil case challenging operation of misdemeanor probation system, judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Superior Court properly held that current law makes no provision for tolling of misdemeanor probation. “The administration of probation in this State is governed by Chapter 8 of Title 42 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, the provisions of which are divided into Articles 1 through 9. Article 2,[fn] also known as the ‘State-wide Probation Act,’ sets forth a state-wide probation system created for felony offenders ‘to be administered by the Department of Corrections.’ OCGA § 42–8–22. OCGA § 42–8–30.1 which is located in Article 2, provides: ‘In any county where the chief judge of the superior court, state court, municipal court, probate court, or magistrate court has provided for probation services for such court through agreement with a private corporation, enterprise, or agency or has established a county or municipal probation system for such court pursuant to Code Section 42–8–100, the provisions of this article relating to probation supervision services shall not apply to defendants sentenced in any such court. ’” Superior Court properly determined that this language limited “OCGA § 42–8–36, which allows probationers' sentences to be tolled under certain circumstances,” to the felony probation system operated by the State Department of Corrections. Nor does any other Georgia statute authorize tolling of a misdemeanor sentence. “We agree with the trial court that under current Georgia statutes, the tolling of a misdemeanor probationer's sentence is not permitted. ‘Statutes providing for the suspension of a sentence or the probation of a defendant must be strictly followed.’ Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 396, 67 S.E.2d 124 (1951); Entrekin v. State, 147 Ga.App. 724, 250 S.E.2d 177 (1978). See also Tenney v. State, 194 Ga.App. 820, 392 S.E.2d 294 (1990). … Unlike the statutes governing the supervision of felony probationers by the state DOC, there is no statute governing misdemeanor probationers which specifically authorizes the tolling of a probationer's sentence. Rather, with respect to a misdemeanor conviction, sentences are fixed at one year and once a sentence has been served, jurisdiction over the defendant ceases. See OCGA § 17–10–3; State v. Mills, 268 Ga. 873, 874, 495 S.E.2d 1 (1998) (requiring State to seek probation revocation within the period of probation as required by statute); State v. Mohamed, 203 Ga.App. 21, 416 S.E.2d 358 (1992). … To the extent Georgia courts have recognized OCGA § 42–8–36 as a basis for allowing courts utilizing probation systems established pursuant to OCGA § 42–8–100(g)(1) to toll a probationer's sentence, such analysis was in error and hereby is disapproved. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 292 Ga.App. 540, 664 S.E.2d 890 (2008); Vincent v. State, 271 Ga.App. 138, 608 S.E.2d 748 (2004).” “FN25. About tolling, we decide only that no provision of the Code upon which Sentinel and [co-defendant Sheriff] Roundtree rely in this case, including OCGA § 42– 8–36, authorized the tolling of misdemeanor probation sentences. We have no occasion here to consider whether such tolling might be permissible as a matter of common law, see Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 44 SCt 43, 68 LE2d 247 (1923), and if so, whether the common law in this respect has been abrogated by legislation. The parties have not briefed those questions, and we, therefore, do not decide them.” See also Anderson (March 25, 2016), above.